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[ G.R. No. 121791. September 8, 2000]
ENRIQUE SALAFRANCA vs. PHILAMLIFE (PAMPLONA) VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASSO., et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT 8 2000.
G.R. No. 121791 (Enrique Salafranca vs. Philamlife (Pamplona) Village Homeowners association, Inc., Bonifacio Dazo and the Second Division, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).)
This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner seeking to annul this Court's Resolution dated June 16, 1999 and to order the immediate execution of the Decision dated December 23, 1998.
As a backgrounder, it should be recalled that petitioner Enrique Salafranca started working with private respondent on May 1, 1981 as administrative officer for a period of 6 months. From this date until December 31, 1983, petitioner was reappointed to his position 3 more times. After his term expired on December 31, 1983, he still continued to work in the same capacity without the benefit of a renewed contract. In 1987, private respondent amended its by-laws including a provision regarding officers, specifically, the position of administrative officer under which said officer shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. On July 3, 1987, private respondents informed petitioner that his term of office shall be coterminous with the Board of Directors which appointed him to his position. He continued working until his termination on December 31, 1992. Claiming that his services had been unlawfully and unceremoniously dispensed with, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims and for damages.
The Labor Arbiter ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P257,833.33 representing backwages, separation pay and 13th month pay. In justifying the award, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the amendment in the by-laws should not be applied retroactively but prospectively.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and rendered a new one reducing petitioner's monetary award to only � month pay for every year of service representing his retirement pay. It viewed the dismissal of petitioner as a valid act.
The case was elevated to this Court1 Composed of now retired Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero (ponente), Justices Santiago M. Kapunan, Fidel P. Purisima and Bernardo P. Pardo. which rendered judgment on December 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The NLRC decision dated June 15, 1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Philamlife Village Homeowners Association is ORDERED: (1) to pay petitioner Enrique Salafranca separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service; (2) to pay his full backwages in accordance with our ruling in Bustamante v. NLRC; (3) to pay his retirement pay in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, (4) to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, respectively; and (5) to pay ten (10%) percent of the total amount due to petitioner, as attorney's fees. Consequently, the respondent NLRC is ORDERED to COMPUTE the total monetary benefits awarded in accordance with this decision and to submit its compliance thereon within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision."
Per Entry of Judgment, said decision became final and executory on February 3, 1999.
In compliance with the Court's decision, Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco submitted to this Court a copy of the computation of petitioner's monetary award as follows:
"COMPUTATION OF JUDGMENT AWARD
(cut-off date is until the finality of Supreme Court's Resolution)
1. Backwages
����������� 12/31/92 - 2/3/99 = 73.93 mos.
����������� P7,000.00 x 73.93 mos. - - - - - - - - - P517,851.00
2. Separation pay
����������� Equivalent to one (1) month
����������� Salary/year of service
����������� (5/1/81 - 2/3/99 = 17 yrs. and
����������� 9.10 months = 18 yrs. or 18 mos.)
����������� P7,000.00 x 18.0 mos. - - - - - - - - - - P126,000.00
3. Retirement Pay under Republic Act No. 7641
����������� P7,000/30 x 22.5 days x 18 mos. - - - P 94,500.00
4. Moral Damages - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -P 20,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 10,000.00
����������������������������������� SUB TOTAL - - - - - -P768,010.00
6. 10% Attoreney's Fees - - - - - - - - - - - - P 76,801.00
����������������������� ����������������������� TOTAL - - - - P844,811.00
Respondents filed a Motion for Clarification alleging that petitioner was already seventy (70) years old when he was separated from the service and pursuant to Section 4, sub-sections 4.2. and 4.3 of R.A. 7641 (New Retirement Law), petitioner is considered to have been mandatorily retired; thus separation pay and retirement pay should not be computed from date of engagement which is on May 1, 1981 up to the finality of this Court's decision but from May 1, 1981 to December 31, 1992 when petitioner reached 70 years of age.
