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[G.R. No. 165710. April 6, 2005]

IGNACIO vs. MAGSIMPAN REALTY

Third Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 6 2005.

G.R. No. 165710 (Juanito C. Ignacio vs. Magsimpan Realty Corp., Deo S. Dionisio and Oscar Tirona, Sps. Ma. Paz Dionisio and Cesar Bautista, Sps. Ma. Aranzazu Dionisio and Canuto Oreta, Sps. Ma. Corazon Dionisio and Pablo S. Bautista, Jr.)

Challenged and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75227, to wit:

1.� Decision dated 02 July 2004, [1] dismissing the petition for review under Rule 43 earlier filed therewith by the herein petitioner against the respondents; and

2.� Resolution dated 14 October 2004, [2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Involved in the case are five (5) fishpond lots at Barangay Coloong, Valenzuela, Metro Manila with an aggregate area of 208,233 square meters and with their respective registered owners, titles and areas, as follows:

Registered Owner

TCT Number

Area (square meters)

Ma. Aranzazu D. Oreta

T-228752

40,810

Ma. Corazon D. Bautista

T-228753

41,319

Ma. Cristina D. Tirona

T-212487

43,406

Deo S. Dionisio

T-228755

41,349

Ma. Paz D. Bautista

T-228756

41,349

The fishpond business is presently under the management of Magsimpan Realty Corporation, a family corporation owned by the herein respondents, the Dionisios.

Records reveal that sometime in 1962, A. Hermoso Vda. De Santiago, former owner of the fishpond lots, leased the same to Do�a Adela Santos Dionisio (Do�a Adela, for short). Thereafter, Do�a Adela took in three (3) caretakers, namely: Eligio Ignacio, Santiago Ignacio and a certain Apolonio.

Under their arrangement, Do�a Adela was to provide capital while the caretakers were to provide labor. As agreed, the parties' share in the profits was computed as follows: the net proceed is arrived at by deducting from the gross proceeds the expenses [representing, among others, the lease rental, payroll for the fishpond workers, diario or the monthly allowance for the caretakers and capital expenses such as bangus and sugpo fries, fertilizer, interest, etc.]; one-half or fifty percent (50%) of the net shall be delivered to Do�a Adela as her share; the remaining half shall be divided into three (3) shares, with each share pertaining to each of the three (3) caretakers. In effect, each caretaker is entitled to a share equivalent to one-third (1/3) of one-half (1/2) of the net proceeds.

Later, Do�a Adela, through purchase, became the owner of the fishpond lots.

When Eligio Ignacio died in 1975, Do�a Adela designated the former's son, herein petitioner Juanito Ignacio, to take Eligio's place as caretaker. For humanitarian reasons, Do�a Adela also gave one-half (1/2) of one (1) share to Hilaria Ignacio, Eligio's second wife, which was taken from Apolonio's share.

When Apolonio died in 1977, his remaining half-share was taken back by Do�a Adela so that the share originally pertaining to Apolonio was fully withdrawn.

When Santiago Ignacio died, his share was assigned by Do�a Adela to Luis Nu�ez.

In 1991, when Do�a Adela died, the share originally pertaining to Apolonio, which was already withdrawn by the former, was taken over by Deo S. Dionisio, who shared one-half (1/2) thereof with a certain Celestino Casimiro.

This new group (Juanito Ignacio, Luis Nu�ez, Deo S. Dionisio and Celestino Casimiro) operated the said fishponds under the same arrangements that prevailed during the lifetime of Do�a Adela, albeit this time with the family-owned Magsimpan Realty Corporation as the capitalist, Deo S. Dionisio as manager, Celestino Casimiro as liaison officer and Luiz Nu�ez and petitioner Juanito Ignacio as caretakers or laborers.

In September 1995, Juanito Ignacio and Luiz Nu�ez filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator a complaint against the herein respondents praying, inter alia, that they be declared agricultural tenants on the fishpond lots in question.

On August 29, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator rendered a decision [3] cralaw dismissing the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant case, all other claims are similarly disposed of sub silentio.

