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[G.R. No. 162882.� April 27, 2004]
TADENA vs. COMELEC
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 27 2004 .
G.R. No. 162882 (Flora T. Tadena vs. Commission on Elections En Banc, Hon. Dominador Ll. Arquelada, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, Vigan City, and Alfred R. Figueras.)
In the 2001 elections, the mayoralty post of the Municipality of Santo Domingo, Ilocos Sur, was contested by two candidates, namely: petitioner Floro T. Tadena ("Tadena"), and then incumbent mayor Alfred R. Figueras ("Figueras"). After due canvass of the elections returns, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Tadena as the winner over Figueras, the former having obtained Five Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Five (5,465) votes as against the latter's Four Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Nine (4,979) votes.1
On 22 May 2002, Figueras filed an election protest, which was docketed and assigned to Regional Trial Court Branch 21 ("RTC"), Ilocos Sur, with respondent Judge Dominador Arquelada ("Judge Arquelada") presiding. The revision of ballots commenced on 20 June 2001, and ended on 11 December 2001. Thereafter, the parties made their respective formal offers of evidence consisting solely of the revision results with written comments, objections and claims to ballots. The case was submitted for resolution on April 25, 2002.2
On 12 July 2002, the RTC released to the parties its decision dated also on 12 July 2002 in favor of Figueras, annulling the proclamation of Tadena and declaring Figueras as the duly elected mayor. The RTC found that Figueras had garnered Four Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Two (4,462) votes, as opposed to Tadena's Three Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Eight (3,998) votes.3
On 16 July 2002, Tadena filed two Notices of Appeal, subsequently docketed with the COMELEC as EAC No. 18-2002. To date, Tadena's appeal is still pending with the COMELEC.
On 17 July 2002, Figueras filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal before the RTC, praying for the immediate execution of its Decision. On the same day, Judge Arquelada set the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal for hearing on 24 July 2002. Tadena was also directed to file his respective Comment/Opposition.4
On 22 July 2002, Tadena filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injuction. Assailed therein was the manner by which the 12 July 2002 RTC Decision was promulgated, the speed by which the same was arrived at, and the RTC's appreciation of the ballots and conclusions reached therefrom. 5 Tadena also claimed therein that as the RTC Decision was seriously flawed, execution pending appeal should not be granted. Figueras filed an Answer to Tadena's certiorari petition, arguing that certiorari cannot be availed of the speedy and adequate remedy of appeal having been already availed of.6
The COMELEC Special Second Division7 initially denied Tadena's prayer for injunctive relief on 13 August 2002, but the COMELEC Second Division8 granted the TRO on 6 September 2002 upon motion for reconsideration by Tadena.9 The TRO enjoined the RTC from acting on any incident or matter in the election protest pertaining to the controversy elevated to the COMELEC on certiorari, particularly from, acting or conducting hearings on Figueras' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal 10
Subsequently, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution 11 dated 27 March 2003, dismissing the petition and ruling, among others, that as there was still an appeal, certiorari was not the plain and speedy remedy provided in law.12 A Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed by Tadena, but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated 6 April 2004.13 On 13 April 2004, Tadena filed before this Court the present Petition for Certiorari, with a corresponding prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Notably, Tadena resorted to two modes of review before the COMELEC, both aimed at invalidating the RTC decision upholding the election protest. First, on 16 July 2002, Tadena filed two Notices of Appeal both relating to the 12 July 2002 RTC Decision, with the appeal consequently docketed before the COMELEC as EAC No. A-18-2002. Second, on 22 July 2002, Tadena also filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 30-2002, likewise praying that the 12 July 2002 RTC Decision be nullified. Both the ordinary appeal and the certiorari petition arise from common set of facts, posit identical legal arguments, and seek the same ultimate relief: the nullification of the 12 July 2002 RTC Decision. The COMELEC however has only disposed of the special civil action before it, and not the appeal to the/ RTC Decision lodged by Tadena.
Tadena's arguments in his Petition for Certiorari with the COMELEC, as well in his Petition before the Court, pertain to the promulgation of the 12 July 2002 Decision by the RTC, and the appreciation of ballots by the RTC in deciding the election protest.
