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[ G.R. No. 120575. March 8, 1999]

DRA. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, vs. CA, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 8, 1999.

G.R. No. 120575 (Dra. Olivia S. Pascual, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Don Andres Pascual and as Executrix of the testate estate of the late Do�a Adela S. Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, Judge Manuel S. Padolina, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162, Deputy Sheriff Carlos G. Maog, and Atty. Jesus I. Santos.)

Before us are (1) petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 15, 1999, and (2) intervenors' similar motion, filed on January 28, 1999, both praying for the reversal of this Court's Decision promulgated on December 16, 1998.

The case at bar originated from petitioner's action to annul the Decision dated January 19, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 23, presided by Judge Manuel Padolina, in SP. No. 7554, granting inter alia attorney's fees [to] Atty. Jesus Santos equivalent to 15% of the � share of the estate of Do�a Adela S. Pascual." Respondent Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 7, 1995, dismissed said petition, declaring that the trial court had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and that it has accorded due process of law to petitioner. On Appeal, this Court upheld the appellate court's Decision and likewise denied the motion for intervention.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration basically raises the same questions already passed upon in our Decision. For clarity's sake however, we emphasize that charging the attorney's fees to the hereditary share of Do�a Adela does not convert the claim into one against the administratix of the estate of Do�a Andres. Not only was the award made in SP. No. 7554, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Late Don Andres Pascual," but the � share of Do�a Adela, to which the claim was charged, is actually part of the intestate estate of Don Andres which is the subject of SP. No. 7554. There is no doubt that the claim was against the estate.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, citing Quirino, v. Grospe (169 SCRA 702, January 30, 1989) which ruled that "[t]he claim for attorney's fees of intervenor Jesus T. David is for services rendered for the benefit of Do�a Carmen Castellvi and not for the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. xxx Such [issue has] to be determined in separate proceedings." It is clear from thus ruling that the trial court would not have jurisdiction if private respondent's services did not benefit the estate of Don Andres. In the present case, the fact that private respondent's services benefited the estate was never disputed at all. Petitioner merely asserted that private respondent's client was Do�a Adela, not Don Andres, which is not fatal to the claim based on Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "[a]n xxx administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the case, management, and settlement of the estate xxx." White v. Enriquez (15 Phil 113, 115 January 27, 1910); Occe�a v. Marquez (60 SCRA 38, 45, September 30, 1974); Sato v. Rallos (12 SCRA 84, 89, September 30, 1964); Escueta v. Sy Juelling (5 Phil 405, 408, December 12, 1905); and even Quirino v. Grospe (at p. 707).

The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Do�a Adela when she moved to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Don Andres. Do�a Adela's demise did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, but triggered the application of Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, requiring the appointment of another administrator. In due course, petitioner moved and was appointed administratrix, making it her duty to oppose the claim at the intestate court, if there were reason to do so.

More than, petitioner lost her right to question the propriety and the amount of the award because she failed to appeal the questioned Decision of the intestate court and allowed it to become final and executory. Further, petitioner chose the remedy of annulment of judgment. Thus, she is bound by its rules, the most fundamental of which is that "[t]he annulment [of judgment] may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." (Sec. 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court; Yba_4ez v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530, 534, March 5, 1993; Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719, 725, July 24, 1990; Arcelona v. Court of Appeal, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, p. 11). In this respect, petitioner miserably failed to demonstrate such grounds. Consequently, she cannot be allowed at this last time to raise any question touching on the merits of the intestate court's decision.

Our Decision was clear that Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court was the applicable rule, as Do�a Adela was merely the administratrix of the estate of Don Andres. The claim was against the estate, not the administratrix. Extinction of a claim under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules occurs only when a defendant dies, therefore, this section is not applicable to the case at bar.

On the other hand, intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration merely repeated their allegation in their Omnibus Motion. It utterly failed to present any argument, much less cite any law or jurisprudence, why their intervention should be allowed.

In view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY both motions for reconsideration with FINALITY for lack of merit. No further pleadings will be entertained.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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