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[G.R. No. 148056-61.� December 1, 2004]
PEOPLE vs. DE CASTRO
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated DEC 1 2004.
G.R. NO. 148056-61 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE DE CASTRO y DE TORRES.)
Up for resolution is accused-appellant Jose de Castro's Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 October 2003 of Our Decision promulgated on 08 October 2003 affirming the trial court's decision finding him guilty of five (5) counts of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, and to pay each private complainant P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each case proved. The Decision convicted him of the said crime in Criminal Cases No. 10242, No. 10243, No. 10244, No. 10245 and No. 10247. Accused-appellant, however, was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 10246.
The instant Motion substantially raises the following grounds:
1.�������� That this Court did not consider the doctrine laid down in the case of People v. Chua [1] cralaw where it was held that in incestuous rape, the moral dominance of the father over his daughter cannot substitute for force and intimidation in proving the guilt of the accused;
2.�������� That the burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution;
3.�������� That accused-appellant was able to account for his whereabouts at the time the alleged crime occurred; hence, this Court should have given weight to accused-appellant's defense of alibi and denial;
4.�������� That there were serious doubts on the veracity and credibility of the private complainants' testimony;
5.�������� That in all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused for it is better to acquit a guilty man than to unjustly bring in prison one whose guilt has not been proven beyond the required quantum of evidence.
We are not convinced.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the grounds raised herein were already passed upon by this Court. We, however, find it proper to discuss the first and the third grounds as the same have not been exhaustively discussed in the assailed decision.
As to the first ground, accused-appellant, in an effort to exculpate himself, relied heavily on the case of People v. Chua. [2] cralaw We, however, find that the said case does not fall squarely with the case at bar.
In People v. Chua, [3] cralaw private complainant accused her father of having carnal knowledge of her through force, threat and intimidation. The totality of evidence presented by the prosecution, however, was bereft of any showing that private complainant's consent was vitiated when her womanhood was surrendered. When accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant, he did not use any weapon to threaten her into submission. Neither did accused-appellant threaten her with blackmail or words of terror. Thus, we ruled therein that in incestuous rape, the mere fact that the father exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto lead us to conclude that there was intimidation.
In the case under consideration, records reveal that the accused-appellant's moral influence over the victim, coupled with the use of threats and intimidations, has instilled fear in the victims' mind whenever accused succumbed to his perverted proclivities.
In any event, in more recent cases, [4] cralaw we ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the accused-appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. Thus, in People v. Servano, [5] cralaw we held:
Granted that the prosecution failed to prove that appellant employed force and intimidation upon his daughter, appellant's conviction by the trial court for the crime of rape is nevertheless affirmable. We have to bear in mind that, in incest rape, the minor victim is at a great disadvantage because the assailant, by his overpowering and overbearing moral influence, can easily consummate his bestial lust with impunity. As a consequence, proof of force and violence is unnecessary unlike where the accused is not an ascendant or blood relative of the victim. Thus, the failure of the victim to explicitly verbalize, as in this case, the use of force, threat, or intimidation by the accused should not adversely affect the case of the prosecution as long as there is adequate proof that sexual intercourse did take place.
Anent the second ground, the same is without merit.
As we have repeatedly held, courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. [6] cralaw Neither can plain denial, a negative self-serving evidence, stand against positive identification and categorical testimony given by a victim of rape. [7] cralaw For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. [8] cralaw The proponent must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The two-fold requisite of time and place must be strictly met.
In this case, the foregoing requirement has not been met. Accused-appellant failed to substantiate his alibi that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crimes.
In rape cases such as these cases at bar, while denial and alibi are legitimate defenses, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. [9] cralaw In this case, the victim was very positive in her testimony both to the identification of the accused and his commission of the crimes.
Moreover, in People v. Tabayoyong [10] cralaw which is the case cited by accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, though weak, was given accord by this Court because the prosecution therein miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as it relied heavily on the uncorroborated testimony of the state witness whose testimony was, in fact, subsequently found by this Court to be incredible. In contrast, the prosecution in the case at bar has satisfactorily discharged the burden of proof. Hence, the principle enunciated in the case cited by the accused-appellant does not find application in the case under consideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit."
Corona, J., on leave.
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw G.R. No. 137841, 01 October 2001, 366 SCRA 283.
[2] cralaw Ibid.
[3] cralaw Id.
[4] cralaw People v. Orillosa, G.R. Nos. 148716-18, 07 July 2004; People v. Cea, G.R. Nos. 146462-63, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 326.
[5] cralaw G.R. Nos. 143002-03, 17 July 2003, 406 SCRA 508.
[6] cralaw People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004; People v. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 154917, 18 May 2004; People v. Pala�a, G.R. No. 124053, 20 March 2002, 379 SCRA 553; People v. Tagun, G.R. No. 137745, 15 February 2002, 377 SCRA 154; People v. Luzorata, G.R. No. 122478, 24 February 1998, 286 SCRA 487; People v. Ca�ada, G.R. No. 112176, 06 February 1996, 253 SCRA 277; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, 08 February 1994, 229 SCRA 754; People v. Querido, G.R. No. 95319, 07 February 1994, 229 SCRA 745.
[7] cralaw People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, 20 May 2004; People v. Magtibay, G.R. No. 142985, 06 August 2002, 386 SCRA 332; People v. Isla, Jr., G.R. Nos. 140211-13, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 676; People v. Marquez, G.R. Nos. 137408-10, 08 December 2000, 347 SCRA 510.
[8] cralaw Ibid.
[9] cralaw People v. Cachapero, supra note 7; People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 135877, 22 August 2002, 387 SCRA 638.
[10] cralaw G.R. No. L-31084 29 May 1981, 104 SCRA 724.
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