ChanRobles Virtual law Library

[G.R. No. 110147. July 11, 2001]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. CHUA et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 11 2001.

G.R. No. 110147(Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals and Alfonso Roxas Chua.)

In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner questions our ruling that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Order denying private respondent's Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery to Metrobank of the Certificate of Ownership and to declare the execution sale as null and void, is appealable. It contends that "[o]nce a judgment has become final and executory, no appeal can be taken therefrom or from any other subsequent orders and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right." We are not persuaded.

The RTC Order, which private respondent appealed from, did not question the merits of the judgment in the collection case. Indeed, such judgment has become final and executory and is no longer subject to appeal. The assailed Notice of Appeal involves the object of the Writ of Execution which, private respondent argues, is part of the conjugal partnership and, hence, could not be made to answer for his personal liability. Under our jurisprudence and as stated on page 11 of the Decision, an irregular writ of execution of a final judgment may still be the subject of appeal (Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, August 8, 1988).

The cases cited by petitioner are not applicable and the rulings therein are not being abandoned or reversed in the case at bar. In Yap v. Ta�ada (163 SCRA 464, July 18, 1988), petitioner therein sought to vary the judgment which had become final and executory; thus, the appeal was not allowed. So in Molina v. De La Riva (8 Phil 569, September 20, 1907), in which the parties liable, while opposing execution of the final judgment, sought to present new issues of fact and law affecting their liability. With respect to Ipekjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals (8 SCRA 59, May 30, 1963) and People's Homesite and Housing Corp. v. Jeremias (73 SCRA 239, September 30, 1976), suffice it to say that the subject matter of both cases are not germane to the present case. Furthermore, none of the cases cited by petitioner relate to prohibition or non-allowance of appeal by a party declared in default.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality. No further pleadings will be entertained.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Asst. Clerk of Court

Back to Home | Back to Main

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE