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[A.M. RTJ 01-1632. August 8, 2001]

RONALDO P. ABILLA vs. JUDGE IBARRA B. JACULBE, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 8, 2001 .

A.M. RTJ 01-1632(Ronaldo P. Abilla vs. Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Dumaguete City, Branch 42.)

Complainant Ronaldo Abilla charges respondent Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 42 with Dereliction of Duty and Non-feasance for his alleged failure/refusal to issue the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 8148 despite the finality of the decision.

It appears that herein complainant and his wife were the plaintiffs in a civil case for specific performance, recovery of sum of money and damages against defendant Carlos Ang Gobonseng, et al. wherein a decision, penned by then Presiding Judge Jesus L. Tabilon, was rendered on October 29, 1990 in plaintiffs' favor. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said decision was affirmed with modification deleting the award of attorney's fees. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court was denied on March 25, 1998 and an Entry of Judgment was made. On June 18, 1999, a motion for issuance of writ of execution was filed by plaintiffs. The trial court, now presided by respondent Judge Jaculbe, issued an Order on November 10, 1999 for the issuance of a writ of execution. In a separate Order of even date, respondent judge likewise denied defendants' "Motion to Repurchase the Subject Properties 17 Lots with Tender of Payment". Hence, a Motion for Reconsideration thereto was filed. Defendants likewise filed a Motion for Inhibition on the ground that plaintiffs' counsel is the sister-in-law of former Congressman Jerome Paras and respondent judge was allegedly his "political recommendee". The motion for inhibition was denied by respondent judge in the Order of January 18, 2000.

It appears that defendants filed on March 10, 2000 a Manifestation informing respondent judge that they intend to elevate the question of his inhibition to the Court of Appeals and praying that he suspend further proceedings in the case and defer any ruling on the motion for reconsideration from the twin Orders granting plaintiff's motion for execution and denying defendants' motion to repurchase.

On March 28, 2000 defendant filed a petition in the Court of Appeals praying for the setting aside of respondent's refusal to inhibit and the consequent denial of their motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 6, 2000, plaintiffs filed a Manifestation stating that in view of the finality of the judgment, there ought to be no further cause for the delay in the actual issuance of the writ of execution and its consequent implementation.

The writ of execution was not implemented in view of the Order dated April 11, 2000 issued by the respondent judge stating that the enforcement or implementation of the writ of execution was being held in abeyance in view of supervening events which transpired before the judgment in the case became final and executory.

Complainant, plaintiff in the civil case, filed the present administrative case alleging that the civil case has been pending for 17 years and that when a decision has become final, the execution thereof becomes a matter of right. Complainant asserts that he has been "continuously denied the fruits of our legal victory through legal maneuvers by the defendants, aided in great amount by Judge Jaculbe's refusal to actually issue the writ of execution." He argues that there was no supervening event that would bar the issuance of a writ of execution.

The case was referred to a consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation. The parties were sent notices for the hearing of the case. Neither party was present. Complainant manifested in writing that inasmuch as his complaint was based on documents which were on record, he does not intend to present any evidence. He manifested that he is submitting the case for decision. Respondent judge likewise filed his Manifestation submitting the case for decision. The Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

We affirm the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Justice. The recommendation to dismiss the complaint is well-taken.

Respondent is being charged with dereliction of duty and nonfeasance "for refusing, without sufficient reason, to actually issue the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 8148, when the same should be a matter of right because of the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 8148." However, there was already an Order dated November 10, 1999 by the respondent judge for the issuance of a writ of execution in view of the finality of the decision in the civil case. In fact, a writ of execution was actually issued by Clerk of Court Ellen Calingacion on November 26, 1999 and the same was delivered to and received by the Sheriff on the same day. Hence, respondent judge could not be said to have committed a dereliction of duty/non-feasance "for refusing, without sufficient reason; to actually issue the writ of execution."

Actually, it is the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution which the complainant is assailing in this administrative case. The implementation of the writ of execution devolves upon the Sheriff. Unless restrained by a court to the contrary, sheriffs should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed (Marisga-Magbanua vs. Villamar V, 305 SCRA 132). However, the Investigating Justice observed that the record is not very clear as to the reason for the failure to implement the writ, although in the Order of April 11, 2000 respondent judge opined that some supervening circumstance has intervened to prevent the implementation of the writ of execution, referring to the unresolved issue of his inhibition which is pending in the Court of Appeals.

In his Report, the Investigating Justice stated:

"x x x. the pendency of defendants' motion to reconsider respondent's denial of their prayer that he inhibit himself can in no way be considered a supervening event that 'rendered the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust.'

x x x. Respondent's actions were all Correct and according to the book until his 'Order' of 11 April 2000 when he refused to have the writ of execution he had earlier ordered issued, implemented on the ground of a supervening circumstance that came after the judgment had become final.

This is where respondent was in error. By holding in abeyance the implementation of the said writ of execution issued as early as 26 November 1999, he effectively deprived complainant of whatever rights that could have accrued to him under the judgment that had long become final and executory.

It is solidly engraved in our jurisprudence that a judge can not be held answerable for every error he commits in his judgments. It is necessary to prove that his error constitutes gross ignorance of law is motivated by corrupt and improper reasons."

Indeed, a judge cannot always be held answerable for every error he commits either in procedure or in his orders or judgments. It is a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous (Canson vs. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268). Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties would render him liable absent a clear showing that the judge had acted with deliberate intent to do injustice (Cagatin vs. Demecillo, 304 SCRA 369). Such error or mistake should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith, -otherwise the issue becomes judicial in character and would not warrant the imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA' 259). Complainant failed to show fraud, dishonesty, corruption or even malice or bad faith. Neither was there a showing of any corrupt or improper motive. Hence, this administrative complaint must fail.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, the case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

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