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[G.R. No. 154651.
CINCO vs. CA
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
G.R. No. 154651(Jovencio F. Cinco, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Jose A. Bernas, respondents.)
This case stemmed from the Information filed on
Upon arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty.Thereafter, trial ensued.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, on
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65413, alleging that the trial court, in denying his Motion to Dismiss/Demurrer to Evidence, acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated January 22, 2001 denying the Demurrer to Evidence, as well as its Orders dated March 22, 2001 and May 30, 2001 denying, respectively, the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered granting petitioner's Motion to Dismiss dated May 31, 2000 and dismissing Criminal Case No. 99-391. No costs.
"SO ORDERED."
In granting respondent's petition and dismissing Criminal Case No. 99-391, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
"Prefatorily, libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice (Vicario vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 25 [1999]).
x x x
"The focal question in this petition is thus: Did the prosecution properly establish the element of publication of the imputation, such that a verdict of conviction against the accused may be justly sustained if he failed to disprove such element?
"It did not.
"At bar, the prosecution was only able to show that private
complainant was able to read the letter in controversy.Cinco testified that he personally received
the letter through the mail on
x x x
"x x x, there is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement (Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 460 [1999]). It must be shown that at least a third person could identify the offended party as the object of the libelous publication (Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 [1999]). These are but a reiteration of the earlier case of Corpus vs. Cuadreno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807 [1996]) where the High Court declared:
'In order to maintain a libel suit it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the plaintiff was intended, or if he is pointed out by extraneous circumstancessothatpersonsknowinghim could and did understand that he was the person referred to.'
"Lamentably, the foregoing requisites (of libel) have not been complied with in the instant case. What were presented instead were affidavits executed by persons who allegedly read the libelous letter and authenticated by Jovencio Cinco who allegedly knew these persons and the facts that they attested to. Yet the affiants were never presented in court to validate their claim. x x x
"Settled is the rule that affidavits are generally hearsay, and have no probative value unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon (People vs. Rendoque, 322 SCRA 622 [2000]). Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible x x x. The prosecution having failed to present Ricardo Librea, Jesus Ma. Turla, Alex Pardo and Carlos Ramos (affiants) as witnesses, their affidavits were patently inadmissible and deserve no consideration at all. Consequently, the element of publication was not accurately demonstrated in this case.
"Equally virulent to the prosecution's cause is its utter failure to produce any direct evidence that Bernas personally caused the publication and circulation of the disparaging letter among the members of the Makati Sports Club. The evidence presented is at best circumstantial. Marian Punzalan testified that she produced two sets of mailing labels which were later delivered by their messenger to the accused several days before the subject letter was circulated (TSN, July 22, 1999, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 169-170). Unfortunately, Punzalan also admitted that other persons also secured mailing labels at that time and that other personnel of the Makati Sports Club had access to the production of mailing labels (TSN, September 2, 1999, pp. 39-40; Rollo, pp. 219-220). Records also reveal that three (3) boxes of envelopes with mailing labels under the care of another person were reported missing several days before the libelous letter was purportedly published (Exhibit 'H;' Rollo, p. 377). The concordant combination and cumulative effect of these circumstances do not satisfy the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. They do not effectively exclude the possibility that other persons may have made the said letter and eventually caused its publication.
"Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that in order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of the circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused (People vs. Acosta, 326 SCRA 49 [2000]). To support a conviction, the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt (People vs. Dacibar, 325 SCRA 725 [2000]). Fittingly, the circumstantial evidence advanced by the prosecution, by itself, is not sufficient to support Bernas' conviction with moral certainty.
x x x
"x x x. As shown by our previous disquisition, petitioner has satisfactorily demonstrated in his demurrer that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against him.Apropos, to refuse to grant the demurrer to evidence despite the clear absence of evidence to sustain a conviction, amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The trial court thus committed grave abuse of discretion. When there remains no reason to hold accused for further trial, the inevitable duty of the court is to acquit him or dismiss the criminal case."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated
Instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner resorted to the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65.This is a procedural infirmity. It is basic that certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
At any rate, even if the instant petition is the appropriate remedy, still the same is dismissible.
In Ong vs. People, [2] cralaw this Court ruled that "a dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable as the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy."
In the recent case of People vs. Sandiganbayan and Geronimo Z. Velasco, [3] cralaw this Court held that "once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal, and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy."
This Court, in People vs. Velasco, [4] cralaw explained the finality-of-acquittal rule, thus:
"The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into 'the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x' (United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310). Thus Green expressed the concern that '(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty' (355 U.S. 1842, L. Ed. 2nd 199,ALR2d 1119).
"It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is 'part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction' (Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and Unreasonable Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 69 [1980]). The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for 'repose,' a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability (Paul Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1018, 1022 [1980]). With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding (Comments, Tulane Law Review, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and The Government's Right to Appeal Sentences: After the Supreme Court's Green Light-Dare We Proceed? [Vol. 56, No. 2, Feb. 1982, at 702])."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Sergio L. Pesta�o and Amelita G. Tolentino; Rollo at 59-68.
[2] cralaw 342 SCRA 372, 376; 387 (2000).
[3] cralaw G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, citing Ong vs. People, ibid.; People vs. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 247 (1976); Almario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 127772, March 22, 2001; People vs. Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 55 (1994); People vs. Gines, 197 SCRA 481(1991); People vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
[4] cralaw 340 SCRA 207, 240-241 (2000).
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