ChanRobles Virtual law Library

[OC No. 01-19.November 27, 2001]

11 OCT. 2001 LETTER-COMPLAINT OF DAVID TO JUDGE PAAS

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 27 2001.

OC No. 01-19 (11 October 2001 Letter-Complaint of Ma. Dulce A. David imputing "grave unethical conduct" to Judge Estrellita M. Paas, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City, for her continued refusal to inhibit from Crim. Cases Nos. 00-3017 to 00-3018 despite clear grounds for her disqualification/inhibition.)

On October 16, 2001, the Supreme Court Oversight Committee received a Letter-Complaint dated October 11, 2001 from Ma. Dulce A. David, the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. 00-3017 to 00-3018 entitled "People v. Dulce A. David," pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City, presided by Judge Estrellita M. Paas.Ms. David claimed that Judge Paas committed "grave unethical conduct" for her continued refusal to inhibit from subject criminal cases despite clear grounds for her disqualification/inhibition.

According to Ms. David, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, the spouse of Judge Paas, represented private complainant in the filing of subject cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor and would naturally have some interest therein which "could substantially affect the outcome of the proceedings."Thus, on August 28, 2001, invoking Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial conduct, which provides that "[a] judge should not take part in the proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," she filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Paas.

On August 27, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Willy V. Chan filed his Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Inhibit.He stated that he could not impute any partiality or bias to Judge Paas for the simple reason that her husband represented private complainant.He emphasized that Atty. Paas withdrew as counsel for private complainant immediately after the criminal cases were raffled to Branch 44, which is presided by Judge Paas.Moreover, he contended that accused should view the situation to her advantage as the "Honorable Judge will preside over the cases with more caution and prudence than normally required of her."Finally, he asserted that the Motion would put to test the competence, credibility and impartiality of Judge Paas and would eventually allay the fear or apprehension of the accused and her counsel.

On September 3, 2001, private complainant likewise filed his Opposition to the Motion to Inhibit maintaining that the lone basis for the Motion was plain suspicion on the part of the accused as (a) Atty. Paas never appeared as counsel in subject cases, (b) Judge Paas had not done anything that would show bias and partiality against the accused, and (c) accused, through counsel, admitted in the hearing of August 31, 2001 that she had no evidence that would show that Atty. Paas was still helping private complainant in subject cases or that he was trying to influence their outcome.Moreover, private complainant contended that in situations where the judge is related in one way or another to a lawyer appearing in a case before him, the inhibition of one of them is sufficient.Accordingly, he insisted that the withdrawal of the lawyer would suffice considering that, as applied in that instant case, Atty. Paas only represented him during the preliminary investigation and withdrew as his counsel before subject cases were filed in court.Finally, private complainant alleged that the Motion was filed merely to delay the resolution of the cases.

In her Order dated September 13, 2001 Judge Paas denied that Motion to Inhibit for lack of merit.Thus, this Letter-Complaint.

The Oversight Committee, in its session of October 25, 2001, required Judge Estrelita M. Paas to comment on the Letter-Complaint within five (5) days from receipt thereof.Judge Paas was also advised to consider suspending the proceedings in subject cases until the issue of her inhibition was finally resolved so as not to render it moot and academic.

On October 31, 2001, the Committee received the Comment of Judge Paas.She maintained that the Motion to Inhibit on the ground of bias and partiality had no evidence or proof whatsoever.According to her, the cases were raffled to her sala only on November 20, 2000, after her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, who represented private complainant in the filing of subject cases with the Office of the City Prosecutor, withdrew his representation on March 22, 2000.Moreover, she claimed that she had no knowledge of the cases being handled by her husband as (a) she was busy attending to her cases in court, (b) she went on leave between March and April 2000 to go to US for medical treatment, and (c) she did not have any knowledge of what transpired between her husband and private complainant which led to the former's withdrawal as counsel of the latter.Furthermore, she contended that the scheduled successive hearings of subject cases on September 19 and October 3, 2001 should not be taken to indicate bias and partiality on her part as they were mandated by the Speedy Trial of Cases Circular of the Supreme Court.In fact, according to her, she had been lenient to the accused by allowing at least five (5) postponements of hearings at the instance of the latter despite verbal objections from private complainant.Finally, however, she resolved to abide by the decision of the Committee on her inhibition and to suspend hearing on subject cases until further notice.

We believe that Judge Estrellita M. Paas should inhibit herself from hearing Crim. Cases Nos. 00-3017 and 00-3018.An indispensable requirement of due process that is consistently demanded by the Court is "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." ¹ Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194 [1986], citing Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18[1973] and Gutierrez v. Santos, 2 SCRA 249 [1961].The judge is not only required to be impartial but he must also appear to be impartial. ² Ibid., citing People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295 [1986].The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states -

Sec. 1 Disqualification of judges . - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid reasons. ³ Parayno v. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807 [1994].The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before her.It points out to members of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition for, indeed, the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. ⁴ Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 [1973], as cited in Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada of Malolos, Bulacan, 155 SCRA 72 [1987].

Judge Paas, together with private complainant and Assistant Prosecutor Chan, never denied the fact that Atty. Paas represented private complainant in the subject cases.The relationship between Judge Paas and the former counsel of private complainant was established.Whether the representation covered only the preliminary investigation stage is immaterial.Rule 3.12 (d), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides-

A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.These cases include, among others, proceedings where:

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;

A magistrate, to be sure, must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants.She must hold herself above reproach and suspicion.At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in her actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative by to inhibit herself from the case. ⁵ Gutang v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 76 [1998].A judge should exercise her discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify herself.That way, she avoids being misunderstood, her reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. ⁶ Ibid., citing Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171 [1987], citing Bautista v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 [1981].

Ms. David could not be faulted for questioning the impartiality of Judge Paas, more so considering that the latter is married to Atty. Paas, the former counsel of private complainant.Indeed, the relationship may lead anyone, particularly Ms. David, to believe that the facts may be colored and the law distorted to the prejudice of a just decision.Thus, if only out of a sense of delicadeza, Judge Paas must inhibit.For like Caesar's wife, she should be above suspicion.In this regard, Judge Paa's attention is called to the Court's constant admonition, recently reiterated in Gacayan v. Pamintuan: ⁷ 314 SCRA 682, 700-701 [1999], citing Pimental v. Salanga, No. L-27934, 18 September 1967, 21 SCRA 160, reiterated in Gutang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124760, 8 July 1998, 292 SCRA 76.

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties.A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance[s] reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote.He is a man subject to the frailties of other men.He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where the party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to the others involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.If after reflection he should resolve to involuntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives and fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, rule 137.He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis supplied)

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Judge Estrellita M. Paas of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City, is ORDERED to INHIBIT herself from presiding over Crim. Cases Nos. 00-3017 to 00-3018, and the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City is DIRECTED to RAFFLE the cases anew for proper disposition.Buena, J., abroad on official business.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Asst. Clerk of Court

Back to Home | Back to Main

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE