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[G.R. No. 145473. January 22, 2001]
SPS. CUSTODIO et al. vs. BACALOCOS
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 22 2001.
G.R. No. 145473 (Sps. Gerardo Custodio & Crisanta Custodio vs. Estelita Bacalocos.)
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Former Sixteenth Division, (CA) dated June 14, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55551 1 Estelita Bacolocos, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Gerardo Custodio and Crisanta Villa Custodio, Respondents.which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No. V-7283 2 Sps. Gerardo Custodio and Crisanta Villa Custodio Plaintiffs vs. Estelita Bacalocos.and dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for Roxas and Pilar, Capiz. Likewise assailed is the appellate court's Resolution, dated October 12, 2000, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners, spouses Gerardo Custodio and Crisanta Villar Custodio, are the registered owners of Lot 1816, Cad-248, Pilar Cadastre, located in Natividad, Pilar, Capiz, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-12737 issued to them on June 15, 1994. After the issuance of said OCT, petitioners inspected the lot covered thereby and discovered that respondent Estelita Bacalocos was unlawfully occupying a one thousand square meter (1,000 sq.m.) portion of their lot. A verification/relocation survey of said lot conducted on March 15, 1996 by Engr. Mansueto Aguire, a geodetic engineer from the Central Environment and Natural Resources Office of Roxas City, revealed that the portion occupied by respondent was within the area covered by petitioners' title. Petitioners further stated that out of tolerance and generosity on their part, they allowed respondent to continue occupying the aforementioned 1,000 square meter portion of the lot. On November 17, 1997, after the lapse of three years, petitioners through counsel, sent a notice to respondent demanding that she vacate the portion of their lot being occupied by her. Due to her refusal to comply with their demand, petitioners instituted a verified complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent in the MCTC of Roxas and Pilar, Capiz.
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that the lot in question belonged to Bonifacio Abaldonado and was inherited by Teresita Abaldonado who executed a Special Power of Attorney in her favor. Respondent also stated that petitioners' the to the lot was secured through fraud, and that said title was the subject of a pending protest before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In its Decision promulgated on January 7, 1999, the MCTC held:
WHERFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations and finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Estelita Bacalocos, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1.) ordering defendant Estelita Bacalocos, her agents, privies and assigns individually and/or collectively, to vacate in the 1,000 square meter portion of Lot 1816, Brgy. Natividad, Pilar, Capiz and remove her house and other structure, standing in the portion of the 1,000 square meter portion of Lot 1816, Cad-248, Pilar Cadastre, situated in Brgy. Natividad, Pilar, Capiz;
2.) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of Lot 1816, Cad-248, Pilar Cadastre, situated in Brgy. Pilar, Natividad, Capiz, covered by OCT (Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo) No. P-12737, registered in the name of plaintiff spouses, Gerardo and Crisanta Custodio, beginning January 23, 1998 until said defendant vacate and restore plaintiff the possession of 1,000 square meters of Lot 1816, Brgy. Natividad, Pilar, Capiz;
3.) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees;
4.) ordering the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim for lack of merit; and
5.) ordering defendant to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 3 Rollo , pp. 51-52.
On appeal by respondent, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 15 rendered a Decision, dated August 11, 1999 affirming in too the decision of the MCTC. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. In the assailed decision, the CA held that the complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the MCTC should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 4 See CA Decision, Id., at 29.since said complaint was filed beyond the one-year reglementary period provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for unlawful detainer cases. The CA stated:
The complaint filed below is for unlawful detainer allegedly by reason of tolerance and pure generosity (par. 7, Complaint). It is also stated in the complaint that after OCT No. P-12737 was issued to the respondents in 1994, they immediately inspected the property and found the defendant occupying the area involved. Then, respondents allowed three (3) years to pass (November 17, 1997) before they demanded defendant to vacate the premises and remove her house thereon upon the pretext that the latter's occupancy was only out of their tolerance and pure generosity. Taken together, it is Our considered opinion that such allegations do not make out a case for unlawful detainer. Consider:
(a) Tolerance, as a ground for unlawful detainer, must be present from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry (Mu�oz vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216 [1992]; Serona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257 [1968]; Refugia vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347 [1996]). On the face of the complaint at bar, it would seem that petitioner's possession of the lot was without the knowledge or consent of the respondents as their occupancy thereon was only discovered when the title owners inspected their supposed lot. This allegation contradicts the idea of tolerance.
x x x. 5 CA Decision, Id., at 29.
We find no error I the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The MCTC could not have properly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since the facts as averred in the complaint do not meet the requirement for the filing of a case for unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
An unlawful detainer case contemplates a situation where the possession by the defendant of the property in dispute was originally lawful, but becomes unlawful by the termination of the right to possess said property by virtue of a contract, express or implied. 6 Espiritu vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 309 SCRA 355 (1999).Where possession by defendant of the property in dispute is at the tolerance of the plaintiff, defendant is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, and if he fails to do so, a case for ejectment may be instituted against him. 7 Mu�oz vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, 224 (1992).
"Occupation by mere tolerance" presupposes that such tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. 8 Ibid ., citing Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257 (1968).In cases for unlawful detainer, there can be no occupation by mere tolerance where in the beginning, defendants occupation of the plaintiff's property is unlawful, including instances where such is made against plaintiff's will or without his knowledge, which is the situation obtaining in the case at bar. As correctly noted by the appellate court, respondent's occupation of the 1,000 square-meter portion of the lot in question was not known to petitioners until they inspected the property in 1994. Such occupation by defendant cannot therefore be considered as having been at the tolerance of petitioners. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy considering that respondent's occupation of the 1,000 square meter portion was unlawful from the very beginning.
In Sarona vs. Villegas, 9 22 SCRA 1257 (1968).the Court had occasion to explain the rationale for the requirement that for a case for unlawful detainer to prosper, plaintiff must have tolerated defendant's occupation of the property from the very beginning, thus:
If right at the incipiency of defendants' possession was with plaintiff's tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because, from the date of the demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer.
But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand to vacate?
x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress - in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before the suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court - upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set it - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 10 Id ., at 1264-65, citing Monteblanco vs. Hinigiran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803.
Neither can the case prosper as one for forcible entry because the one-year period reckoned from the time when petitioners learned of respondent's unlawful occupation of the 1,000 square-meter portion of their lot in 1994 had already prescribed when they filed the complaint in 1997.
This is not to say that there is no remedy available to petitioners for recovery of possession of the portion of their lot occupied by respondent. Although more than one year had passed since they learned of respondent's occupation thereof, they may still file an accion publiciana with the appropriate Regional Trial Court. 11 Id., at 1265; Mu�oz vs. Court of Appeals, supra Note 7.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated June 14, 2000, and Resolution, dated October 12, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55551, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
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