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[G.R. No. 165415.� February 23, 2005]
OYSTER SHOPPING vs. MEDINA
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 23 2005.
G.R. No. 165415 (Oyster Shopping Village, Inc. vs. Sps. Jesus T. Medina and Elizenda V. Medina.)
At bar is this petition for review on certiorari of the March 29, 2004 decision [1] cralaw of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39708, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Para�aque City in its Civil Case 90-959, an action for Damages or Specific Performance thereat filed by petitioner Oyster Shopping Village, Inc. against the herein respondent-spouses, Jesus T. Medina and Elizenda V. Medina.
On October 9, 1985, in the municipal (now, Metropolitan) Trial Court of Para�aque City, the spouses Jesus Medina and Elizenda Medina (Medinas) filed an unlawful detainer case against petitioner Oyster Shopping Village, Inc. (Oyster). Docketed as Civil Case No. 6923, the complaint was anchored on the alleged failure of Oyster to pay rentals for two parcels of lot it leased from the Medinas.
On April 5, 1990, in an apparent act of retaliation, Oyster filed against the Medinas an action for damages or specific performance before the Regional Trial Court at Para�aque City. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case 90-959, Oyster alleged that the ejectment suit earlier filed against it by the Medinas was malicious and merely instituted as a cover-up for the Medinas1 breach of their contractual commitments under the lease contract. Oyster claimed that the Medinas failed to construct the Kabihasnan access road connecting the leased premises to the Benigno Aquino Ave., and that as a result of the malicious unlawful detainer suit filed by the spouses, it suffered damages.
In their answer, the Medinas alleged, among others, that they have all the rights under the law to file the ejectment case against Oyster in view of the latter's violations of the lease contract, foremost of which is its failure to pay the agreed monthly rentals, an allegation purportedly admitted by Oyster in its reply to the Medinas' demand letter, albeit claiming that its failure to pay rent was due to the "economic crunch" it is suffering; that there is nothing in the lease agreement obligating the spouses to construct anything; that the road construction was the undertaking of Queensway Commercial Center, Inc. (Queensway, for brevity), owner of the land adjoining the leased premises which Oyster purchased from Queensway.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 90-959, dismissing Oyster's complaint and awarding damages to the Medinas. More specifically, the decision [2] cralaw dispositively reads:
Upon the evidence, the Court dismisses the complaint against the
defendants and awards damages to the defendants in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and attorney's fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), with costs against the plaintiff.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is converted into a
permanent mandatory injunction, that is, the Kabihasnan Road shall remain open.
For this reason, the Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) bond filed by the
plaintiff shall be released in its favor upon the presentment of the Official
Receipt.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Oyster appealed the aforementioned decision to the Court of Appeals whereat its recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39708. Oyster argued that the RTC erred: (1) in concluding that it filed the case for damages and/or specific performance in retaliation of the earlier case for ejectment filed against it by the Medinas, which ejectment suit, so petitioner contends, was maliciously instituted and for which it suffered damages; (2) in absolving the Medinas from their obligation to construct the Kabihasnan access road, or cause the construction thereof as principal, through Queensway, as developer; and (3) in ruling that the ejectment suit was a valid action by the Medinas.
In a decision dated March 29, 2004, [3] cralaw the Court of Appeals dismissed Oyster's appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, for utter lack of merit, the present appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision, AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the appellant Oyster Shopping Village, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Zeroing on the core issue of whether Oyster can institute and maintain the action for damages or specific performance against the Medinas on account of the latter's filing of the unlawful detainer case which Oyster maintains to have been maliciously filed and for which it is entitled to damages, the appellate court ruled in the negative.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its resolution of September 16, 2004, [4] cralaw Oyster has come to this Court via the present recourse.
We find no reversible error in the decision under review.
