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[G.R. No. 132929. July 3, 2000]

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. CTA, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 3 2000.

G.R. No. 132929 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals and Philippine Casino Operators Association.)

Private respondents moves for a reconsideration of the decision in this case.

First. Private respondent contends that service of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals on lawyers of the Bureau of Customs was valid and binding for the purpose of computing the period for the filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration because at that time, they had ceased to be under the supervision and control of the Office of the Solicitor General. Private respondent cites the fact that the latest letter of deputation issued by the Solicitor General, dated September 11, 1991, was only for one year and there is no proof that such authority has ever been renewed. Consequently, it is contended, the Bureau of Customs lawyers became independent counsels of petitioner and service of the CTA decision on them was binding on the Solicitor General. ¹ Motion For Reconsideration, pp. 3-5; Supplement to Motion For Reconsideration, pp. 4-7; Rollo, pp. 226-228, 248-251.

The contention has no merit. The Office of the Solicitor General is the legal counsel of the entire government, ² Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, �35.excepting only such offices as are specified by law. Even when it deputizes lawyers in other government agencies to represent it, the lawyers concerned nonetheless act under the supervision and control of the OSG. ³ Id ., �35(8).If, as private respondent claims, the authority of the government lawyers had already expired on May 30, 1997, when a copy of the decision of the CTA was served on them, then al the more that service should have been made on the OSG. In contending that upon the expiration of their authority the lawyers at the Bureau of Customs became "independent counsels" of petitioner, private respondent is turning the rule on its head. For if the lawyers at the Bureau of Customs ceased to be representatives of the OSG, service of the decision on them cannot be binding on the OSG, much less on the Bureau of Customs.

As the OSG received its copy of the decision on June 5, 1997, the motion for reconsideration filed by it on June 20, 1997, fifteen days later, was filed on time, and it was for the CTA to hold that its decision had become final.

Second. Private respondent contends that by granting the petition, the Court, in effect, allowed petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as a substitute for an appeal which he had lost. Private respondent contends that when petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on September 30, 1997, 43 days had elapsed since the OSG received a copy on August 18, 1997 of the resolution of the CTA denying reconsideration of its decision. ⁴ Motion For Reconsideration, pp. 5-9; Supplement to Motion For Reconsideration, pp. 7-15; Rollo, pp. 228-232, 251-259.

The contention has likewise no merit. In its resolution of August 14, 1997, the CTA did not only deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration but it also grated private respondent's Motion for Entry of Judgment on the ground that, counted from the date of the receipt on May 30, 1997 of its decision by the lawyers at the Bureau of Customs, petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed on June 20, 1997, was filed late, even though the OSG received its copy only on June 5, 1997. ⁵ Petition, Annex J, p. 5; Rollo, p. 108.Petitioner, therefore, had no other plain, speedy nor adequate remedy except to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. That the actual entry of the judgment was effected later, i.e., on September 5, 1997, does not detract from the fact that at the time petitioner received the resolution of the CTA on August 18, 1997, his only recourse was to file a petition for certiorari. This he did within the60-day period petition to the question of whether his motion for reconsideration was filed late. Considering, however, that the Court of Appeals affirmed not only the order of August 14, 1997 but also the decision of May 28, 1997 of the CTA, this Court had to review the merits of the case as well in the instant petition.

Third. Private respondent next contends that the Court erred in relying on the documents ⁶ Records, pp. 90, 229, 328; Exh. JJ, M & ZZ. and portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes ⁷ TSN, p. 15, Sept. 22, 1989.contained in the records of the proceedings before the Collector of Customs to establish fraud on its part. It is contended that these were not marked, identified and offered as evidence during the proceedings at the CTA as required by Rule 132, �34. ⁸ Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 15-17; Rollo, pp. 259-261.

The contention also has no merit. The documents and transcript of stenographic notes in question were formally offered during the hearings conducted by the Collector of Customs, throughout which private respondent was represented by present counsel. As such, they form part of the records of the case which this Court can properly consider. The proceedings conducted by the Collector of Customs and do not have the effect of vacating the records of the prior proceedings. In addition, the Court also cited documents ⁹ Petitioner's Formal Offer of Evidence, Exhs. II, GG to CCC; CTA Rollo, pp. 131-153.presented by private respondent itself during the proceedings in the CTA to show that there was fraud in the importation of the seized articles, a fact which private respondent does not refute in its present motions.

Fourth. Private respondent further claims that the fact that it had imported articles tax-free for a period of nearly three years represents official interpretation of P.D. No. 1067-B, as amended, by the then Ministry of Finance and Commissioner of Customs and should thus be accorded respect. As regards this issue, suffice it to state that, as explained in the decision, private respondent was precisely able to procure the release of the imported articles tax-free by virtue of its misrepresentations that they were imported by PAGCOR, and not by PCOC. If private respondent believed that it was exempted from paying the taxes due thereon, it did not have to resort to such a fraudulent scheme.

The other points raised by private respondent with regard to the interpretation of P.D. No. 1067-B, �4(1), as amended, need not be discussed as they have been amply resolved in the decision in this case, and anything that can be said to dispose of them will simply be a repetition.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DENY with finality private respondent's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court

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