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[ G.R. No. 139525. January 24, 2000]

CHINA BANKING CORP. vs. CA, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 24 2000.

G.R. No. 139525 (China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)

On October 4, 1999, we denied the instant petition for review for having been filed beyond the reglementary period and for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error to warrant the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 15, 1999, which we denied with finality on November 15, 1999, upon a finding that there is o compelling reason to warrant a modification of our earlier resolution. Before us now is petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration filed on December 15, 1999. In the Second Motion, petitioner invokes the recent case of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. V. Hon Herminio I. Benito (G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999), wherein we held that service of summons on the branch manager at the branch office of defendant corporation was improper, and the trial court did nor acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Prior to the filing of the instant petition, petitioner filed on August 9, 1999 a motion for extension of time to file petition for review. The motion for extension stated that petitioner received the denial by the Court of Appeals of its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 1999; hence it had until August 7, 1999 to file a petition for review. Inasmuch as August 7, 1999 fell on a Saturday, petitioner filed the motion for extension the following Monday, August 9, 1999. We granted petitioner an extension of thirty (30) days, "counted from the expiration of the reglementary period," in a Resolution dated September 13, 1999.

Petitioner prays in its motion for extension that the thirty-day additional period be counted from August 9, 1999 to September 8, 1999. Considering the tenor of our Resolution of September 13, 1999, however, it is clear that the thirty-day extension we granted should be reckoned from August 7, 1999, this being the date of expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary period. It was error for petitioner to assume that its thirty-day period should be counted from August 9, 1999. Petitioner had, thus only until September 6, 1999 to file the petition. Therefore, petition for review filed on September 8, 1999 was two days late.

When a party fails to observe very elementary ruled of procedure, we cannot exculpate it from its effects. We cannot open the door to situations where we will be asked to decide when to obey and when to ignore the rules, for this will undermine the stability of the judicial process (Cf: Annie Tan v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 755, at 768 [1998]). Especially, the prescribed period for appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional (Peftok Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 293 SCRA 507, at 511 [1998]). Based on these considerations, the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.

Further, the second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner without express leave of court. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco (254 SCRA 234, 240-41 [1996]), we have already held that a second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinary persuasive reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained.

There are also no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed orders of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss by the trial court was an interlocutory order. There are remedies available to petitioner, as the case filed against it will still have to be tried by the lower court.

ACCORDINGLY, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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