It cannot be said that the Medinas acted without cause of action or without probable cause in instituting the unlawful detainer suit against petitioner. To be sure, petitioner did not categorically deny having failed to pay the stipulated rentals on the leased premises of the Medinas. As it is, and as pointed out by the appellate court in the decision under review, petitioner Oyster merely nebulously traversed its alleged failure to pay rent in the following fashion:
"4.���� The allegations on the supposed violations by defendant of the contract of lease, the supposed propriety of plaintiffs' letter-demands, the supposed arrears of defendant, the supposed right to have defendant evicted under the lease contract, and the supposed propriety of the instant complaint for eviction (pars. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, id.), are specifically denied for being without basis in fact and law, the truth of the matter being that-
a)���������� indeed defendant has paid unto plaintiff a lump sum amount of P484,722.00, plus monthly rental advances intended to cover the months of October, November, and December 1984, and finally January 1985;
b)���������� the parties have been in the process of negotiating a settlement of the confusion and difficulties under the contract of lease, in light of unusual economic circumstances and basic commitments plaintiffs (i.e, the Medinas) have not been able to satisfy in respect to their obligation as lessors, such that the sudden institution of this suit is as surprising as it is unwarranted and arbitrary". [5] cralaw
Case law on malicious prosecution traces its origin to unfounded criminal action. Generally, denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions. [6] cralaw In the course of time, however, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted for no other purpose than to merely vex and humiliate the defendant. [7] cralaw
But regardless of whether the action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is based on an earlier criminal or civil case, it is indispensable that such an earlier case, be it civil or criminal, had been terminated in favor of the present suitor. Thus, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceedings in favor of the defendant therein [8]
Here, petitioner Oyster commenced its action for damages against the Medinas while the unlawful detainer case still pends at the MeTC. For sure, up to the time petitioner filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39708, the ejectment suit has not yet been resolved by the MeTC. In fine, when petitioner filed with the RTC its action for damages against the Medinas for alleged malicious prosecution, there was yet no basis to conclude that the unlawful detainer case was filed against petitioner merely to vex or harass the latter.
Besides, and as correctly observed by the RTC in its decision in Civil Case No. 90-959:
"The filing of the ejectment complaint by the defendants against the plaintiff was based specifically on paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the aforementioned Contract of Lease and under Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. As early as February of 1985, plaintiff already failed to pay the agreed rentals to the defendants. This was, as a result, the subject of two (2) demand letters, Exhibit 2 and 3, dated May 7, 1985 and June 17, 1985, respectively. In fact, the non-payment of the rentals was confirmed by the reply letter of the plaintiffs counsel dated July 1, 1985, Exhibit 4, to defendants' lawyers' letter dated June 17, 1985, Exhibit 3, reasoning that the non-payment of rentals was due to 'x x x extraordinary and unforeseen economic crunch x x x.'
The Court does not see the bad faith or malice as conjured by the plaintiff having been committed by the defendants. The filing of the ejectment case was a valid action by the defendants against the plaintiff simply for the latter's failure to pay the rentals. It cannot be otherwise.
Upon the other hand, the Court sees in the filing of this complaint by the plaintiff against the defendants, a clear pattern to use it as a leverage to blunt the legal effects of a probable adverse decision coming from the ejectment case lawfully being pursued by the defendants based on valid grounds. If only for this reason, the Court must award appropriate damages and attorney's fees to the defendants. Judicial processes and the courts must never be used for this purpose. It is given that the plaintiff has a right to seek redress for a grievance. Corollary to this, is the right to free access to the courts. Even so, these rights must not be abused. For the very essence of these rights is the responsibility to act fairly and equitably". [9] cralaw
No matter from whatever angle petitioner's complaint for damages is viewed, the same is doomed to fail as an action for malicious prosecution founded on what petitioner conjured to be a vexatious and malicious suit for unlawful detainer filed against it by the Medinas.
We now proceed to consider the Medinas' alleged obligation to construct the Kabihasnan access road.
In this regard, we quote with approval the following observations of the trial court relative thereto:
"It is not disputed that defendants (i.e. the Medinas) and Queensway, the Land Developer, entered into a Land Development Agreement (Exhibit A-Exhibit 1) for the development of defendants' (MEDINAS') lands in consideration of which fifty (50%) percent would be ceded to Queensway. On said agreement, particularly Paragraph 1, subparagraph C, it is provided therein that:
'1.���������� Developer shall develop at its own expense the above-described parcels of land of LANDOWNER (MEDINAS) to cover the following:
'xxx�������� xxx������ xxx
c)���������� Construct the necessary roadways and drainage systems as the plan may require;
x x x������ x x x���� x x x
(Exhibit A1-Exhibit 11 A)'.
