THIRD DIVISION

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 4 2005.

G.R. No. 150797 ( lluminada Tan, Sps. Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Tan, and Ma. Emma Sy vs. Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, Florecita Sy, Rolando Sy, Lourdes Sy, Rosauro Sy, Julieta Sy and Rosita Ferrera-Sy; and G.R. No. 114217 - Sps. Jose Sy Bang and lluminada Tan, Sps. Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Maria Emma Sy and Oscar Sy vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy and Rosita Ferrera-Sy.)

This resolves the Motion to Order Deposit in Court of Supreme Court's Ordered Widow's Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioner's Julian Sy, Et Al. to Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance, filed by respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy and Rosita Ferrera-Sy.

The said motion is an incident in the above-entitled two (2) consolidated petitions pending before the Court.

In G.R. No. 114217, petitioners seek the reversal of the May 6, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686, upholding the Orders issued by the then Court of First Instance at Quezon Province, Branch 2 in an action for partition thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.

In G.R. No. 150797, the same set of petitioners assail the decision dated February 28, 2001 and resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244, affirming in toto the order dated July 8, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court at Lucena City, Branch 58 in Special Proceeding No. 96-34 entitled "In the matter of the Guardianship of Incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy: Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, Florecita Sy, Rolando Sy, Lourdes Sy, Rosauro Sy and Julieta Sy, Petitioners, Enrique Sy, Oppositor, Rosauro Sy, Special Guardian". The said affirmed Order dated July 8, 1997 of the RTC dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their children, Zenaida Sy and Maria Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this court, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00 representing the widow's allowance of the incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the periods from September 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00 per month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each month,

Let a copy of this Order be furnished counsel for the petitioners and special guardian, counsel for the oppositor, and likewise, the individual parties required to pay and deposit the aforementioned amount.

This Order shall be served personally to all the parties concerned by the Court's Process Server.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners and respondents in these two (2) consolidated cases are all descendants of Sy Bang, a Chinese, twice-married businessman who died intestate sometime in 1971. Petitioners in both cases are the children of Sy Bang by his first marriage, while the respondents in both cases are Sy Bang's eight (8) children by his second marriage with Rosita Ferrera-Sy.

On September 23, 1996, the Court's Third Division issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 114217. In full, the resolution reads:

Acting on the Motion for Payment of Widow's Allowance dated May 9, 1996, together with the Comment thereto dated August 15, 1996, and the Reply dated August 27, 1996, the Court hereby ORDERS petitioners Jose Sy Bang, (his wife) Iluminada Tan, (their children) Zenaida Sy and Maria Emma Sy; and, Julian Sy and (his wife) Rosa Tan TO PAY jointly and severally private respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy the sum of P25,000.00 as "widow's allowance" to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate of Sy Bang is finally settled, or until final orders of this Court.

SO ORDERED. ^[1] cralaw

Respondents' copy of the aforequoted September 23, 1996 Resolution was brought by the guardian of Rosita Ferrera-Sy, her son Rosauro Sy, to the RTC where the case originated, for implementation through a motion for execution. On January 7, 1999, a writ of execution was issued by said court. However, upon motion of petitioners, the writ was subsequently amended to limit its execution to the estate of Sy Bang. Even then, petitioners opposed implementation of the writ, arguing that the estate of Sy Bang, admittedly under the control of petitioners, has not yet been finally determined due to the pendency of the case before this Court.

In desperation, respondents filed in Sp. Proc. No. 96-34, a petition to cite for indirect contempt of court petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy and Rosa Tan, who, according to respondents, are "known holders of the Sy Bang properties". In its order of August 13, 2003, RTC Branch 58 adjudged petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and imposed on them a fine of P30,000.

Said contempt order of the trial court, however, is not yet final because the same was separately elevated by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals.

Rosita Ferrera-Sy, second wife and widow of Sy Bang, whose guardianship is the subject of SP No. 96-34, is now more than 87 years old. As found by the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244, Rosita is now enfeebled by old age and without any means to support herself. She depends upon her son Rosauro Sy, her judicial guardian, who has been taking care of her, paying for her medical bills and ministering to her daily needs, for the last six years. It was precisely to alleviate Rosita's plight that the Court came out with its Resolution of September 23, 1996, ordering petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy a widow's allowance of P 25,000.00 to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang "effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate of Sy Bang is finally settled, or until final orders of this Court".

As it now turns out, the Resolution was never complied upon by the petitioners.

Hence, respondents' instant motion, which the Court finds impressed with merit.

The Resolution of this Court which the motion under consideration seeks to implement dates as far back as September 23, 1996, or more than eight (8) years ago. The factual basis for said motion arising from petitioners' defiance of the Court's September 23, 1996 Resolution are undisputed: Rosita Ferrera Sy is the widow of the late Chinese national, Sy Bang; the properties constituting the estate of the late Sy Bang are under petitioners' control and possession; Rosita Ferrera-Sy is entitled to a widow's allowance in the amount of P25,000/month from September 1, 1996; and there is a sizeable estate from which this monthly widow's allowance of P25,000.00 could be satisfied; and, if we may now add, Rosita Ferrera-Sy's present condition demands more than ever the decreed widow's allowance.

Petitioners' excuse to the effect that Sy Bang's estate has not yet been finally determined due to the pendency before this Court of these two (2) consolidated cases is, to say the least, flimsy and, at best, an attempt to merely frustrate realization of this Court's concern for Rosita's needs during her remaining years. As it is, the Court was fully aware of the pendency of these cases when it promulgated the Resolution sought to be implemented by the subject motion. Petitioner's continued defiance and contumacious disregard of said Resolution is a blatant affront to the legitimate directive of this Court sufficient enough to hold them liable for contempt of court.

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. Jur 389, cited in 14SCRA813).

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4).

This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA I). ^[2] cralaw

Contempt may be classified as civil or criminal. Civil contempt is the failure to do something that is ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of an opposing party, while criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

Petitioners' refusal to give the widow's allowance in this case clearly constitutes civil contempt, governed by Sec. 7, Rule 71, which provides:

"Sec. 7, Rule 71. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it."

Conformably with the above, petitioners' indefinite imprisonment until their compliance with this Court's Resolution of September 23, 1996 is very much warranted. The nature of such imprisonment is explained in Harden vs. Director of Prisons, ^[3] cralaw thus:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life.'

"The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Courts which provides that 'when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he perform it'.

"If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the court, and in this manner put an end to his incarceration. In these circumstances, the judgment cannot be said to be excessive or unjust. (Davis vs. Murphy [1947], 188 P., 229-231.) As stated in a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S. W., 2d, 145-147), 'to order that one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a remedial measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an act within his or her power to perform. He must have the means by which he may purge himself of the contempt'. The latter decision cites Staley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq., 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:

'In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specific in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he may discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket'" (pp. 747-748).

It is apt to borrow the words of Salcedo vs. Hernandez: ^[4] cralaw

The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner lluminada Tan (widow of deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida Sy, Maria Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latter's wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Fererra-Sy by way of a widow's allowance pursuant to this Court's Resolution of September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their immediate imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated unpaid widow's allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) a month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Fererra-Sy her monthly widow's allowance for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.

This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court