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[G.R. No. 158236.� April 25, 2005]
SANTOS vs. ORDA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 25 2005.
G.R. No. 158236 (Ligaya V. Santos vs. Domingo I. Orda, Jr.)
Petitioner Ligaya Santos seeks a reconsideration of our Decision dated September 1, 2004 which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962 granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent Domingo Orda.
In this motion for reconsideration, the petitioner relies on the following grounds:
a.� The assailed Order allowing the withdrawal of the Information cannot be nullified based on the rule on independent evaluation of the merit of the case or the evidence on record as enunciated in Crespo vs. Mogul, the trial court not having anchored the withdrawal on the resolution of the DOJ Secretary finding lack of probable cause.
b.� The resolution of the DOJ Secretary on the lack of probable cause cannot be disregarded and the criminal action, including the warrants of arrest without bail, directly reinstated without an independent evaluation of evidence on record or without affording the trial court the opportunity to resolve anew the existence of probable cause based on evidence on record as enunciated in the same case of Crespo vs. Mogul. [1] cralaw
The petitioner avers that the trial court, in granting the motion to withdraw the Informations filed by the public prosecutor, did not rely on the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which found no probable cause against the accused. She argues that the trial court in fact steered away from the issue of lack of probable cause, taking into account the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. The petitioner posits that the trial court exercised its own discretion, in light of the demands of justice and equity, and on its own determination that the prosecution still had the authority over the Informations since the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused. She, therefore, contends that it was still within the prerogative of the prosecution to withdraw the Informations. The petitioner further alleges that, precisely due to the fact that the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, it had no authority to resolve the motion to withdraw the Informations on the merits. Moreover, any resolution on the merits of the motion to withdraw the information would constitute a prejudgment of the issue of probable cause, considering that the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause was not yet final due to the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. [2] cralaw
Finally, the petitioner argues that by directly reinstating the criminal cases and the warrants of arrest based on the previous determination of probable cause without making an independent evaluation of the evidence on record, and allowing the trial court to resolve anew the motion to withdraw based on the evidence, the CA, in effect, committed the abuse of discretion it has imputed on the trial court. [3] cralaw
On January 13, 2005, the respondent filed his Comment [4] cralaw on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration wherein he pointed out that the Court had already passed upon and exhaustively discussed why the Informations and warrants of arrest should be reinstated.
On February 10, 2005, the petitioner filed her Reply [5] cralaw to the said comment. She denied that the arguments raised in the motion for reconsideration are a mere rehash of her previous allegations and had been passed upon by the Court. She avers that said arguments are new matters that merit the attention of the Court.
The motion for reconsideration is without merit.
The petitioner imputes abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it directly reinstated the criminal cases without conducting an independent evaluation of the evidence on record to determine whether or not there is probable cause. We rule, however, that this is not the function of the appellate court but that of the trial court judge. It is an elementary rule that the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the prosecutor or for the appellate court to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination. [6] cralaw This is, in fact, the mandate of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, the same rule is enunciated in Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court.- Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the complaint or information.
Moreover, in the extraordinary writ of certiorari, neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. [7] cralaw A writ of certiorari is intended to redress grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent tribunal. [8] cralaw Hence, it would not have been proper for the CA to make an independent evaluation of the evidence on record to determine whether there was probable cause.
The petitioner further contends that the CA should have allowed the trial court to resolve anew the motion to withdraw based on the evidence available and should not have directly reinstated the criminal cases and the warrants of arrest against the accused. This contention is misplaced. The direct reinstatement of the criminal cases by the CA did not preclude the trial court from determining whether or not there is probable cause based on the evidence available because, as previously stated, this is the exclusive function of the trial court.
The other arguments raised by the petitioner are, indeed, mere rehash of the arguments presented in the petitioner's previous pleadings, which had adequately been passed upon by this Court in its Decision dated September 1, 2004.
In said decision, this Court emphasized that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. This rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. Hence, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused.
In its Decision dated September 1, 2004, the Court found that the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases, based on the evidence on record or those in the possession of the public prosecutor. The trial court relied solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice. It then held that the trial court acted with inordinate haste in granting the motion to withdraw the Informations, considering that the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become final and executory as a motion for reconsideration thereof was still pending.
The Court further ruled that the bare fact that the trial court had already issued warrants of arrest against the accused did not warrant an outright grant of the motion to withdraw the Informations. The trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to resolve the said motion to withdraw on its merits. The fact that the accused may be incarcerated pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice (since warrants of arrest had already been issued) does not justify ignoring the rules and running roughshod over the rights of the respondent. Moreover, the Court noted that the petitioner had, in fact, submitted herself to the trial court's jurisdiction when she filed her motion to examine the witnesses, suspend the proceedings and the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo, p. 807.
[2] cralaw Id. at 808-826.
[3] cralaw Id. at 827-828.
[4] cralaw Id. at 940-944.
[5] cralaw Id. at 964-1011.
[6] cralaw Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, citing People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990).
[7] cralaw Odin Security Agency, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135912, 17 September 2001, 365 SCRA 351.
[8] cralaw Sy v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 140903, 12 September 2000, 365 SCRA 49.
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