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[G.R. Nos. 147062-64.February 26, 2002]
REP. OF THE PHILS., etc., vs. COCOFED, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 26 2002.
G.R. Nos. 147062-64(Republic of the Philippines, etc., vs. COCOFED, et al.)
Before the Court are three Motions for Reconsideration regarding the disqualification/inhibition of three members of the Court from the present case.
First, in its Motion dated 30 November 2002, the Republic - through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) - asks for the setting aside of our Resolution dated 18 September 2001, which denied the inhibition of Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.While admitting that Justice Santiago is not disqualified under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, [1] cralaw petitioner is nonetheless asking her to inhibit herself voluntarily, "premised not only on the peril of possible unconscious bias but also on the need to appear impartial rather than on actual acts indicating partiality and bias" arising from the "close personal association" between Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and Spouses Casimiro M. Ynares (Justice Santiago's brother) and Rebecca Alcantara Ynares. Petitioner adds that "the question from a curious public, especially the millions of true impoverished farmers who have so much at stake in its outcome, is whether the Honorable Justice will be able to participate therein free from the reasonable apprehension that powerful familial and political bonds, no matter how indirect, may unduly influence, even though unconsciously, her objectivity and impartiality."
Second, in his Motion dated January 16, 2002, Respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr., through Counsel Estelito P. Mendoza, prays for the reconsideration of our Resolution dated 11 December 2001, which denied the inhibition of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio.Movant alleges that Justice Carpio is among the petitioners in GR No. 147036, Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) et al. v. Executive Secretary, which prays that "Executive Order No. 312 and 313 and Article III, Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1468 be declared null and void for being contrary to the Philippine Constitution and that this Honorable Court affirm that coconut levy funds are in the nature of public funds."Furthermore, prior to his joining the Court, Justice Carpio supposedly wrote in his column in the Sunstar Manila issues of December 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2000, that "coconut levy funds are public funds."Finally, it is also argued that Justice Carpio was "legal adviser to the President of the Philippines" when the latter issued Executive Order No. 277 "directing that the coconut levy funds be treated, utilized, administered and managed as public funds."
Third, in its Motion dated 22 January 2002, petitioner, also through the OSG and the PCGG, pleads for the reversal of our Resolution dated 20 November 2002, which denied the Motion to Disqualify Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan.Petitioner calls attention to its corollary Motion to Admit Documents dated 3 December 2002, in which it attached certified true copies of (a) "letters dated 12 May 2000 and 02 August 2000 of Atty. Estelito Mendoza to the PCGG showing that Atty. Tamano is an associate in his law firm," (b) "a pleading (Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) filed and signed by Atty. Estelito Mendoza in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 pending with the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan x x x indicating that Atty. Tamano is an associate in his law firm," (c) a "copy of a Counter Manifestation dated 25 July 2001 signed by Atty. Estelito Mendoza" in the same cases, stating expressly that "Attys. Orlando A. Santiago and Adel A. Tamano [were] associates of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza. . . ."Petitioner contends that since Atty. Tamano is Justice Kapunan's son-in-law, he should be disqualified under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 or at least inhibit himself voluntarily under the second paragraph.
After due deliberation and purposeful discussion, the Court hereby RESOLVES to DENY WITH FINALITY all the foregoing Motions for Reconsideration, for the following reasons:
(1)������ The first two Motions merely reiterate the grounds already known to the Court when it issued the assailed Resolutions and on which the justices repeat their opinions. [2] cralaw Petitioner merely rehases the allegations regarding the alleged "close relations" between Respondent Cojuangco and Justice Santiago's brother and sister-in-law.Similarly, during the Court's deliberations on this case, Justice Carpio already raised the matters alleged in Respondent Cojuangco's Motion and offered to inhibit himself.However, the Court resolved to turn down the offer because the main issue here - namely, "Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their reversion to the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan?" - is not at issue in GR No. 147036.Moreover, the constitutionality of EO 312 and 313 and Article III, Section 5 of PD 1468 is not involved in this case.Neither was it discussed in our Decision.The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has written on the coconut levy will not disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will not be disqualified just because they may have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question involved in a case.Nor are we persuaded that merely being legal adviser to the President who issued EO 277 is decisive of disqualification.In fact, in 1949 the Court denied the Motion to Disqualify Justice Sabino Padilla, grounded on the notion that as justice secretary he had advised the President on the question of emergency powers.In denying the Motion, the Court said that, aside from the fact that the Motion was filed after Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of these cases, "the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act on these cases, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties.The President is not here a party." [3] cralaw Besides, appointees to the highest court of the land forsake all previous associations - political or otherwise - when they begin their incumbency.They are beholden only to their fidelity to the Court itself and to the dispensation of justice.
