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[ G.R. No. 140155. October 25, 1999]

FIL-ESTATE REALTY CORP. vs. TRINIDAD E. CRISTI

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 25, 1999.

G.R. No. 140155 (Fil-Estate Realty Corporation vs. Trinidad E. Cristi.)

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision rendered by the Office of the President dated October 5, 1998. The assailed decision granted respondent's appeal which in effect reversed the November 21, 1994 decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1991, respondent Trinidad Cristi reserved to purchase three lots from petitioner Fil-Estate Realty Corporation in a subdivision known as Vista Real Classica. For these transactions, respondent paid a total amount of P237,840.00 as downpayment. However, herein petitioner failed to issue official receipts and to execute contracts to sell for the three transactions. Consequently, respondent demanded the refund of the downpayment but petitioner refused, prompting respondent to lodge a complaint before the HLURB.

In its answer, petitioner contended that respondent Cristi had no cause of action against it because petitioner had acted only as an agent or broker vis-�-vis the three lots in question. Petitioner further averred that it was not the owner of the lots.

In settling the main issue of whether or not respondent is entitled to a refund, the HLURB arbiter ruled in favor of respondent (then complainant) and ordered Fil-Estate Corporation to refund respondent the amount of P297,840.00 at 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complain on November 25, 1991.

On appeal, the Board of Commissioners set aside the arbiter's decision and decreed thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the proceedings below is hereby declared NULL and VOID, and the Arbiter a quo's decision dated June 05, 1992 [should be June 4], is hereby SET ASIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, this case is hereby REMANDED to the Arbiter a quo who is directed to conduct proceedings anew and to implead ACL Realty and Development corporation and Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation and [sic] party-respondent.

SO ORDERED.

In explaining its decision, the Board ratiocinated in this wise:

If respondent is indeed a mere agent or broker, and the realty companies are truly the owners, then it would be unjust to direct the former to make refund. Under the law on agency, whenever an agent contracts on behalf of his principal, the principal is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom the agent has contracted especially when the contract involves things belonging to the principal (see Article 1883, second paragraph, New Civil Code). The presence of the aforementioned companies, therefore, is vital to a fair and just determination of the controversy. Consequently, the realty companies are indispensable parties, and their non-inclusion rendered the proceedings below null and void.

On appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the Board was set aside and the decision of the arbiter was reinstated.

The reversal was anchored on the ground that in all transactions between respondent and petitioner, the latter had made no reference whatsoever to give the impression that it was not the owner of the purchased lots. In fact, all payments were made to petitioner. Moreover, even the demands for payment and notices of cancellation also emanated from petitioner without it giving any reference to any principal. Hence, as far as respondent is concerned, petitioner represented itself to be the principal or owner of the three lots. Hence, petitioner cannot, without the consent of respondent, pass to a third party whatever liabilities or obligations petitioner may have under their agreement. Petitioner's subsequent admission that it does not own the lots constitutes fraud and substantial breach of contract which entitles respondent to demand rescission of the contract as well as refund for whatever amount it had paid.

Hence, the instant petition.

At the outset, it must be noted that the petition was filed directly with this Court in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3 (Rule Governing Appeal from Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals).

It is basic legal truism that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction.

But more importantly, we perceive no error in the action of the Office of the President. Its decision is founded on solid legal grounds.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied due course.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

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