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[G.R. No. 145221.September 12, 2001]

ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION vs. ORTALIZ

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT 12 2001.

G.R. No. 145221(Angeles University Foundation and Emmanuel Y. Angeles vs. Avelina Ortaliz, et al.)

On March 31, 1993, petitioner Angeles University Foundation (AUF) gave notice to respondents Avelina L. Ortaliz, Marilou Aquino, and Bernadeth T. Embuscado, all of whom were faculty members of AUF's College of Arts and Sciences, that they would be retrenched effective May 1, 1993 because of a reduction in enrollment due to a fire on March 17, 1993 which gutted the College of Arts and Sciences building.AUF also notified the Regional Director (Region III) of the Department of Labor and Employment of its intended action.

On July 13, 1993, AUF paid the amounts of P24, 638.40, P13,040.00, and P28,740.00 to respondents Ortaliz, Aquino, and Embuscado, respectively, as separation pay for which the latter signed quitclaims.Three days after, however, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against herein petitioner AUF and its President Emmanuel Y. Angeles.Respondents claimed that petitioners' alleged need to retrench was belied by the hiring of new faculty members shortly after their (respondents') separation from the service.

The Labor Arbiter upheld respondents' claim and ordered their reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and the payment to them of full backwages after deducting the separation pay received by them.He also ordered petitioners to pay each of the respondents P50,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees.

However, on appeal to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter's decision was reversed, although petitioners were ordered to pay respondents their salaries from May 2, 1996 until promulgation of the decision in accordance with Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

Respondents then filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which, in a decision, dated August 29, 2000, reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision.Petitioners received a copy of the decision on September 28, 2000.Hence, they had 15 days, until October 13, 2000, within which to appeal to this Court.

On October 16, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for a "thirty (30) days extension from 13 October 2000 or until 14 November 2000 (sic) within which to file their petition for review."On October 17, 2000, petitioners' counsel filed a manifestation explaining that the motion which was due on October 13, 2000 (Friday) was actually filed on October 16, 2000 (Monday) because their counsel's messenger suffered acute hypertension as attested to by a sworn medical certificate.

On October 27, 2000, the Court denied petitioners' motion for extension due to failure of petitioners (1) to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition on respondents and (2) to show timeliness of the said motion by stating the date when a copy of the assailed decision was received by them.

On November 20, 2000, the Court denied petitioners' petition for review, filed on November 14, 2000, for having been filed late and for failure of petitioners to timely pay the docket and other legal fees and deposit for costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of October 27, 2000 and later, another motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 20, 2000 denying their petition.

The Court finds no compelling reason to reconsider its denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time and petition for review.

First. Petitioners justify the late filing on October 16, 2000 of their motion for extension, which they say was on account of their messenger's hypertension, and their failure to submit an affidavit of service of copies of said motion, which they say "[d]ue to the confusion that attended the filing of the subject [m]otion."They submitted registry return cards to show receipt of their motion by the Office of the Solicitor General and respondents' counsel.

While the Court is willing to accept petitioners' justification for the late filing of the motion (which actually was not a ground for the denial of the same) as well as their failure to attach to their motion an affidavit of service, they have not explained the failure to state in their motion for extension the date they received the decision of the Court of Appeals to enable this Court to determine whether the motion was filed on time.Petitioners only supplied this information in their petition for review wherein they stated that they received the decision of the Court of Appeals on September 28, 2000.This is not sufficient as Rule 45, �2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that such date must be stated in the motion for extension of time to show that petitioners have not lost the 15-day reglementary period to file the same.

Moreover, even if petitioners' motion for extension were granted their petition for review which they filed on November 14, 2001 was filed late.Under Rule 45, �2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant an extension of 30 days within which to file the petition.The extension is counted from the expiration of the reglementary period, which in this case was on October 13, 2000.Since October had 31 days, the last day of the extension of 30 days would have been November 12, 2000.Since this day fell on a Sunday, the last day for filing the petition was on November 13, 2000 which was the next business day.The petition, however, was actually filed on November 14, 2000, outside the extension asked for.

In addition, petitioners were also late in paying the docket and other legal fees and deposit for costs, which should have been paid on October 13, 2000 in accordance with Rule 45, ��2 and 3 in relation to Rule 56, �5(c ).They paid the fees only on October 17, 2000.The result, therefore, is that the petition was denied not only because it was filed late but also because docket fees were paid late.

Second.In any event, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in taking cognizance o respondent's petition when the same is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not for certiorari under Rule 65 specifying the ground/s relied upon for the allowance of the same; (2) in holding that the quitclaims signed by respondents were not voluntary when the fact was that this matter was not in issue; (3) in holding that there was no valid ground for retrenchment; and (4) in failing to consider that the separation from service of respondents Embuscado and Aquino was also for just cause as administrative complaints had been filed against both.

Even assuming that the petition filed by respondents is one for review under Rule 45, the Court of Appeals is not precluded from treating the same as a petition for certiorari (Trans-Orient Overseas Contractors, Inc. v. NLRC, 180 SCRA 714 (1989)).

Nor were respondent's arguments in their petition before the Court of Appeals general.They argued that "when [the] NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision, it gave undue and unwarranted benefits to the [petitioners] AUF/Angeles, and by reason of which it acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with abuse of discretion; that the [respondents'] constitutional right and security of tenure was violated by the NLRC when it entered a new judgment dismissing the case."Pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of substantial justice.

By praying for the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter's decision, which held that their execution of quitclaims and notices of release did not stop from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners, respondents were in fact placing the validity of the quitclaims in issue.Indeed, it is not enough for an employer to simply claim that a quitclaim has been voluntarily executed by his employee who has been retrenched; the employer must also show that there was indeed a valid ground for such retrenchment (Philippine Carpet Employees Association, et al. v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. Nos. 140269-70, Sept. 14, 2000).In this case, petitioner's claim is that they suffered substantial losses from a fire which destroyed their building, as a result of which it became necessary for them to retrench.But the claim is belied by the fact that they hired 24 new faculty members in the other colleges as well as three new faculty members in the college of Arts and Sciences.In fact, as featured in the AUF's monthly publication News, petitioners planned major expenditures for school year 1993-1994 including salary increases and purchase of various equipment.

Anent petitioner's contention that respondents Embuscado and Aquino had been validly separated from the service because of administrative complaints filed against them, the same is an obvious afterthought as it is undisputed that they were retrenched instead of dismissed for just cause.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the resolutions of October 27, 2000 and November 20, 2000 are DENIED with FINALITY.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court

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