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[G.R. No. 145715-18February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE vs. TE
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 19 2001.
G.R. Nos. 145715-18(People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te.)
In a joint decision, dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, found Evelyn Te guilty on four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her to two (2) months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory after this Court had denied Te's petition for review from the affirmance of the trial court's decision by the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. In an order, dated May 25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences successively, but "for humanitarian reason" and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, it held that "instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six months."
On June 2, 2000. Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. In a supplemental motion, Te argued that she had been denied equal protection of the law because the trial judge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences.
On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Te's petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment.
On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in jail since March 15, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the alternative, Te prayed for release on recognizance.
On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court's order of June 20, 2000, alleging that the finality of the joint decision against her did not bar her application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending determination as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, �14.
On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.
On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Te's bail bonds in the reduced amount of P500,000.00 and ordered her release. The trial court also directed its clerk of Court to certify the proceedings to the Court.
On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial court's resolution of July 5, 2000.
On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated June 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated July 5, 2000, of the trial court.
On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City Prosecutor. It also denied due course to Te's notice of appeal on the ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it had already ordered that the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102, �14.
Rule 102, �14 provides:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. - if it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court.
If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed, Rule 102, �4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is "suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."
The certification of a case under Rule 102, S14, moreover, refers to cases where the habeas corpus Court finds that the applicant is charged with the noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this Court is clearly erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to return the records of this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City and to order the latter to give due course to Evelyn Te's notice of appeal.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court
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