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[G.R. No. 141949.� August 11, 2003]
PADUA vs. RANADA
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 11 2003.
G.R. No. 141949 (Ceferino Padua vs. Hon. Santiago Ranada, Presiding Judge of Makati, RTC, Branch 137, Philippine National Construction Corp., Toll Regulatory Board, Department of Public Works and Highways, and Republic of the Philippines.)
G.R. No. 151108 (Eduardo C. Zialcita, vs. Toll Regulatory Board and Citra Metro Manila Toll Ways Corporation.)
R E S O L U T I O N
At bar are two (2) motions for reconsideration, separately filed by petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita, of our Decision dated October 14, 2002 dismissing the "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order" [1] cralaw and "Petition for Prohibition" [2] cralaw for being procedurally impermissible and in violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the main, movants want this Court to disregard the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies, contending that these are merely procedural rules which should not defeat substantive rights.
In their comment, public respondents Judge Santiago Ranada, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), through the Solicitor General, merely lifted portions of the assailed Decision and prayed that the motions be denied for being a rehash of petitioners' allegations in their petition. Private respondent Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) likewise invoked our pronouncement, praying that the motions be dismissed for lack of merit. For its part, public respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) rebuked petitioner Padua for ignoring the remedies suggested in the Decision.
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are conceived for the effective functioning of the administrative agencies and the courts. They cannot simply be disregarded, more so, in these cases where the crux of the controversy is whether or not the toll rate is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. It will be in the interest of both parties that the same be addressed first to the agency concerned, it being essentially a question of fact that requires reception of evidence.
It must be understood that rate fixing involves a series of technical operations into the details of which the Supreme Court is ill-equipped to enter. [3] cralaw What is a just and reasonable rate is not merely a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the evidence; [4] cralaw it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. [5] cralaw In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. This, we cannot effectively do without the facts upon which we can base our judgment. Time and again we have ruled that this Court is not a trier of facts. [6] cralaw Necessarily, it will work to both parties' advantage if they are given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their claims before the proper administrative agencies.
Indeed, the focal point for judicial review of an administrative action should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. [7] cralaw The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate standards of review to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court and the reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusion based on such inquiry. [8] cralaw
Here, the Court maintains its resolve not to interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulations of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. [9] cralaw Until the proper recourse is exhausted, a suit before the court is premature and must be dismissed. This is required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may: (1) function efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its own errors; (2) afford the parties and the court the benefit of its experience and expertise without the threat of litigious interruption; and (3) compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. This means that the exhaustion doctrine does not preclude, but only defers, judicial review until after the expert administrative body has built a factual record and rendered a final decision. [10] cralaw
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Justice Panganiban reiterates his Separate Opinion.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo of G.R. No. 141949, pp. 557-567.
[2] cralaw Rollo of G.R. No. 151108, pp. 3-13.
[3] cralaw Republic vs. Medina, supra.
[4] cralaw State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. City of Springfield vs. Springfield Gas & Electric Co., 125 N.E. 891.
[5] cralaw Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 12, 1989, 180 SCRA 218.
[6] cralaw La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-55674, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 679.
[7] cralaw Florida Power & Light Co. vs. Lorion, 470 US 729, 84 L Ed. 2d 643, 105 S Ct. 1598; New Mexico Enviromenttal Improv. Div. V. Thomas (CA10) 789 F2d 825.
[8] cralaw 2 Am Jur 2d � 518
[9] cralaw First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117499, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 540.
[10] cralaw 2 AM Jur 2d � 505
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