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[ G.R. No. 140627. January 19, 2000]

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 17, 2000.

G.R. No. 140627 (Finlay Millar Timber Co., Inc. vs. Pacita Quidlat.)

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to declare null and void the Resolutions dated September 10, 1999 and October 28, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54735.

From the petition and its annexes, the following are the antecedent facts: Petitioner is a company engaged in the wood and timber industry operating in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. On March 29, 1995, respondent Pacita Quidlat, the Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte issued a warrant of levy dated March 1, 1995 against petitioner upon a claim for delinquencies on real estate taxes covering the period for prohibition with prayer for issuance of preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte and docketed as Civil Case No. 07-329. The trial court issued a restraining order directing respondent Quidlat and those acting on her behalf to cease and desist from enforcing and implementing the said warrant of levy. On October 14, 1998, the trial court issued an order that should there be no arrangement for the payment of taxes, the court will issue an order allowing the sheriff to sell the properties of petitioner. From the said order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court allegedly did not resolve the said motion. On April 20, 1999, the trial court issued an order lifting the injunction and authorized the sheriff to enter and seize petitioner's properties sufficient to satisfy the payment of real estate taxes. Copy of said order was allegedly received by petitioner on April 26, 1999.1 Paragraph 15, p. 7 of the Petition, p. 14, Rollo. On April 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto,2 Paragraph 16, ibid. which motion was denied in the Order of June 17, 1999. Said order was received by petitioner on July 7, 1999.3 Paragraph 17, ibid. Hence, a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 was filed with the Court of Appeals by petitioner on September 6, 1999, September 5, 1999 being a Sunday.4 Paragraph 22, ibid. On September 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and for petitioner's failure to attach a certified true copy of the Order dated April 20, 1999. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the CA-Resolution dated September 28, 1999.

Hence, the present petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

On the first issue, petitioner alleges that under Rule 65, there is no defined mode of computing the 60-day period to file a petition as Section 4 thereof only provides that the petition shall be filed from notice of judgment, order or resolution; there is allegedly no mention of how a motion for reconsideration will affect or disturb the period. Petitioner further avers that the 60-day period is to be counted from receipt of the order of denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner further invokes the ruling in the cases of De la Paz vs. Panis (254 SCRA 242), PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. NLRC (260 SCRA 768), Santiago vs. Court of Appeals (285 SCRA 21) that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed within a reasonable period from the time the petitioner received notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

It is regrettable that counsel did not take greater pains in ascertaining the applicable rule. Circular No. 39-98,5 Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated July 21, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803 - Re: Correction of Clerical Errors in and Adoption of Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amending, among others, Section 4 of Rule 65. which took effect on September 1, 19986 Noel F. Ciacico vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 137113, August 30, 1999 (En Banc). states:

Petitioner allegedly received on April 26, 1999 the copy of the assailed order of April 20, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration thereto was filed on April 29, 1999. Applying the rule on computation of time under Rule 22,7 SEC. 1. How to compute time. - In computing any period prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performed included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

SEC. 2. Effect of interruption. - Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period. two (2) days were already consumed of the 60-day prescriptive period to file the petition. When petitioner received on July 7, 1999 the order denying the motion for reconsideration, petitioner had fifty-eight (58) days remaining within which to file a petition or until September 3, 1999, a Friday. He filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals only on September 6, 1999.

Counsel for petitioner is to be reminded that it is his bounden duty as lawyer in active practice to keep abreast with changes in the law as well as of decision of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decision (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.8 De Roy vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757 (1988).

Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, is a rigid and stern implementation of procedural requirement, underscored the rule of technicality refusing flexibility in the interest of substantial justice. Petitioner further alleges that although the Order of April 20, 1999 was not certified, the Order of June 17, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration was certified. Petitioner is of the view that since the filing of the petition for certiorari is reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the said order is more important and as such, the same is to be certified. Moreover, petitioner attached a certified true copy of the Order of April 20, 1999 when it filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution, hence, there was substantial compliance.

Section 1, of Rule 65 provides that "(T)he petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46." The 1988 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA) likewise provides that the petition "be accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers." It should be stressed that in the resolution dated October 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals noted that the copy of the assailed RTC-Order of April 20, 1999 which was appended to the motion for reconsideration was only a mere photocopy of a certified true copy.9 pp. 42-43, Rollo.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in issuing the assailed resolutions dated September 10, 1999 and October 28, 1999.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.