The above-cited provisions clearly show that the obligation to construct the Kabihasnan Road Project solely belongs to the land developer, Queensway. It is to be constructed by Queensway for the benefit of the defendants. Moreover, the Land Development agreement binds only the defendants and Queensway, x x x
And neither can it be said that the development agreement conferred a favor on plaintiff because of the date of the development agreement --- November 11, 1981. The Contract between the defendants and the plaintiff is dated October 15, 1983. The Deed of Sale between , plaintiff and Queensway is dated October 18, 1983.
Likewise, it cannot be said either that the defendants undertook to construct the Kabihasnan Road. Otherwise, this should have been stated in the Contract of Lease between plaintiff and the defendants, x x x". [10] cralaw
As correctly observed by the trial court, the Medinas had no obligation to construct the access road, and neither could petitioner Oyster who is a complete stranger to the land development contract between the Medinas and Queensway, compel the spouses to undertake the construction of said road for the benefit of the petitioner.
Tracing the roots of this controversy, it appears that the Medinas used to own several adjacent parcels of land located at the Benigno Aquino Avenue, Para�aque, Metro Manila. On November 11, 1981, the spouses entered into a Land Development Agreement with Queensway as the developer. Under said agreement, Queensway undertook the development, at its own expense, of the lands of the Medinas, including the construction of the necessary roadways and drainage system in the area. In consideration thereof, Queensway shall own one-half (1/2) of the total land area, with the remaining other half pertaining to the Medinas.
Subsequently, on October 15, 1983, petitioner Oyster leased from the Medinas the latter's retained one-half (1/2) portion of the area.
And still later, on October 18, 1983, petitioner purchased the one-half portion share of Queensway.� Very significantly, in the covering Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner Oyster and Queensway, it is there stipulated, among others, that Queensway shall undertake the works on the Kabihasnan Road for the benefit of the petitioner, thus:
"In addition, the VENDOR (Queensway) undertakes (a) to cement, at its expense, the Kabihasnan Road extension which is adjacent and situated at the northern side of the aforesaid parcels of land not later than February 15, 1984, and (b) not to engage, for a period of ten (10) years from the date of this Deed, directly or indirectly, singly or jointly with others in the development of any commercial strip or center, located anywhere from the New Manila International Airport on Imelda Ave. to the Sucat Entrance of the Multinational Village on Sucat Road x x x". [11] cralaw
In fact, on December 4, 1986, petitioner Oyster, to enforce the aforequoted stipulation, brought suit against Queensway in Civil Case No. 15503 of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 142, wherein petitioner prayed for a judgment ordering Queensway to perform its obligation to lay out and complete the construction and cementing of the Kabihasnan Road extension, or, in the alternative, to pay actual damages in an amount sufficient to defray the cost of building the same road.
Given the fact that under both the Land Development Agreement between the Medinas and Queensway, and the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner Oyster and Queensway, the obligation to construct the Kabihasnan Road pertains to Queensway by its lonesome, we are truly baffled why petitioner has to go against the spouses for the construction of that road.
All told, we rule and so hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the trial court in the suit for damages or specific performance thereat filed by the petitioner against the Medinas.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Arturo D. Brion of the Eleventh Division; Rollo, pp. 45-64.
[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 33-41.
[3] cralaw Rollo, pp. 45-64.
[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 66-68.
[5] cralaw Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[6] cralaw Madera vs. Lopez, L-37105, 102 SCRA 700 [February 10, 1981].
[7] cralaw Buchanan vs. Vda, de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363,365.
[8] cralaw Singco vs. Deguma, 317 SCRA 521, 538 [1999], citing Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211 [1997]. Emphasis supplied.
[9] cralaw Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[10] cralaw Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[11] cralaw Rollo, pp. 62-63.
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