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[G.R. No. 142575. June 26, 2000]

DELBROS, INC. vs. FGU INSURANCE CORP.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 26 2000.

G.R. No. 142757 (Delbros, Inc. vs. FGU Insurance Corporation.)

Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation was the insurer of a Nissan Sentra car bearing Plate No. PRS-954 registered in the name of Ma. Angelica Rapadas.

On September 14, 1992, while the car was being driven by the registered owner's husband, Roberto Rapadas, it was hit in the rear by a van driven by Reynaldo P. Cruz. Said van was owned by PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. which had leased the same to herein petitioner Delbros, Inc.

Total cost for repair of the car reached P89,029.63. Respondent insurance corporation paid P8,442.46, while the registered owner, Ma. Angelica Rapadas, shouldered the balance. Later, she executed a release and subrogation in favor of respondent. The latter then filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. and Reynaldo V. Cruz. Upon learning that the van was leased to herein petitioner, respondent amended the complaint to include the former.

On January 29, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner and Reynaldo V. Cruz jointly and severally to pay respondent the sum of P81,442.46, with legal rate of interest of 12% from the filing of the complaint on February 16, 1993, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the principal amount, and costs. The complaint was dismissed as to PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.

On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

LEGAL ISSUES

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF THE DRIVER OF THE NISSAN SENTRA IN ABRUPTLY STOPPING IN THE MIDDLE OF EDSA WHILE TRAVELLING AT THE SPEED OF ABOUT 60 KPH AND TURNING HIS VEHICLE TO THE DIRECTION OF THE VEHICLES BEHIND HIM IS ITSELF A NEGLIGENT ACT IN LAW AND IS AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK THAT PRECLUDED HIM FROM RECOVERY FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION FINDING THE PETITIONER DELBROS, INC., AND NOT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A VEHICLE INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT, AS PRIMARILY LIABLE IN LAW.

III. WHETHER OR NOT AN INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUBROGEE, IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT FOR INDEMNIFICATION IN ALL CASES.

First. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the accident was caused by the negligence of petitioner's driver, Reynaldo V. Cruz. Indeed, the evidence shows that when the car in front of him suddenly stopped, Rapadas was able to step on his brakes and avoid hitting the said car, but Reynaldo V. Cruz, who was behind Rapadas' car, failed to stop his vehicle, thus hitting the former. As the Court of Appeals found:

[Reynaldo V. Cruz] was behind the car of Rapadas only by about 3 to 3 and � meters before the incident happened; the road was slippery because it was at that time raining; from a distance of 3 to 3 and � meters, he was driving "quite fast"; he was not alert, precisely when the car of Rapadas made a turn to the left, he was not able to avoid hitting Rapadas' Sentra car, even if he put his foot on the brake pedal, and, as a consequence, the left side rear of the Sentra car was hit; and he was indeed driving fast considering the extent of the damage .

These are findings of fact which are binding on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal. (Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 332 (1998))

Second. That PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. was the registered owner of the errant van does not automatically make it liable instead of petitioner.

In FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 718 (1998), it was contended that the registered owner of a vehicle should be held liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another. Rejecting the contention, this Court, however, ruled:

. . . The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x x"

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; ;and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR [the registered owner, ], because only the fault or negligence of [Peter] Dahl-Jensen [the lessee] was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

In this case, there was a similar failure to establish the fault or negligence of the van's registered owner, PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. The negligence in this case was solely that of petitioner's driver. Petitioner's liability, on the other hand, is premised on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code providing that

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Third. Having been subrogated to the rights of the registered owner of the damage vehicle, respondent was properly awarded damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED (1) to GRANT petitioner's motion for extension to file its petition and (2) to DENY the aforesaid petition for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court

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