Anent the first issue, Tadena claims that the 12 July 2002 RTC Decision was never promulgated, since he never received prior notice that the decision was to be promulgated in open court in compliance with Rule 35, Section 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 14 , nor was the decision delivered to the clerk of court for proper filing, publication and release.15 Acting on the issue, the COMELEC correctly applied our ruling in Lindo v. COMELEC 16 that the failure to give advance notice of the promulgation does not render the decision invalid. At most if at all, it is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor of the promulgation.17 Tadena adverts to Justice Melencio-Herrera's concurring opinion in Lindo which opined that the advance notice was part of the process of promulgation that should not be disregarded.18 Yet he fails to cite Justice Melencio-Herrera's conclusion in the same opinion that "non-complicance with the letter of the requirement is not a reversible error nor does it invalidate the promulgation."19
Nor can credence be given to Tadena's contention that the Decision was not filed with the RTC Clerk of Court and thus should be deemed not promulgated. This, according to the petitioner, was proved by a purported Certification issued by the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court that the RTC Decision in the election protest was not yet received by that office as of 19 July 2002.20 This document was not accorded value by the COMELEC for an understandable reason. It is, on its face, unauthenticated. Assuming that is a genuine writing issued by a public officer such as the clerk of court, such public document does not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, unless evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy.21 Since there is no proof of such official record, this "certification" must be considered a private document, and bereft of evidentiary value absent collateral proof of due execution and genuineness.22 The COMELEC thus properly relied on the presumption of regularity in holding that the RTC Decision was promulgated in accordance with the proper procedure.
The second issue raised by Tadena concerns alleged flaws in the appreciation of the ballots subject of the election protest. Even assuming that the respondent judge erred in the appreciation of the documentary evidence, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie, as no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged wrongful appreciation of facts and evidence.23 Refutations of the merits of the decision of a trial court in an election protest, specifically in the appreciation of contested ballots, should be properly threshed out in the ordinary appeal still pending before the COMELEC, and not through a special civil action for certiorari.24 This was the correct conclusion reached by the COMELEC in its assailed resolutions. Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse and is a limited form of review, its principal function being to keep inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction.25
It is well settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over special civil actions of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.26 In relation to the COMELEC's appellate jurisdiction over decisions on election protests rendered by the RTC, the Court has previously sustained the COMELEC's resort to the writ of certiorari to nullify executions pending appeal granted by the trial court.27 Assuming that Tadena's ultimate motive was to prevent the RTC from executing its decision pending appeal, resort to certiorari was clearly premature, as the RTC had yet to issue an order granting immediate execution. Had there been such an order promulgated, the same could have properly been the object of a petition for certiorari by Tadena before the COMELEC. But as there was none, the COMELEC properly concluded that there was no compelling reason to grant Tadena's petition. Indeed, the poll body did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 80
2 Id., at 84.
3 Id. at 353.
4 I d , pp. 10-11
5 Id., at 11
6 Id., at 12.
7 Composed of Presiding Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioners Resurreccion Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
8 Resolution penned by Presiding Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, concurred in by Commissioners Borra and Tuason.
9 Rollo, p. 12.
10 ld., at 417.
11 Resolution penned by Presiding Commissioner Sadain, concurred in by Commissioners Borra and Tuason.
12 Rollo, pp. 429-444.
13 The COMELEC En Banc composed of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr., and Commissioners Javier, Sadain, Borra, Tuason, Virgilio Garcillano and Manuel Barcelona.
14 "Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. - The decision of the Court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties, xxx"
15 Petition for Review, p. 15.
16 G.R. No. 95016, 11 February 1991, 194 SCRA 25.
17 Lindo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95016, 11 February 1991, 194 SCRA 25 (1991).
18 Rollo, p. 16.
19 Lindo v. COMELEC, supra note 13, at 35.
20 Annex "N" to the Petition for Certiorari.
21 See Section 24, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Section 23, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court. See also Matugas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151944, 20 January 2004.
22 See Section 20, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.
23 People v. Hon. Chavez, 411 Phil. 482, 492. (2001).
24 Guttierez v. COMELEC, 337 Phil. 143, 151 (1997).
25 Obando v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 124, 130 (2001), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95533, November 20, 2000.
26 Relampagos v. Cumba, 313 Phil. 626, 642 (1995).
27 See, e.g., Camilian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 124169, 18 April 1997; Nazareno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126977, 12 September 1997; Fermo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140179, 13 March 2000.
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