Regional Clerk of the Board Oscar M. Batalla is directed in his capacity as Ex oficio Sheriff to:

1) Conduct a final accounting and reliquidation of the harvests derived from the subject fishponds more particularly described in Paragraph 2 to sub-paragraphs to (sic) 2.5 of the Complaint commencing from the inception of the instant case on September 5, 1995 up to the present;

2) Collate, offset and divide the net proceeds thereof between the contending parties pursuant to their customary practice in this wise:

a.����������� Magsimpan Realty Corporation - 50%

b.����������� the remaining 50% to be apportioned as follows:

Deo S. Dionisio and Celestino P. Casimiro - 50-50 sharing of 1/3 portion of the 50% net

Luiz Nu�ez - 1/3 portion of the 50% net.

Juanito Ignacio - 1/3 portion of the 50% net.

3)���������� Require Regional Sheriff Artemio L. Saguing to immediately surrender the funds under his custody for purposes of final accounting and reliquidation as aforestated.

SO ORDERED.

The dismissal was based on the Regional Adjudicator's finding that no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and respondents:

Plaintiffs [referring to Juanito Ignacio and Luiz Nu�ez] tenancy claims vis-�-vis the fishponds in question ring hollow and untrue.

No semblance of tenancy can be inferred from the records on hand which disclose an amazing array of bare surmises and conjectures rather than hard fact and well-grounded conclusions (Italics supplied).

Therefrom, herein petitioner went on appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which, in a decision dated January 12, 2001, [4] cralaw upheld the Regional Adjudicator's finding that there existed no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents, and, concomitant thereto, dismissed the case and all its incidents for lack of jurisdiction. More specifically, the DARAB decision dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises the decision of the Adjudicator a quo is hereby MODIFIED and order is hereby issued dismissing the case and all its incidents for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75227.

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a decision dated July 2, 2004, dismissed the petition, reasoning out that it sees no justification to disturb the findings of both the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB that there exists no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents. Instead, according to the appellate court, what existed between them is a civil law partnership.

In a Resolution dated October 14, 2004, the same court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse, it being his submission that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error -

"(1) xxx in ruling that the relationship between the parties is a civil law partnership;

(2) xxx in concluding that the dispute between the parties does not fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR on his (sic) failure to recognize the fact that a fishpond is not a one-on-one undertaking between the tenants and the landlord;

(3) xxx in not finding that petitioner Ignacio's vested substantive right as an agricultural tenant is protected under RA 3844 and 1199".

As we see it, the recourse will either rise or fall on the singular question of whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents. Unfortunately for the petitioner, however, the resolution of that question would require this Court to scrutinize the facts of the case, a task which we rarely, if ever, embark upon.

Time and again, we have consistently emphasized that this Court is not a trier of-facts. As we said in Bernardo vs. CA: [5] cralaw

The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court, which have more opportunity and facilities to examine these matters. This same Court has declared that it is the policy of the Court to defer to the factual findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to determine their demeanor whether they are telling or distorting the truth,

and again in Remalante vs. Tibe: [6] cralaw

The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. 'The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.' [Chan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, reiterating a long line of decisions]. This Court has emphatically declared that 'it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court' [Tiongco v. De la Merced, G.R. No. L-24426, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 89; Corona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62482, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 865; Banigued vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47531, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 596]. xxx

With all the more reasons must the foregoing rule finds compelling application in this case, what with the reality that the Regional Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and respondents.

We do acknowledge that there are established exceptions where this Court may scrutinize the facts of a case and disregard the factual findings of the courts or offices below. To quote from our pronouncement in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA [7] :

[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Sadly, however, we have gone at length in reviewing the records before us and found none of the above exceptions as obtaining herein to warrant our own reevaluation of the factual findings and conclusion arrived at by the three (3) offices below.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guari�a III with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Santiago J. Ranada, concurring; Rollo, pp. 24-33.

[2] cralaw Rollo, p. 40.

[3] cralaw Rollo, pp. 64, et seq.

[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 99, et seq.

[5] cralaw 216 SCRA 224 [1992].

[6] cralaw 158 SCRA 138 [1988].

[7] cralaw G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004.


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