On June 16, 1999, this Court2 Composed of Justices Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Jose C. Vitug, Artemio Panganiban, Fidel P. Purisima and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes. issued a Resolution, the pertinent portions of which read:
"After a review of the contentions raised, the Court is constrained to make the following modifications. The award of backwages in the amount of P517,510.00 is deleted for want of basis. Backwages accorded an employee represents the compensation which he could have earned had he not been dismissed by his employer. In the instant case, however, petitioner, at the time of his dismissal by respondent, was already entitled to retirement benefits under the law or any contractual agreement existing between them. Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner shall be entitled to separation and retirement pay as the two 'are not necessarily antagonistic to each other'.
In view of the nature of the award of retirement benefits which automatically severs the employer-employee relationship upon applicability of the retirement law, the computation of separation and retirement pay must be reckoned from May 1, 1981 or at the time of engagement of petitioner up to December 31, 1992 when he was finally dismissed. Thus:
1. Separation Pay������������������������������������������ P 77,000.00
2. Retirement Pay����������������������������������������� 57,749.99
3. Moral Damages���������������������������������������� 20,000.00
4. Exemplary Damages�������� 10,000.00
����������������������������������� SUB-TOTAL������������� P164,750.00
5. 10% Attorney's Fees������� 16,475.00
����������������������������������������������� TOTAL =������� P181,225.00
��������������������������������������������������������������� = = = = = = =
Hence, the present Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner contending that the Resolution dated June 16, 1999 modified this Court's Decision dated December 23, 1998 when it (a) deleted the award of backwages on the ground that the same has no basis and (b) set the cut-off date for the award of separation pay and retirement pay on December 31, 1992 (the date when petitioner was illegally dismissed) and not on February 3, 1999 (the date when the December 23, 1998 decision became final and executory).
Petitioner argues that the said Resolution cannot modify a final and executory decision except for clerical errors or mistakes. The award of backwages can no longer be questioned by private respondent even if this be in the guise of a motion for clarification. If private respondent wanted to question the award of backwages granted in the Decision dated December 23, 1998, the matter should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration timely filed. Petitioner further avers that private respondent slept on its rights and had to devise a scheme to do what otherwise it can no longer do. Petitioner posits the view that respondent's Motion for Clarification is nothing but a motion for reconsideration which should not have been accorded any credence as it was already filed out of time.
Petitioner is of the view that an award of backwages does not merely serve as compensation but as penalty in illegal dismissal; thus to delete the award of backwages would render inconsequential and void the finding of illegal dismissal in this case. Moreover, this Court rules that private respondent's defense of compulsory retirement was a "dismissal disguised as retirement", a mere afterthought.
In the Opposition, private respondents allege that in the assailed Resolution, this Court acknowledged the fact that reinstatement of petitioner could no longer be feasible since he is already 70 years of age at the time he was terminated thus recognizing the fact that petitioner could no longer be reinstated by reason of his age.
The motion has no merit.
While it is true that this Court in the decision of December 23, 1998 ordered private respondent to pay petitioner his full backwages in accordance with the Bustamante case3 265 SCRA 61 (1996). the Bustamante ruling likewise stated that the award of backwages was to be computed from the time compensation was withheld from the employee up to the time of his reinstatement. It is likewise a settled rule that backwages should be computed from the time of his dismissal or separation from service until actual reinstatement unless he reached compulsory retirement age in which case he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to corresponding retirement benefits in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor Code and Section 14, Rule 1, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code.4 Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997); Equitable Banking Corporation vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 352 (1997).
In the present case, reinstatement is no longer viable since petitioner had attained retirement age at the time of his termination on December 31, 1992. Since petitioner has already reached his retirement age, he was already entitled to retirement benefits under the law or contractual agreement existing between him and private respondent. Clearly, there is no basis for the award of backwages after he has reached his retirement age and reinstatement was no longer viable. As regards petitioner's separation pay, the same is to be computed from the start of his employment up to his termination.5 Mendoza vs. NLRC, 287 SCRA 51 (1998).
It should be stressed that the Resolution dated June 16, 1999 did not amend, alter or modify the Court's Decision of December 23, 1998. Even a judgment which has become final and executory may be clarified under certain circumstances6 Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 19. as in the present case where there was a clear misinterpretation in the computation of the judgment award submitted by the Labor Arbiter. It is likewise settled that courts may still amend a final and executory judgment to clarify an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the disposition of the decision.7 Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 692; Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 543; Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 152 SCRA 309.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Asst. Clerk of Court
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