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[G.R. No. 136502 & 136505.February 19, 2001]

GREFALDE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 19 2001.

G.R. Nos. 136502 & 136505(Rufina Grefalde, et. al, vs. The Sandiganbayan and the Republic of the Philippines.)

From the decision dated December 15, 2000, petitioner Rufina Grefalde filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 18, 2001 seeking the reversal of her conviction on fifty three (53) counts of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 ("R.A. 3019"), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On February 2, 2001, the Court also received from Grefalde a "Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss" dated January 5, 2001, which seeks the nullification of the decision by the Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction.

The motion for reconsideration prays for the Court to: (1) disregard the positive identification of Grefalde by state witness Delia Preagido for being false and incredible; (2) disregard the circumstantial evidence against Grefalde; (3) apply the ruling in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, 225 SCRA 156, to Grefalde alleging that they are similarly situated and the ruling is favorable to Grefalde; and (4) set aside the judgment of conviction and acquit Grefalde of all charges. Alternatively, the motion seeks the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, invoking the case of George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al., 312 SCRA 77 (1999), where the Court retroactively applied Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 ¹ Republic Act No. 8249, which amends Presidential Decree No. 1606 (otherwise known as the Sandiganbayan Law), delineates the scope of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The pertinent portions of Section 4 thereof provides:

"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(I)Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) x x x"to declare the Sandiganbayan as being without jurisdiction over cases where the accused occupied a position equivalent to one below salary grade "27" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. The motion avers that Grefalde's position of District Accountant at the time of the commission of the offenses was below salary grade "27"; hence, the ruling in Uy should apply squarely to her.

The grounds for acquittal raised in the motion for reconsideration deserve scant consideration as they are mere reiterations of the arguments Grefalde had already raised in her earlier pleadings, all of which had been discussed or taken into consideration in rendering the decision dated December 15, 2000. The additional argument, that owing to our acquittal of her co-petitioners and alleged co-conspirators the theory of conspiracy is nullified and Grefalde should likewise be acquitted, is bereft of merit because the bases for Grefalde's conviction on charges of conspiracy, which proceeds from the state witness's positive identification of her as part of the region-wide conspiracy and the overwhelming amount of circumstantial evidence against her, was not removed by the acquittal of her supposed co-conspirators.

What Grefalde has not previously raised, and which we find significant to discuss, is the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

It is well-established that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by persons occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" as prescribed in Republic Act No. 6758, in relation to their office. ² Cuyco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 137017-18, February 8, 2000; Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77.In cases of conspiracy, it is sufficient that at least one of the principal accused is of salary grade "27" for the Sandiganbayan to validly take cognizance of the offense.

In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan clearly lacked jurisdiction over the cases of petitioners, it being shown that all of the accused therein held positions equivalent to salary grades lower than "27" as prescribed in the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. As held in the cases of George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan and Cuyco vs. Sandiganbayan, this merits the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its subsequent refiling with the court of competent jurisdiction. To our mind, though, the more appropriate issue is whether the defense of lack of jurisdiction was properly raised at this late stage, after the Supreme Court has already promulgated a decision on the appeal filed from the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

While jurisdiction may be raised at any time until a final judgment has been rendered, under the facts of the present case we hold that petitioner Grefalde is estopped from invoking the same. This case has been pending for more than twenty (20) years since the filing of the informations before the Sandiganbayan, whereupon which Grefalde had actively participated in the trial, testified in her own defense, sought her acquittal from that court, and initiated the petition for review before this Court. The jurisdictional argument that she now raises, and the documents ³ Annexes to the "Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss" dated January 5, 2001.that she now elevates for the consideration of this Court, such as her service record and the certification from the Department of Public Works and Highways respecting her salary grade, contain nothing that she could not have produced at trial, or even while the case was pending on appeal with this Court. The Court is thus left with the impression that the argument of lack of jurisdiction was not made in good faith and was thrown in only after the judgment on appeal (which was unfavorable to her alone, as her co-petitioners were acquitted on reasonable doubt) was handed down.

Moreover, to nullify the decision of the Sandiganbayan at this late stage would not only result in the dismissal of the action as against Grefalde but also in the setting aside of this Court's judgment of acquittal of Grefalde's co-petitioners, which judgment has now become final and executory. This is because a valid acquittal on our part presupposes a valid judgment by the court below; for us to declare the Sandiganbayan decision void for lack of jurisdiction would also be to declare ineffective any appeals taken therefrom, and no double jeopardy attaches to the refiling of the cases before the proper Regional Trial Court. ⁴ See Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43; People vs. Argel, 104 SCRA 497; People vs. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 450; People vs. Jardin, 209 Phil. 134.

In Austria vs. People, 192 SCRA 342, the Court was faced with a similar situation where the trial court which convicted the accused was later found to be without jurisdiction. The Court, speaking through Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, stated:

There can be no debate that this case has been pending for the last nine years. . The Court can not indeed imagine the unsettling consequences, should the same be tried anew, in terms of the expeditious administration, especially, of criminal justice. The Court finds that the ends of speedy trial will be subserved better if the proceedings before Judge Caguioa were left alone.

Moreover, the records show that the petitioner had pursued vigorously the case before the lower court, on the supposition that it had jurisdiction, and had asked it to render a judgment of acquittal, as he in fact requests this Court to set aside its decision (as well as the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals). it is a behavior that forces him to accept the jurisdiction of the Pasig court; because if the latter lacked jurisdiction, it can not act, much less render a decision, whether of a conviction or acquittal. Surely, he can not rightfully maintain an attack on the trial court's competence after having accepted --- and invoked --- it. Estoppel is an impediment against any attack.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 18, 2001 and the "Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss" dated January 5, 2001 are DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court

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