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[A.M. No. OCA-IPI-98-533-RTJ. July 19, 2000]

MILDRED GOCOCO-TAN, vs. JUDGE ANDRES B. REYES, JR., et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 19 2000.

A.M. No. OCA-IPI-98-533-RTJ (Mildred Gococo-Tan v. Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, now Associate Justice, Court of Appeals.)

Complainant Mildred Gococo-Tan filed a case for bigamy against her husband Willy Tan. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2282-93-SM, was assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, of which respondent (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Andres Reyes, Jr. was the presiding judge.

In a decision, dated June 28, 1996, but promulgated on December 12, 1996, Judge Reyes found the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to "suffer a prison term of prision correccional in its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months."

Based on the penalty thus imposed, accused-appellant applied for probation on December 23, 1996.

With the conformity of the public prosecutor, complainant opposed the application for probation of her husband and moved for the modification of the penalty imposed on him. The same was, however, denied by Judge Reyes. In his resolution, dated August 5, 1997, Judge Reyes stated

It should be noted that the instant motion was filed on January 21, 1997. . . after the accused has filed application for probation. In fact, this Court, in its Order, dared January 8, 1997, has given due course to the said application for probation but has withheld the release of the said Order pending the resolution of the instant motion filed by the prosecution.

The foregoing premises considered, this Court has no alternative but to deny the motion filed by the prosecution. As stated earlier, it is clear that the Decision in this case had become final long before the prosecution filed its motion. We agree with the counsel for the accused that even before the lapse of the fifteen-day period, the said Decision became final when the accused opted to avail of the benefit of probation when he filed his application for probation.

With respect to the opposition interposed by the prosecution to the application for probation filed by the accused, this Court also finds no reason to deny the said application considering that the penalty imposed is within the coverage of the Probation Law and it is not disputed that the accused is a first[time] offender.

WHEREFORE, the MOTION TO MODIFY PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE DECISION AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR PROBATION, filed by the Private Prosecutor, is hereby DENIED.

On September 13, 1997, complainant moved for a reconsideration. Then on April 20, 1998, she filed the instant complaint against Judge Reyes "for knowingly rendering an unjust decision or sentence, undue delay in resolving a motion, and for manifest partiality to the accused."

Complainant alleged that it took Judge Reyes more than three years from the time of the filing on August 9, 1993 of the information against her husband, Willy Tan, and six months from the date of the preparation of his decision on June 28, 1996 to promulgate the same on December 12, 1996. The delay, according to her, was caused by Judge Reyes' accommodation of the accused's numerous requests for postponement of promulgation. Moreover, she alleged that the penalty imposed by Judge Reyes was erroneous because under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor; that applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the accused should have been given an indeterminate sentence the minimum of which should be from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, while the maximum term should fall from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium; and that consequently, the accused should have been denied probation, since under the law, those who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years are not entitled to probation.

In his comment, dated August 12, 1998, Judge Reyes denied the changes against him. First, he alleged that his decision was prepared while he was taking medication for his asthma, which affected his nervous system. To aggravate matters, he said, he also had a heavy schedule of continuous trial and several cases to dispose of. These factors contributed to the imposition of an erroneous penalty in the case, but he added that he had corrected the error on February 25, 1998, before the instant complaint had been filed, by granting complainant's motion for reconsideration of his resolution of August 5, 1997 and issuing an amended decision on July 10, 1998. Second, he claimed that the delay in the resolution of the case was caused by postponements sought by the accused, to which complainant never objected. Third, Judge Reyes contended that whether modification of accused-appellant's penalty was still possible after promulgation of the decision was an "extremely difficult" question to resolve because under Rule 120, �7 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judgment of conviction may only be modified upon motion of the accused and, in any case, becomes final the moment the accused applies for probation.

The Office of the Court Administrator, to which this matter had been referred for investigation, report, and recommendation recommended that Judge Reyes be fined in an amount equal to his salary for one month and that he be warned that commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

On January 20, 1999, the Court required Judge Reyes to submit a certified true copy of his order granting complainant's motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 5, 1997 as mentioned in his comment.

After Judge Reyes had submitted a copy of his order, the parties were required to inform the Court whether they were submitting the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings and the records or whether they still wanted a hearing to be held.

What Judge Reyes filed instead was a manifestation stating that complainant had already executed an affidavit of desistance stating that she was no longer interested in further prosecuting the instant complaint. He therefore moved that it be dismissed. On the other hand, complainant confirmed her lack of interest in pursuing this case on the ground that Judge Reyes had already modified the penalty imposed on the accused in Criminal Case No. 2282-93-SM. She believed that Judge Reyes did not act in bad faith and prayed for the dismissal of her complaint.

In view of the foregoing, the Court returned the case to the OCA for re-evaluation.

In a memorandum, dated February 14, 2000, the OCA reiterated its previous recommendation.

A judge cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. (Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88(1998); Santos v. Orlino, 2% SCRA 101 (1998)) A contrary rule would be nothing short of harassment and would make his job unbearable. (Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568 (1998)) Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment implies more than just rendering an erroneous decision. It means maliciously acting in a case to inflict harm on a party. In this case, complainant admits that the error committed by Judge Reyes was an honest mistake, not one made in bad faith. Indeed, there is nothing in the records to suggest that in imposing a lighter penalty on the accused in Criminal Case No. 2282-93-SM, Judge Reyes intended to favor the accused thereby. The Court is inclined to believe that the lapse was due to his heavy caseload and the result of the medication he was then taking. It was a human error even judges are sometimes prone to commit. For no one called upon to try the facts and interpret the law in the administration of justice can claim infallibility. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 (1988))

The record shows that Judge Reyes corrected his error even before the filing of the complaint in this case by reconsidering, on February 25, 1998, his resolution, dated August 5, 1997, and issuing, later on July 10, 1998, an amended decision imposing the proper penalty. It cannot be ascertained from the record whether his action had any effect at all. Complainant has not submitted evidence concerning this. But whatever the effect of the modification of the penalty was, Judge Reyes' readiness to admit error and willingness to correct it should be given credit.

With respect to the delay in the promulgation of the disputed decision, while Judge Reyes' heavy caseload and ill health mitigate his liability, he cannot totally escape blame. He should be reminded that the proper and efficient management of the business of his court is his responsibility. (Abarquez v. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109 (1998)) While it does not appear that the delay was due to malice or bad faith but to the continued absences of the accused and the latter's motions for postponement, Judge Reyes should be reminded that as a judge, he should be in control of the proceedings of a case at all times. Accordingly, he should be given an admonition. (See Gaspar v. Bayhon, 278 SCRA 492 (1997))

Accordingly, the Court RESOLVED to ADMONISH respondent Judge Andres Reyes, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal to observe due care and diligence in the performance of his duties, and he is hereby WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court�

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