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[G.R. Nos. 14582-83. January 17, 2001]

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSN. OF THE PHIL., et al. vs. LUCIO TAN, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 17 2001.

G.R. Nos. 14582-83 (Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Lucio Tan, et al.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54894 ¹ Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP) and Capt. Florendo Umali, Petitioners. vs. Lucio Tan and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56, Respondent.and 55192, ² Armand Nocum and Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., Petitioners, vs. Lucio Tan and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Respondent.which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 (RTC), dated April 19, 1999, admitting private respondent Lucio Tan's amended for libel. Likewise assailed is the appellate court's Resolution, dated September 19, 2000, dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its decision.

The antecedents facts are as follows:

On September 27, 1998, private respondent Lucio Tan filed a civil complaint for libel in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against Armand Nocum, a reporter from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) and ALPAP spokesperson Capt. Florendo Umali. Tan prayed for moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against him which appeared in Nocum's news article in the Inquirer.

PDI and Nocum filed a joint Answer on October 29, 1998, alleging that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the alleged defamatory statements were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the news article in question was a fair and true report on the matters of public interest of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication on the same article of Tan's or Philippine Airlines' side of the story.

On October 31, 1998, ALPAP and Capt. Umali also filed their joint Answer claiming that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action, (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Tan was not a real party-in-interest. ALPAP and Umali contended that the complaint failed to state the residence of Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.

The RTC thereafter dismissed Tan's complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue in an Order dated February 10, 1999. ³ Rollo , pp. 48-50.

On February 24, 1999, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the RTC's dismissal of the complaint and the admission of the attached amended complaint, which contained and allegation in paragraph 2.01.1 thereof that the article and the caricature complained of was printed and first published in Makati City.

Subsequently, the RTC set aside its previous order of dismissal and admitted the amended complaint, stating in its Order dated April 19, 1999 ⁴ Id ., at 51-52.that:

The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly admitted, pursuant to Rule 10, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final. Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendant's defenses in their Answers. The amendment is merely formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial.

Amendment of the complaint may be allowed even if an order of dismissal is filed before the dismissal order became final (Constantino vs. Reyes, 8 SCRA 379). ⁵ Id.

The sole issue raised in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals acted in accordance with long-settled jurisprudence in affirming respondent trial court's orders admitting the amended complaint.

A perusal of the assailed decision, however, will reveal that it is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We quote with approval the appellate court's ruling, thus:

We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.

Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue, instead of a motion to dismiss.

x x x

We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in facts the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quo's jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.

The aforecited ruling of the appellate court is an accord with that of this Court in Diaz vs. Adiong ⁶ 219 SCRA 631 (1993).that:

Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all, involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. ⁷ Id ., at 637.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for failure of the petitioners to show that respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error of law. Consequently, their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is likewise DENIED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

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