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[G.R. Nos. 140900 & 140911. February 17, 2004]

PEOPLE vs. LICAYAN

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 17 2004.

G.R. Nos. 140900 & 140911 (People of the Philippines vs. Roderick Licayan @ Rudy, Roberto Lara @ Tungkoy/ Unyok, et al.)

This treats of the Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court (Motion to Re-Open) dated January 15, 2004 filed by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) on behalf of death convicts Roberto Lara (Lara) and Roderick Licayan (Licayan).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Decision dated August 15, 2001 (363 SCRA 234), the Court found Lara and Licayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and affirmed the imposition of the death penalty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272. The Court in its Resolution dated October 9, 2001 denied accused-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration. The Decision became final and executory on November 9, 2001.

On November 18, 2003, the RTC issued a Warrant of Execution ordering the execution of Lara and Licayan on January 30, 2004 at 3:00 p.m.

On January 15, 2004, the PAO filed the instant Motion to Re-Open praying that, in view of the recent arrest of Rogelio delos Reyes (delos Reyes) and Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), Lara and Licayan's co-accused, the Court issue a resolution ordering: (1) the deferment of the scheduled executions of Lara and Licayan; and (2) the re-opening and remand of the cases of Lara and Licayan to the court a quo for further trial and reception of defense evidence.

In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 20, 2004, the PAO on January 22, 2004 submitted among other evidence in support of its Motion to Re-Open:

1. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 21, 2004 of accused delos Reyes declaring that Lara did not have anything to do with the kidnapping, that the latter was not at the place where the victims were brought after the kidnapping, and that Licayan just happened to pass by said place;

2. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 21, 2004 of accused Mabansag stating that Lara was not involved in the crime because the latter was then working as a laborer in construction sites in Cavite and Antipolo, that Lara was not at the place where the victims were brought after the kidnapping, but that Licayan was at the said place.

On January 23, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment recommending that the Motion to Re-Open be granted.

On January 26, 2004, the Court heard the parties on oral argument on the sole issue of whether the affidavits presented to support the Motion to Re-Open constitute newly-discovered evidence that will warrant a new trial.

Pending the resolution of this incident, the Court, by a vote of 7-6, issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004 ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of Lara and Licayan on January 30, 2004 for a period of thirty (30) calendar days from January 27, 2004 or until February 26, 2004.

The remedy sought by the movants is one not expressly sanctioned by the Rules of Court. They seek to "reopen and remand" the present case, so that the "newly-discovered evidence" may be received by the trial court. Effectively, they are alternatively seeking a new trial or the reopening of the case. However, Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court only allows the reopening of a case before the finality of the judgment of conviction. Similarly, Section 1, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court requires that a motion for new trial be filed before a judgment of conviction becomes final. In this case, the Court's Decision had already become final and executory on November 9, 2001.

Nonetheless, the Court, on previous occasions, has alluded to its power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require it. [Abrajano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120787, 343 SCRA 68 (2000), citing De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996).] Indeed, the basic ground for the grant of a new trial is that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that the grant of a new trial will be in the interest, of justice. [Ibid., citing 66 C.J.S. New Trial � 14.]

Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that courts shall grant a new trial when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and winch if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Technically, the affidavits of delos Reyes and Mabansag are not newly-discovered in that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were already identified as such during the trial. Nonetheless, we note that the evidence contained in the affidavits could not have emerged during the pendency of the case, owing to the flight of the affiants. The Court has been made aware of this newly emergent evidence immediately after their discovery and the movants cannot be faulted for not having presented these affidavits or any testimonial evidence from delos Reyes or Mabansag. Both affidavits tend to establish that Lara had no involvement in the kidnapping while that of delos Reyes tends to absolve Licayan with a statement that the latter just happened to pass by the place where the victims were detained. It appears that if introduced and admitted, the affidavits might lead to a change in the outcome of the case, sparing the movants from the severest and most permanent of penalties.

Significantly, the OSG, representing the People of the Philippines, poses no objection to and, indeed, supports the granting of the Motion to Re-Open. That the People's Tribune himself seeks the reopening of the case must be given due regard and cannot be dismissed lightly. The State is no less interested than the individual accused of a crime in his acquittal if he is innocent. [Ibid., citing United States vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil. 416 (1909).]

In light of the above, the Court, by a vote of 8-6, pro hac vice finds it imperative in the interest of substantial justice to suspend the operation of the Rules of Court and accordingly to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the Decision of this Court dated August 15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are hereby REMANDED to the lower court for further reception of evidence pursuant to Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with the trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In accordance with Section 6(b) and (c), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan is concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional evidence as the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered with the evidence already in the record. Towards tins end, the Court directs Lion. Reuben P. dela Cruz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272, to hear the case of the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan, and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.

Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the President and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

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