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[ G.R. No. 142002. July 31, 2000]
JEROLAN TRUCKING, et al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 31 2000.
G.R. No. 142002 (Jerolan Trucking/Orlando Uy vs. Court of Appeals, National Labor Relations Commission, et al.)
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, dated September 13, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 525891 Jerolam Trucking/Orlando Uy, Petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., Respondents. which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Supreme Court, Third Division, dated September 14, 1998 in G.R. No. 132176.2 Ibid .
The case arose from several complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, cost of living allowance, night shift differentials, service incentive leave and other benefits filed by private respondents against petitioner. On the basis of the position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints against petitioner for lack of merit.3 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case Nos. 8-0332-95, 8-0231-95-A, 8-0231-95-B, 8-0231-95-C and 8-0231-95-D, dated May 30, 1996, Rollo, pp. 15-20.
On appeal, the aforementioned decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission which held that private respondents were illegally dismissed and were therefore entitled to reinstatement and backwages, as well as payment of their 13th month pay.4 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0237-97, dated December 10, 1997, Id. At 21-31.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. However, in a Resolution, dated September 14, 1998, we dismissed the same for lack of merit, ruling thus:
x x x The challenged decision of the Commission, to the effect essentially that the private respondents are petitioner's employees and not independent contractors hired "as needed", is based on the parties' position papers and the evidence on record which was subjected to careful evaluation. This Court perceives no grave abuse of discretion on the Commission's part in arriving at this conclusion; indeed, the same is supported by substantial evidence. There is otherwise no special and important reason for the exercise by this Court of its discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction in this case.
PETITION DISMISSED. NO COSTS. 5 Resolution of the Supreme Court, Third Division in G.R. No. 132176, dated September 14, 1998, Id., at 32-33.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 Id., at 34-44. of the said Resolution which we referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action7 Resolution of the Supreme Court, Third Division, dated February 24, 1999, Id., at 45. pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor Relations Commission. 8 295 SCRA 494 (1998).
Finding no cogent reason to reconsider this Court's Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution, dated September 13, 1999.9 Rollo, pp. 46-47.
Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order setting the pre-execution conference for February 16, 2000.10 Id., at 48.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolution, since the same did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the constitution. Petitioner further claims that the appellate court failed to consider the excerpts of the testimonies of private respondents as cited in the motion for reconsideration which show that they were not employees of the company.11 Petition, Id., at 7-10.
The Courts finds no merit in the petition.
In the first place, the petition was filed out of time. Assuming that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper remedy, the petition was filed way beyond the period granted under the Rules. Contrary to petitioner's claim that it learned of the appellate court's Resolution only on February 10, 2000 when it received the notice of entry of judgment, the records show that petitioner's counsel, Atty. Felicisimo Chavez Ilagan, received the same on September 21, 1999, the date indicated in the registry receipt returned to the appellate court.12 see Notice of Resolution with attached Registry Receipt, Id., at 73.
Atty. Ilagan's receipt thereof is binding on petitioner since it is established doctrine that when a party is represented by counsel, service of pleadings and notices shall be made upon his counsel or one of them.13 see Rule 13, Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, 14 261 SCRA 309 (1996), per Puno, J. we reiterated the foregoing rule thus:
x x x This is in accord with our case law that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform them of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of their right to appeal will not justify setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face. xxx
x x x 15 Id ., at 317-318, citing Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996), Palanca vs. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819 (1968), Duran V. Pagarigan, 106 Phil. 907 (1960).
Hence, the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should have been accomplished within sixty (60) days from September 21, 1999.16 see Rule 65, Sec. 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Clearly, the sixty-day period had already lapsed when the petition was filed on March 9, 2000.17 Rollo , p. 1.
Second, the instant petition is not the appropriate remedy to seek the reversal of the assailed Resolution. Rule 65 clearly states that a petition for certiorari may be filed when the remedy of appeal is not available. Petitioner could have appealed the appellate court's Resolution to this Court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 within 15 days from its receipt of the same on September 21, 1999, since this remedy was available to petitioner under the Rules. Since its failure to appeal was due to its own negligence, petitioner cannot now substitute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for its lost remedy of appeal.18 People vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 418, 427 (1998), per Davide, J.; Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 (1998).
There is, likewise, no merit in the allegation that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. We have already explained in several cases that the constitutional mandate that decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law forming the basis therefor does not apply to minute resolutions.19 Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1, 5-6 (1990; Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 127, 132-133 (1992), per Cruz J.; Nunal vs. Commission on Audit, 169 SCRA 356, 362-363 (1987), per Melencio-Herrera, J.; Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160, 165 (1987), per Paras, J.; see Dabulo vs. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA 747, 754-755 (1993), per Cruz, J.
As this Court held in Nunal vs. Commission on Audit. 20 supra Note 19.
x x x This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.
Our ruling in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 21 Supra Note 19. sufficiently explains the rule with regard to minute resolutions:
The Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. xxx
x x x
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distincly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review x x x shall be refused due course x x x without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
It must be noted that the assailed Resolution was issued in connection with a motion for reconsideration of a Minute Resolution of this Court which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated December 10, 1997. The Minute Resolution issued by this Court in G.R. No. 132176 already sufficiently discussed the reason for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari earlier filed by petitioner. The appellate court's Resolution merely denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the same, and likewise stated that it was standing by this Court's resolution dismissing the petition and the reasons cited therein. Clearly, the assailed Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration which is, as stated by this Court in its Minute Resolution dated September 14, 1998, for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Asst. Clerk of Court
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