(2)������ Justice Kapunan's son-in-law was just an associate, not a partner, in the Mendoza law firm - a relationship that does not fall within the ambit of compulsory disqualification."A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137." [4] cralaw In any case, Atty. Tamano already resigned from the Mendoza law office in August last year.
(3)������ Voluntary inhibitions are addressed to the sound discretion of the justice concerned. [5] cralaw In the present case, the magistrates concerned believe in good faith that, notwithstanding the allegations in the three Motions, they can render justice fairly and in good faith in the present proceedings.The Court does not doubt this.
(4)������ Being collegiate in nature, the Supreme Court allows greater leeway to its members in applying the rule on inhibition/disqualification.In case of doubts, it defers to the sound judgment of the individual magistrate, believing that all members of the Court are capable of discharging their sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor."It is for him alone, therefore, to determine his disqualification." [6] cralaw
SO ORDERED. (Melo, J. took no part; Puno, J. filed a separate opinion; Kapunan, J. joined by Justices Santiago and Gutierrez filed a separate opinion)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN , J.:
As ground of respondent Cojuangco's motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of December 11, 2001, specifically the portion which resolved to DENY Justice Antonio T. Carpio's inhibition and to DIRECT him to vote, respondent Cojuangco stated that it was inappropriate and the Court was without jurisdiction to issue such resolution.
I fully respect Justice Carpio's decision to participate in the voting because of his honest perception that no valid grounds exist to disqualify him.His decision was based on the exercise of his own discretion.
The grounds for disqualification of a judge or judicial officer under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court are mandatory under the first paragraph and discretionary under the second paragraph:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, on in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written counsel of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The reason for disqualification is aptly stated, thus:
The rule on disqualification of a judge, whether compulsory or voluntary, to hear a case finds its rationale in the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent, which is aimed at preserving the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.In the case of compulsory disqualification, the law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned.In the case of voluntary inhibition, the law leaves to the judge to decide for himself the question as to whether he will desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him, unless he cannot discern for himself his inability to meet the test of the cold neutrality required of him, in which event the appellate court will see to it that he disqualify himself.
In the case of compulsory disqualification under paragraph 1, the law presumes that the judge cannot objectively and impartially decide the case before him, hence, he has to recuse, unless all the parties concerned give their written consent.Paragraph 2 refers to instances where a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from sitting in a case for reasons other than those enumerated in paragraph 1.The decision to inhibit himself from a case is left primarily to the sound discretion of the judge, based on rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before him.A voluntary inhibition on the part of the judge is allowed in recognition of the fact that there might be other causes that could conceivably erode his objectivity besides pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication.1 There is no question then that voluntary inhibitions are addressed to the sound discretion of the judge or justice concerned.
My recollection of the events when the Court deliberated on G.R. Nos. 147062-64 on December 11, 2001, is that Justice Carpio proposed to inhibit himself.However, upon the advice of one or two justices that he need not inhibit, he proceeded to participate in the voting.I am not aware of the Court having formally deliberated or voted upon the matter.Such being the case, to my understanding, Justice Carpio's decision to participate in the voting was wholly his, in the exercise of his discretion, based on his rational and logical assessment of the facts and on his conviction that he could exercise his duty and prerogative in a way which is wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO , J.:
I am unable to fully participate in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Cojuangco, thru counsel, dated January 16, 2002 of our Resolution dated December 11, 2001 regarding the non-inhibition of Mr. Justice Carpio in the cases at bar.I was out of the country on December 11, 2001 on official business and hence, have no knowledge whether the Court "directed" Justice Carpio to vote nor am I privy to the factual and legal reasons relied upon by the Court "to turn down the offer" of Mr. Justice Carpio to inhibit.Be that as it may, I venture the personal view that the matter of inhibition raised by the respondent should be left to the judgment alone of Mr. Justice Carpio.
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Section 1, Rule 137:
"Section 1.Disqualification of judges.-No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
[2] cralaw In CIR v. CA, 267 SCRA 599, 607, February 6, 1997, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration because "the basic issues raised therein having already been passed upon in said decision and there being no substantial arguments to support said motion."
[3] cralaw Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 432, August 26, 1949, per Tuason, J.
[4] cralaw Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, 166, September 18, 1967, per Sanchez, J.
[5] cralaw Sevilleja v. Laggui, AM No. RTJ-01-1612, August 14, 2001; Latorre v. Ansaldo, AM No. RTJ-00-1563, May 31, 2000; People v. Kho, GR No. 139381, April 20, 2001; Gutang v. CA, 354 Phil. 77, July 8, 1998.
[6] cralaw CIR v. CA, supra, p. 606, per curiam.
1 Gulang vs. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 73 (July 8, 1988).
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