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[G.R. No. 141831. June 14, 2000]
SPS. JOYOSA vs. AMBROCIO J. JAVIER, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 14 2000.
G.R. No. 141831 (Spouses Bienvenido Acelajado and Natividad Joyosa vs. Ambrocio J. Javier, Francisco J. Javier, Jose J. Javier, Troadio J. Javier, and Apolonia J. Manzano, and Hon. Court of Appeals.)
The spouses Felipe Javier and Felisa Jamon had six children: Ambrocio, Francisco, Jose, Troadio, Apolonia, and Fidel. Fidel, who predeceased his parents, was survived by his wife Rosa and two sons, Tirso and Adam.
After Fidel's death, the cultivation of the parcel of land located at Ilog-Putol, Siniloan, Laguna, consisting of 1,138 sq. m., was transferred to his heirs. On May 27, 2986, Rosa and Adam executed a Quitclaim, whereby they relinquished their right to the land in favor of Tirso Javier. By virtue of the same, Tirso Javier was issued Tax Declaration No. 8748, series of 1985.
Tirso Javier sold the land to petitioner spouses Bienvenido Acelajado and Natividad Joyosa by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, dated July 15, 1986. Tirso Javier also sold to petitioner spouses by means of another Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, dated April 24, 1977, two other parcels of land located in Mabitac, Laguna. Said parcels of land, covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5154 and 5115 with an area of 7,614 and 5,152 sq. m., respectively, had been transferred to Tirso Javier's name by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 24, 1977, purportedly executed by Felipe Javier in his favor. (Felipe Javier died on July 14, 1987.) The fourth parcel of land involve in this case, with an area of 5,863 sq.m., was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5081 in the name of Tirso as "newly discovered alienable and dispos[able] land" and was sold by him to petitioner spouses on June 4, 1986 by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Alleging that the deeds of sale had been executed to exclude the four parcels of land from the properties of the spouses Felipe and Felisa Javier, the heirs of said spouses, herein respondents, filed a complaint for annulment of deeds, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages, and injunction. The action was brought against Tirso Javier and his wife Marcelina and herein petitioner spouses. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. S-466, was assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, at Siniloan, Laguna.
After a series of pre-trial conferences failed to amicably settle the dispute, trial on the merits proceeded. Petitioner spouses, however, failed to attend the hearings despite due notice to them, prompting the trial court on September 25, 1990 to issue an order allowing respondent heirs to present their evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court. Ex parte hearings were held on March 12, 1991, March 26, 1991, April 10, 1991, April 17, 1991, and October 30, 1991.
On June 2, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment ordering, among others, the cancellation of the tax declarations in the name of Tirso Javier and the reconstitution of the original of the tax declarations in the name of Felipe Javier. The trial court stated:
Let it be stressed that the assertion by defendant Tirso of his tenurial rights over the four (4) parcels of land prohibit[s] in absolute terms an assertion of anything contrary to his fiduciary obligation to the owners of the land. The possibility of conflict of interests such as this is pre-empted in favor of the interest of the landowner under Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord.
.
Tirso Javier mentioned in his Answer that he has a right to sell and encumber these parcels of land as part owner of the share due to his deceased father Fidel. This part of the answer is a justification of the pacto-de-retro sale made in favor of the Acelajados who didn't also file an answer to controvert plaintiffs' claim that the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli is a fictitious contract. Clearly it was a scheme designed by Tirso toplace the properties out of the reach of the plaintiffs. The indication that the said deed of pacto-de-retro was simulated is the date of its execution which significantly coincides with the date of the execution of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan [by Felipe Javier in favor of Tirso Javier], another is the place of notarization which is [the] far flung town of Magdalena. It cast a dubious cloud on the deed.
As serious as the accusation is, the Acelajados did not bother to assail the accusation. The court upholds plaintiffs' submission that the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale is simulated. The High Court rules that when "the apparent contract is not really designed or intended to produce legal effects or in anyway alter the juridical situation of the parties (Vda. de Rodriguez v Rodriguez, L-23002, July 31, 1967, 20)," the contrast should be deemed simulated.
Furthermore, the Acelajados "kept silent as they have no real interest to protect.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
First. Petitioner spouses contend that the September 25, 1990 order of the trial court, allowing respondent heirs to present their evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court, is not authorized under Rule 30, �9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. - The judge of the court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in where the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.
They claim that they were denied due process because they were not notified of the ex parte hearings conducted by the Clerk of Court and thus were not able to cross-examine respondent heirs' witnesses.
Their contentions are without merit.
To begin with, Rule 30,�9 cannot be invoked by petitioners because the order of the trial court authorizing the clerk of court to receive evidence ex parte was issued on September 25, 1990, prior to the effectivity of the present Rules on July 1, 1997. What is more, if in default cases the reception of evidence of the plaintiff can be delegated to the clerk of court, there is no reason why it cannot also be done in any other ex parte hearing. The reason for this is that there can be no possible objection to the presentation of evidence by one party since the other party is not present. To require the judge to perform this function would be without practical value.
Moreover, petitioner spouses never questioned the subject order until the trial court's decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals, when they could have done so by filing a petition for certiorari or moved for a new trial in the trial court.
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals observed:
The records will bear out the fact that in all proceedings of the court, [petitioners] and their counsel were notified but [petitioners] miserably failed to appear. Their former counsel, Atty. Salvador T. Reyes, noticing that he was somewhat abandoned by them, in desperation lamented the actuations of his clients, thus, on August 16, 1990, he filed his "Motion to Withdraw As Counsel." Clearly, [petitioners] were not deprived of due process. They may have lost their right to confront [respondents'] witnesses and to present evidence in their favor but they were not denied their day in court. It must be stressed that what due process abhors is not the lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (People vs. Aquino, 199 SCRA 610; Lindo vs. Commission on Election, 194 SCRA 25). It's a pity that [petitioners] failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, their plea that they were denied due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from the court.
Second. Petitioner spouses also contend that Tirso Javier's admission in his answer that he was Felipe Javier's tenant-tiller refers only to the two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5154 and 5115 in Tirso Javier's name and not to the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5081, the same being "newly discovered and alienable land," and Tax Declaration No. 8748, as the property covered by it was land allegedly inherited from Tirso Javier's grandparents on his mother's side. They also contend that the presumption of regularity of private transactions was overlooked by both the trial and appellate courts when they concluded that the sales executed by Tirso Javier in favor of petitioner spouses were simulated simply because both courts found that the parcels of land were owned by Felipe Javier. These are, however, questions of fact which are beyond review in this petition. (Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351 (1998))
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
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