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[G.R. No. 142361. July 12, 2000]
SPS. MANALILI vs. SPS. DE LEON
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 12 2000.
G.R. No. 142361 (Spouses. Papa and Lolita Manalili vs. Spouses. Arsenio and Gliceria de Leon.)
On August 27, 1997, respondents
filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Las Piñas City. They alleged that to prevent the foreclosure of
their property which had been mortgaged to one Rey Camua in the amount of
P900,000.00, petitioners sought the help of respondents by advancing the money;
that upon release of the mortgage, petitioners agreed to execute a deed of sale
in favor of respondents for the purpose of "applying a loan in a banking
institution, in a much higher loanable amount, with the interest and principal
to be paid by the petitioners"; that respondents secured a loan in their
name in the amount of P1,400,000.00 from China Banking Corporation and
executed a promissory note; that the amounts of commission due the petitioners
were applied by the respondents to the preceding monthly payments from October
to December 1996 and January 1997; that petitioners were supposed to pay
respondents P25,000.00 for six consecutive months from February 1997 to
August 1997, including the interests due thereon; that petitioners paid only
the first monthly installment as a result of which respondents were compelled
to pay the monthly amortizations due, including the interests, to China Banking
Corporation; that as petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of the
agreement requiring them to pay respondents the six consecutive monthly
payments, the deed of sale earlier executed became valid and binding between
them pursuant to the agreement; and, that demands to vacate and to pay the
obligation due were made, but petitioners failed and refused to comply.
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate the premises and pay
rental in the amount of P10,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of
the property until actually vacated and turned over to respondents.
Petitioners alleged in their defense that the deed of sale which they executed in favor of respondents was actually an equitable mortgage and that the purported sum of P250,000.00 paid by respondents was not the real value of the subject property. They averred that being mortgagees, respondents had no right to eject them from the premises.
It appears that on the same day that petitioners executed a deed of sale in favor of respondents, they likewise signed an agreement which provided, among other things, as follows:
(f) That The Second Party [herein respondents] has no interest whatsoever in acquiring the property being sold by the First Party [herein petitioners] it being understood further that the only purpose of the Deed of Sale of the property executed by the First Party in favor of the Second Party is to secure a much higher loan from the bank of the Second Party and in order that the First Party shall now be able to settle the obligation of the First Party to the Second Party, and that the aforesaid Deed of Sale shall become null and void and without force and effect should the First Party have fully complied with the terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement, however, in thc event the First Party failed to pay the six (6) consecutive monthly payments, the Deed of Sale over the property executed between the First Party and the Second Party shall be honored and binding upon the said parties.
On December 10, 1997, the MeTC rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the issue of ownership had been raised by petitioners. On appeal, the RTC affirmed. On petition for review, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the MeTC for trial on the merits.
Petitioners now seek reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals claiming that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case because the same involved the right of ownership over the property.
The petition has no merit.
First. The records show that petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 9, 2000 on March 16. 2000, hence, the last day to file the petition for review on certiorari was on March 31, 2000. In the resolution dated May 20, 2000, the Court granted petitioners a 30-day extension expiring on April 30, 2000. Since April 30, 2000 was a Sunday and May 1 a holiday, the petition was due on May 2, 2000. However, the petition was actually filed on May 3. 2000, which is one day late.
In a manifestation dated May 4, 2000, petitioners explained that the tardiness was not intended but was due to heavy traffic which is beyond their control. The contention is without merit.
The petition should be dismissed for having been filed late. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The might to appeal is a statutory right. A party who seeks to avail of this right must strictly comply with the statutes or rules. In the absence of meritorious circumstances warranting their relaxation, they must remain inviolable. (Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 587 (1998); Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 484 (1995))
Second. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case. The allegations set forth in the complaint clearly make out a case of ejectment. Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the defendant raises the question of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding provisionally the issue of ownership. A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. Where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract, as in this case, the deed of sale, on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. (Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 133 (1998); Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 34 (1998); Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Semira v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 577 (1994); Buazon v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 182 (1993)).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for having been filed beyond the extended period pursuant to Rule 56, �5(a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court�
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