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[G.R. No. 144701.March 27, 2001]
CABALLERO vs. CA et al.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 27 2001.
G.R. No. 144701(Hermila Caballero vs. Court of Appeals, et al.)
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner who is charged with estafa is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
����������� In May 1997, petitioner bought 4.40 karat diamond ring from the private complainant, Filipinas Estrella. In payment of the ring, petitioner issued three (3) postdated checks, to wit: P142,400 dated July 31, 1997; P140,000 dated August 31, 1997, and P140,000 dated September 30, 1997, all in the aggregate amount of P442,400. Upon presentment of these checks on their maturity dates, they were dishonored and rejected due to "Account Closed."
On August 18, 1998, an Information was filed with the RTC, Muntinlupa City (docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-447) charging petitioner with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by PD 818. On August 28, 1998, the trial court came out with an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of petitioner. Petitioner was consequently arrested and on October 1, 1998 a "Petition for Bail" was filed alleging that she is entitled to bail as a matter of right considering that the evidence of guilt is not so strong.
On December 7, 1998, the trial court denied the petition for bail considering that the total amount of the checks was more than P22,000.00 in which case the penalty imposable must be reclusion perpetua pursuant to PD 818 (amending Art. 315 of the RPC by increasing the penalties for estafa). The pertinent provision reads as follows:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P 10,000.00 but the total penalty which may be imposed shall be in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In a subsequent order, the trial court, likewise, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated December 7, 1998.
A petition for certiorari was thereby filed with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court's orders. On August 27, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred in the interpretation of PD 818. Had the PD intended to upgrade the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, petitioner argues, it could then have clearly specified so. It is averred that the word "termed" in the law only refers to the accessory penalties and not to the principal penalties. Nonetheless, petitioner claims, he is still entitled to bail considering that the evidence of guilt is not so strong pursuant to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner, moreover, assails as invalid the order granting or denying the application for bail that it does not contain the judge's evaluation of evidence.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
After a careful perusal of the petition and the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), we do not find any reversible error with the decision of the respondent court in ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's petition for bail.
Anent the penalty, the law is clear that when the amount of fraud is between P 12,000.00 and P22,000.00, the penalty imposed is reclusion temporal. And when the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal imposed in its maximum period. However, for each additional P 10,000.00, one year shall be added to this maximum period of reclusion temporal. When the computed penalty exceeds twenty (20) years, the penalty is no longer reclusion temporal but considered as reclusion perpetua. The law is, however, categorical that the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years. Be that as it may, considering the amount defrauded by the petitioner, which when computed far exceeds the maximum provided by the law, there is no question that the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
We agree with the OSG's observation that it would certainly be an absurdity if the phrase "termed reclusion perpetua" would only refer to the accessory penalties when the principal penalty is only reclusion temporal. It is basic rule that the accessory penalty follows the principal penalty and not the other way around.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, suffice it to say that the grant of bail is discretionary upon the trial court for so long as a hearing was conducted. To the trial court, the worthless checks which contain a sizable amount of money is enough documentary evidence to show petitioner's guilt. As it posits, this is a case of estafa in large scale.
Furthermore, the fact that the trial court's order does not contain a summary of evidence does not make it invalid as to entitle the petitioner to bail. The trial court need not discuss the full merits of the case in its order denying bail for this would mean premature judgment of the case. The appellate court found the assailed orders of the trial court to be substantially sufficient so as to affirm the denial of the application for bail. This is a finding that we need not disturb.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
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