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[ G.R. No. 142130. April 5, 2000]
NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., et al. vs. HON. FIDEL P. PURISIMA, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated
APR 5, 2000.G.R. No. 142130 (Neugene Marketing, Inc. Leoncio Tan, et al., vs. Hon. Fidel P. Purisima, et al.)
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the decision dated February 18, 1999 of the Third Division of the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 112941, Neugene Marketing, Inc. et al. vs. CA, et al.) which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals which in turn reversed that of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Declared thus the Court:
In light of the foregoing and after a careful examination of the evidence on record, and a judicious study of the provisions of law and jurisprudence in point, we are with the Court of Appeals on the finding and conclusion that the certificates of stock of the private respondents were stolen and therefore not validly transferred, and the transfer of stock relied upon by petitioners were fraudulently recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of NEUGENE under the column "Certificates Cancelled."
Although well-established is the rule that the appellate court will not generally disturb the factual findings by the trial court for the reason that the trial court heard the testimonies of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial and was afforded the singular chance to assess the probative value of the evidence. The rules does not apply where, as in this case, the SEC overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered would affect the result of the case (Tomas vs. CA, 185 SCRA 627 [1990]; People vs. Alforte, 219 SCRA 458 [1993]).
(pp. 43-44, Rollo.)
Petitioners have impleaded as respondents in the instant petition all the justices of the Court's Third Division at the time of the promulgation of the decision and seek the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against the implementation of the now final and executory decision dated February 18, 1999 in G.R. No. 112941.
The instant petition is a desperate attempt to circumvent the proscription against a second motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 56 makes Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court applicable to cases filed before the Supreme Court. Thus,
Sec. Second motion for reconsideration.- No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
The prohibition against the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is justified by public policy which demands that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at some definitive date fixed by law (Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187 [1997])
Furthermore injunction cannot be issued by the Court against itself. It would be the height of absurdity to expect the Court, or any court for that matter, to issue a provisional or preliminary remedy against itself. The Court is asked to stand as the judge and the respondent at one and the same instance. Surely, no one can be a judge in his own acts without being charged with incompetence, bias, and partiality. Insisting on this would result in the violation of the very fundamental principles of judicial due process of law. Petitions such as this must never be allowed to prosper (En Banc Resolution, Joel G. Miranda vs. Supreme Court, En Banc, The Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, G.R. No. 140130 [October 26, 1999]).
Clearly, the instant petition is nothing but a last ditch effort to delay execution of the judgment in G.R. No. 112941.
WHEREFORE
, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
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