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[UDK No. 13050.April 1, 2002]
DE GUIA & TORRES vs. PNP & DOJ
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 01 APR 2002.
UDK No. 13050(Mary Jane De Guia and Jayson Torres vs. Philippines National Police and Department of Justice.)
Petitioners, coming to this Court as pauper litigants, seek in this petition for prohibition to enjoin the Philippine National Police (PNP) from enforcing, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting cases under Article 202, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (the Anti-Vagrancy Law), and the declaration of said law as unconstitutional.
On 03 August 2001, Mary Jane De Guia, sixteen years old, and Jayson Torres, fifteen years old, were among the youths arrested for violation of the Anti-Vagrancy Law. They pleaded guilty to the accusation and were ordered to pay a fine of P100.00 each in an order, dated 16 August 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89. Six days later, or on 22 August 2001, they were again arrested for the same offense. They are at present detained at the Molave Youth Home in Quezon City.
Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court:
1)�� Whether or not the anti-vagrancy law violates the principle of equality and non-discrimination under international customary law;
2)�� Whether the law violates the best interest of the child principle under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC);
3)�� Whether the law violates the equality and non-discrimination provisions and other relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), CRC, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and with respect to child-petitioner Mary Jane De Guia, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);
4)�� Whether the law violates the right to due process of law of child petitioners;
5) �� Whether the law violates the provisions of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty in conjunction with the Family Courts Act of 1997 as well as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. [1] cralaw
In its comment on the petition, the Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds:
1)�� The petition for prohibition should be denied where there is no allegation or charge of lack of jurisdiction or with having committed grave abuse of discretion;
2)�� Petitioners did not avail of other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law before filing the instant petition. Thus, they violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
3)�� The petition for prohibition did not comply with the "requisites of a judicial inquiry." Specifically, it failed to show that there is an actual justiciable controversy or case;
4)�� There is no necessity of deciding the purported constitutional questions presented in the petition.
We dismiss the petition.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "(w)hen the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer of ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require."
The writ of prohibition is a preventive remedy and its function is to prevent the doing of some act which is about to be done. [2] cralaw It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. [3] cralaw In the case before us, the act sought to be enjoined was already a fait accompli insofar as petitioners are concerned.
It would further appear that what petitioners intended was the prevention of their criminal prosecution for the offense under which they were charged, in which case prohibition is not the proper remedy. Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. [4] cralaw Indeed, petitioners failed to show that they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioners failed to state with certainty in what manner the PNP and the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction making the petition fatally defective. Finally, as the Solicitor General pointed out, petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts in filing the petition directly to this Court. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition which relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person must be filed in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial areas as defined by the Supreme Court, or in the Court of Appeals, whether or not it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
To further justify their stand, petitioners made a collateral challenge on the constitutionality of the Anti-Vagrancy Law. This, too, must fail.
Every court must approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable caution. [5] cralaw Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds. [6] cralaw Having ruled that the writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy of petitioners, there is no need for this Court to further rule on the constitutionality of the Anti-Vagrancy Law.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
The Court further Resolves to:
(a)GRANT the motion of the Solicitor General for a fourth extension of ten (10) days from February 17, 2002 within which to file a comment on the petition for prohibition; and
(b) NOTE the said comment thereafter filed.
PUNO, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[2] cralaw See Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. vs. IAC, 173 SCRA 581 (1989).
[3] cralaw Id., citing Cabanero vs. Torres, 61 Phil 522 (1935); Agustin, et al. vs. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515 (1949); Navarro vs. Lardizabal, 25 SCRA 370 (1968).
[4] cralaw See Paredes vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 126 (1996).
[5] cralaw See Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444 (1991).
[6] cralaw See La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828 (1989).
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