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[G.R. No. 146883.February 19, 2002]
VILORIA vs. CSC AND Q.C. MAYOR MATHAY, JR.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 19 2002.
G.R. No. 146883(Dante M. Viloria vs. Civil Service Commission and Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr.)
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44421, which affirmed the Resolution No. 966850 of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) upholding petitioner's separation from the service.
Petitioner is the former Assistant City Assessor of Quezon City detailed at the Office of then City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. sometime in September 1994.
On February 8, 1996, Mayor Mathay issued a Notice/Order of Separation addressed to petitioner dropping him from the rolls of the service effective October 3, 1994 because of absences without official leave since September 1, 1994. [1] cralaw
Petitioner appealed the said Order to the Commission contending that he had been regularly reporting for work during the period in question.
On October 21, 1996, the Commission affirmed petitioner's separation from the service ruling that petitioner "did not submit any document which will establish his whereabouts after said date, such as the log book where the employees normally record the time of their arrival and departure from the office." [2] cralaw
The motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals contending inter alia:(a) that the documents he presented to the Commission are sufficient proof that he had been reporting for work during the period in question; (b) that the latter of the Secretary to the Mayor and the Certifcation of the City Personnel Officer relied upon by the Commission have no probative value; (c) that the doctrine of res judicata applies in view of the dismissal by NCR-CSC Director Benita Santos of the charge against him for falsification of his daily time records; (d) that he was denied due process of law when he was dropped from the service without notice and hearing; (e) that his detail to the Officer of the Mayor is illegal; (f) that he had submitted his daily time records to respondent Mayor but the latter failed to act thereon; and (g) that respondent Mayor connived with City Assessor Rosas to remove him from his position.
On May 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
Petitioner now comes to us reiterating the issues/arguments raised before the Court of Appeals.
We resolve to deny the petition.
The issues raised are factual.It is a settled rule that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioner in the Commission and analyze or weigh them to ascertain if the respondent Commission and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. [3] cralaw Moreover, factual findings by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.They are entitled to great weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings arrived at by respondent Commission. [4] cralaw When supported by sufficient evidence, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, are not to be disturbed on appeal. [5] cralaw
Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process is erroneous.It must be noted that after Mayor Mathay furnished him a copy of the Notice/Order of Separation, petitioner appealed the order to the Commission and when the Commission dismissed his appeal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.Admittedly, petitioner was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side.The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [6] cralaw What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, [7] cralaw hence, petitioner cannot feign denial of due process.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error when it issued the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Annex "C", p. 66, Rollo.
[2] cralaw Annex "F", p. 75, Rollo.
[3] cralaw Tinio vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 460 [1999].
[4] cralaw Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995]; Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151 [1994]; First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 [1996]; Fortune Motors Phils. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 653 [1997]; Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc. 306 SCRA 762, 774 [1999].
[5] cralaw Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178 [1996].
[6] cralaw Arboleda vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38 [1999]; Libres vs. NLRC, 307 SCRA 675 [1999]; Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340 [1999].
[7] cralaw DBP vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 362 [1999]; Loong vs. Comelec, 305 SCRA 832 [1999].
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