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[G.R. No. 142290. June 26, 2000]

F.C. VALARAO REALTY, INC. vs. CA, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 26 2000.

G.R. No. 142290 (F.C. Valarao Realty, Inc. v. Court Of Appeals, Gregoria Correa, Dominador Correa, et al.)

On June 27, 1995, petitioner F.C. Valarao Realty, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 407 in the Municipal Trial Court, Angat, Bulacan, against respondents Gregoria Correa, Dominador Correa, Epitacio Correa, Liwayway Bautista, Silangan Correa, Amor Dytioco, and Roman Correa, alleging that the latter, with the aid of armed men, had entered its property and had refused to vacate it despite its demands. It appears that the property subject of the ejectment case was titled (OCT No. P-10782) in the name of Luz Correa from whom petitioner bought the subject property.

In their answer, respondents alleged that they were actually owners in equal shares of the property together with one Luz Correa and the latter's sister, Amalia Correa.

In its decision, dated October 10, 1996, the MTC ordered the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint on the ground of prematurity, having been instituted prior to the partition of the property. Its decision was affirmed, first, by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, and later, by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held:

Considering that the ejectment case is for the determination of better right to possession, and considering further that the MTC's finding that a final and executory decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, in a case for partition, accounting, and damages (Exh. "1" & "1-A"; Record, pp. 100-104, 105) and which decision, however, has not been executed up to this date, the MTC was, therefore, correct when it . . . . dismissed the complaint on the ground of prematurity.

The case of Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals, (112 SCRA 237, 239) was aptly applied by the MTC in this case under consideration, to wit:

The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must be settled first is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where these are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

Finally, we agree with the finding that the Sale Agreement entered into by and between Luz Correa Vda. de Roxas and F.C. Valarao, Inc. (petitioner herein), dated July 16, 19[83], was made within the five (5) year prohibited period in a patent grant.

Controverting the factual finding s of the MTC as affirmed by the RTC and the appellate court, petitioner contends that Luz Correa, from whom it bought the property in question, was the absolute owner thereof and not just a mere co-owner, and that, as her successor-in-interest, it is entitled to the possession of the entire property. It also contends that the sale to it was not made within the proscribed period.

It appears that in a decision, rendered on October 15, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan, held Luz Correa and her sister Amalia Correa to be among the co-owners of the subject property and ordered its partition. Said decision is now final, although there has been no partition of the property.

Thus, the question is not simply whether petitioner is bound by the decision in a case in which it was not a party. The question is whether Luz Correa, from whom petitioner purchased the property, owned the entire property and not only a share in it. This is a factual question which is not only beyond the scope of review in this case but also outside the jurisdiction of the MTC in the ejectment case. Under B.P. Blg. 129, �33(2), inferior courts have the power to resolve questions of ownership where a determination thereof is necessary for the proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession because the principal issue is possession and the question of ownership is merely incidental. (Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347, 365 (2996)) But here the principal question being raised by petitioner is actually that of ownership. This is beyond the scope of the question in an ejectment case.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the petition and the supplemental petition for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court�

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