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[G.R. No. 162704.
ENCINAS vs. NAT'L BOOKSTORE
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
G.R. 162704 (Memoria G. Encinas and Adolfo A. Balboa vs. National Bookstore, Inc.)
This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Memoria G. Encinas, represented
by Adolfo A. Balboa, of our Decision
dated
In the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner basically alleges the same issues she raised in her Petition for Review on Certiorari. She argued then, as she does now, that it was incorrect for this Court to conclude that the defects in respondent National Bookstore, Inc.'s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 300861 are mere typographical or clerical errors. She now cites Sections 43, 48 and 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1523 (Property Registration Decree), saying that this law mandates the information to be included in the certification in the TCT and, unless corrected in accordance with the procedure outlined in the same law, any alteration of the information therein is not allowed. Hence, petitioner claims that the defects in the certification in respondent's TCT-that TCT No. 300861 is a derivative of an original certificate of title issued pursuant to Decree No. 917 in GLRO Record No. 197 covering property in Bataan and not in Diliman, Quezon City-should not be disregarded as mere typographical errors but should be construed as true and correct.
Petitioner adds that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that the defects are typographical errors since no proof of respondent's mother title bearing the correct decree and GLRO record numbers was presented, and there was likewise no evidence that these correct informations were wrongly copied onto the certificates of title issued to respondent's predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioner alleges as well that this Court incorrectly ruled that respondent was able to overcome the burden of proof and establish by preponderant evidence the superiority of its title over that of petitioner's. Petitioner reiterates that respondent's defective and therefore spurious TCT No. 300861 cannot be the basis of ownership rights over the subject property. Neither can respondent's tax declarations and tax payments covering the subject land also give rise to ownership since such papers supposedly cannot prevail over petitioner's reconstituted title TCT No. RT-103022 over the property, and petitioner herself had also declared the same property for taxation purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon.
Petitioner further avers that the Land Registration Authority's (LRA) nullification of her reconstituted title TCT No. RT-103022 was unfair and not in accordance with law. The order reconstituting petitioner's title had long reached finality and had been executed when the LRA decided to set it aside.
These arguments do not persuade us. The Court remains convinced that petitioner failed to substantiate her claim with clear and convincing evidence, while respondent was able to prove its title to the property.
It must be remembered that this case had its origins in the complaint for quieting of title filed by respondent against petitioner. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Its purpose is to secure "...an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "...not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best." [1] cralaw
Respondent, as plaintiff, to prove its title to the property,
presented its duplicate copy of TCT No. 300861 covering the subject property.
It is important to note that the original copy of this TCT was among those
titles which survived the fire that consumed the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on
On the other hand, petitioner, as defendant, presented its
reconstituted title TCT No. RT-103022 and tax declarations
and tax bill receipts. We cannot wholly depend on the reconstituted
title to declare petitioner as the rightful owner of the property. Petitioner's
title was administratively reconstituted under Republic Act No. 6732
[2]
cralaw
by the Land Registration Authority, but the same was later cancelled on
Administrative or extrajudicial reconstitution is essentially ex parte and without notice. It is granted only on the basis of the copies of the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of the certificate of title and an affidavit of the registered owner stating the necessary information [3] cralaw required by law and appended real estate tax receipts or tax declarations. Administrative reconstitution is less rigorous compared to judicial reconstitution which partakes of a land registration proceeding and is therefore a proceeding in rem . [4] cralaw Given the nature of proceedings in administrative reconstitution, it would be easy for unscrupulous persons to fraudulently acquire real property by obtaining reconstituted titles to property they do not own.
In addition, petitioner was unable to show to this Court, as well as to the lower courts, how she was able to acquire ownership of the property. She did not identify her predecessor-in-interest. She merely alleged that she was the subject property's absolute owner in fee simple. Petitioner herself did not testify. We may take into consideration the difficulty involved in presenting petitioner before the trial court, as she was presumably in the United States at the time of trial and due to old age and illness could not personally testify. However, counsel for petitioner could have availed of other remedies to procure her testimony. Petitioner's testimony could have been taken by deposition. She could also have presented documents, like a deed of sale or of donation, or other evidence to show how she acquired the property. Even her attorney-in-fact, Adolfo A. Balboa, could not relate to the trial court the particulars of petitioner's ownership of the property. There was also no evidence that would show whether petitioner had ever maintained possession of the property.
Petitioner's tax declarations cannot also be relied on. Therein, petitioner had declared Lot 4-B-2-B-1 for taxation, and not Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the subject property. Petitioner failed to explain this discrepancy.
We reiterate that the defects in respondent's title as well as in the titles of its predecessors-in-interest are typographical or clerical errors. This has been sufficiently explained by the witnesses for petitioner. They stated that despite the variance in the entries, the technical description in the title is controlling. And it has been shown that respondent's title describes the subject property. It will now be up to respondent to initiate action to correct the entries in its title according to P.D. No. 1523.
We likewise find no merit to petitioner's argument that the LRA's cancellation or revocation of her reconstituted title is illegal. The finality of the order of reconstitution does not preclude the revocation thereof. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 specifically provides that a reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. Section 10 of the same law also provides that any interested party who by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence has been unjustly deprived or prevented from taking part in the proceedings may file a verified petition in the proper court to set aside the decision and to reopen the proceedings. The petition must be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the decision but not more than six months from the promulgation thereof.
In the case at bar, respondent was never notified or made aware of the administrative reconstitution proceedings taken by petitioner. Neither was it made aware of the orders granting the reconstitution in favor of petitioner. In fact, it was only when petitioner offered the sale of the subject land to respondent's president that the anomaly was discovered. The discovery happened after the order of reconstitution had become final and the reconstituted title had been issued in favor of petitioner so that she was able to place the subject property in the real estate market. Respondent then filed the complaint for quieting of title from which this case originates, the resolution of which bodes unfavorably for petitioner, as has been previously discussed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY, no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the granting thereof.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.).
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 15 (2000).
[2] cralaw Entitled "An Act Allowing Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and other Force Majeure , Amending for the Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine and Section Five of Republic Act Numbered Twenty-Six."
[3] cralaw Sec. 2 of R.A. 6732 states: "For the purpose of the preceding section, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 26 is hereby revived and amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 5. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a,) and 3(b) of this Act may be filed with the Register of Deeds concerned by the registered owner, his assigns, or other person, both natural and juridical, having an interest in the property. The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary sources for reconstitution and with an affidavit of the registered owner stating, among other things:
"(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
"(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures;
"(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
"(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed;
"(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the Assessor's Office; and
"(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution.
"If the reconstitution is to be made from any of the sources enumerated in Section 2(b) or 3(b), the affidavit should further state that the owner's duplicate has been lost or destroyed and the circumstances under which it was lost or destroyed. Thereupon, the Register of Deeds shall, no valid reason to the contrary existing, reconstitute the certificate of title as provided in this Act."
[4] cralaw Allama v. Republic, G.R. No. 88226, 26 February 1992, 206 SCRA 600.
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