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[ G.R. No. 136489. July 12, 1999]
DEL NACIA CORPORATION vs. DORIE ABESA NICOLAS.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 12, 1999.
G.R. No. 136489 (Del Nacia Corporation vs. Dorie Abesa Nicolas.)
On February 20, 1988, petitioner Del Nacia Corporation and respondent Dorie Abesa Nicolas entered into a Land Purchase Agreement whereby petitioner agreed to sell to the latter a 10,000 square meter parcel of land for P150,000.00, payable in 120 equal monthly installments. The land, known as Lot 3-B-4, is covered by TCT No. 233702.
On December 3, 1991, however, petitioner cancelled the sale on the ground that respondent had incurred arrearages. On June 17, 1992, it informed respondent that she could claim the cash surrender value of her payments, and on February 3, 1993, it required respondent to vacate the property.
This promised respondent to file a complaint with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for unfair business practices against petitioner. Judgment was later rendered in her favor and petitioner was ordered by the HLURB arbiter to render an accounting to respondent of her amortizations even as respondent was ordered to pay her arrearages within 45 days from receipt of the accounting.
The decision of the arbiter was appealed tot he HLURB Commission and later to the Office of the President, where it is still pending review.
On March 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for the ejectment against respondent in the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. In her answer, respondent alleged, among others, that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
In its decision, dated February 29, 1996, the MTC adopted the decision of the HLURB declaring petitioner's cancellation of the Land Purchase Agreement null and void and ordering respondent to pay the amount of her remaining obligations to petitioner plus the legal rate of interest thereon.
On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, (Branch 11) affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which, on August 31, 1998, set aside the decision of the RTC and MTC for lack of jurisdiction, it held that the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction of the case as the same involves a sale on installments of real property.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari praying that respondent be ordered to vacate the lot in question and pay P10,000.00 a month by way of rent for the use of land starting October 1992 until she vacates the same, or in the alternative, to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price due under the Land Purchase Agreement including interest, penalty, and surcharges; P10,000.00 attorney's fees plus P1,000.00 per appearance; and costs.
In its resolution, dated April 12, 1999, this Court denied the petition "for having been filed outside the reglementary period of 15 days." Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claims that it filed its petition on January 25, 1999 or on the last day of the extension it had asked in a previous motion.
The extension of time within which petitioner could file a petition for review on certiorari was granted by the Court in its resolution of February 10, 1999. The basis therefore for considering that the petition was filed late should have been not that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days but that it was filed outside the period of extension as it was postmarked January 27, 1999 whereas the extension expired on January 25, 1999.
Even so, petitioner contends that its petition was filed within the extended period. Petitioner alleges that its petition was filed through registered mail at the Makati Post Office under Registry Receipt No. 369 on January 25, 1999. However, petitioner has not attached to its motion for reconsideration the registry receipt, or the registry return card, or at least the affidavit of the person who filed the petition to show that the petition was actually filed on that day. It does not explain why the mail matter which contained its petition had a Manila postmark dated January 27, 1999 with the notation "Special delivery Registered Return Card."
Even if the petition was filed on time, the same should nonetheless be denied for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over this case because the property sold is not a subdivision lot or a condominium unit as defined under P.D. No. 957 but a part of an industrial zone. Petitioner claims there "was no partition of a large tract of land primarily for residential purposes and a subsequent offering for sale of the lots to the public."
The contention has no merit. Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the Land Purchase Agreement states as follows:
(16) The property is subject to a perpetual casement of two (2) meters within the lot and adjacent tot he rear and two sides thereof for the purpose of inspection, measurements, relocation survey, laying of monuments of necessary lines of water, gas, electric power, telephones and other public services, and the PURCHASER hereby agrees that the OWNER or its representatives of public utility entities shall have the right to enter the property any time for the construction or repair of the above purposes for which the easements is created and any inconvenience or disturbance thus caused shall not be a cause for the rescission of this agreement or for an action for damages.
(17) The parcel of land subject to this agreement shall be used by the PURCHASER exclusively for residential purposes and he shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or from any other lot belonging to the OWNER.
There would be no need to include a provision for easement for laying of monument and lines for public utilities and for inspection, measurement, and relocation surveys and a prohibition to remove soil, stones, or gravel from other lots belonging to petitioner if the lot sold was not part of a subdivision project.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit.
The notice of change of firm of counsel for petitioner to "Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices" in view of the acceptance and assumption to public office as Secretary of the Department of Agriculture of Atty. Edgardo J. Angara and his withdrawal as partner of the law firm is noted.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
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