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[G.R. No. 166224.� February 9, 2005]
BA�EZ vs. REGION BANK
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 9 2005 .
G.R. No. 166224 (Adoracion Ba�ez, Amor Mario Ruiz, Antonio Sabdao, Romel & Arnel Lago, Guido & Mila Canete, Nely & Edmond Diezma, Rene & Vicky Quillo, Dindo & Cecile Benoza, Lourdes & Irine Costimiano, Pablito & Jorlyn Maat, Benigno Sumaribos, Natividad & Rogelio Rosales, Juanito & Nilda Pendon, Alfredo & Gina David, Salvacion & Dionisio Hayahay, Christopher Ruiz, Glory Jean Masada, Teresita & Espiridion Masada, Josephine Pring, Ruben & Elvira Dacoco, and their children vs. The Region Bank (purportedly in substitution of the original petitioner praying for the writ of possession, Los Ba�os Rural Bank, Inc.), the Planters Development Bank (purportedly having acquired the Region Bank], Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla (presiding judge of RTC , QC , Branch 215), and Branch 215 Sheriff.)
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the November 18, 2004 decision [1] cralaw of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76728 affirming the October 18, 2002 decision of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 215 granting respondent bank's petition for issuance of writ of possession in LRC Case No. Q-97-9197.
The facts, as culled from the records:
Emeline Abella and the spouses Jose Reyes and Corazon Reyes
obtained from respondent bank the following loans: April 8, 1983, P58,000;
April 28, 1983, P100,000; and June 7, 1983, P115,000, all secured
by real estate mortgages over five (5) lots embraced in and covered by TCT Nos.
292177, 292178, 292184, 297367 and 282182 located at Piedad Estate, Pasong
Tamo, Quezon City. When the loans fell due and unpaid, respondent bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. The mortgagors failed to redeem the subject lots
within the one-year redemption period. Thus, the respondent bank through its
Branch Manager, executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT Nos. 68124 to
68128 in the name of respondent bank.
Petitioners, members of the Citizen United Neighborhood Association, Inc. (CUNAI), are occupants of the subject lots and claim to be assignees thereof.
On April 22, 1997, the respondent bank filed a petition for issuance of writ of possession alleging that petitioners were occupying the subject lots without paying rental and without its consent.
In the Order dated May 6, 1997, the trial court directed the respondent bank to appear before the branch clerk of court to present its evidence ex-parte preparatory to the issuance of a writ of possession. During the scheduled hearing, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition for issuance of writ of possession. The motion was denied by the trial court in a resolution dated July 23, 1997. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In a subsequent resolution dated September 25, 1997, trial court relented to the pleas of the petitioners and decided to give them their day in court. Petitioners were thus ordered to appear in court on November 19, 1997 to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
On October 18, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision [2] cralaw granting the respondent bank's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the same court in its Order of April 2, 2003. [3] cralaw
On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76728, petitioners insisted that respondent bank must institute a separate and independent action after the expiration of one-year redemption period, in order to obtain possession of the property.
In a decision dated November 18, 2004, [4] cralaw the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision and orders of the trial court and accordingly denied the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the 18 October 2002 Decision of the Honorable RTC Judge Padilla, Presiding Judge of RTC of Quezon City, Branch 215, granting the respondent bank's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, and the 2 April 2003 Order of public respondents judge denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Obviously displeased, petitioners immediately elevated the case to this Court without first asking for a reconsideration of the CA's decision.
They claim that the TCTs of respondent bank are null and void for having been derived from the falsified titles of the spouses Jose Reyes and Corazon Reyes, and Emeline Abella; that the subject lands are allegedly covered by TCT Nos. 116924 and 118194 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the names of Wilfredo S. Torres, Amado R. Santos and Liberato V. Casals; that Wilfredo S. Torres had filed a case for Quieting of Title against the respondent bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-31006.
Relying in Joven vs. Court of Appeals, [5] cralaw petitioners insist that the trial court erred in granting the application for a writ of possession. They anchor their posture on the pronouncement of this Court in Joven that possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. They insist that they are third party actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor
The petition is unavailing.
It is true that in the case cited by the petitioners we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued only if the debtor is in possession and no third person not a party to the suit had intervened. Admittedly, we there made it clear that the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right only where the judgment debtor or his successors-in-interest who are in possession of the premises. Where the land is occupied by a third party, the court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession.
Petitioners' argument, however, is premised on their claim that they are "third-party" as contemplated by the Rules of Court, which they are not. Petitioners failed to prove that they are third-party within the contemplation of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As found by the trial court and thereafter affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners' bare allegation that they are assignees of Wilfredo Torres remains as such. They failed to offer any evidence, documentary or otherwise, that would prove their title or that of Wilfredo Torres. Their assertions, therefore, are nothing but a specious claim not worthy of any serious consideration.
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:
Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.-xxx
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Corollarily, Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by ACT 4118, reads:
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without complying with the requirements of this Act. xxx
Based on the foregoing, this Court has consistently ruled that once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially sold, and is not redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the property. [6] cralaw The purchaser at the public auction only has to file a petition for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court properly ruled, when it held:
The opposition interposed by the respondents/oppositors is of no moment. In a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, the jurisdiction of the court is limited. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function, as such, proceedings thereon is summary in nature. Whatever decision rendered in the petition is not judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title, thus proceedings is held ex-parte. In Joven vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, August 2, 1992, it was held that Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 provides that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the court may issue as a matter of course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership thereof in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7, supra, of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period expired and the property not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. [7] cralaw
To give effect to the right of possession, "the purchaser must invoke the aid of the courts and ask for a writ of possession" [8] cralaw and he "need not bring a separate and independent suit for this purpose" [9] cralaw . It is essential, however, that the purchaser asks for and be granted a writ of possession in order that he may be legally installed in the property he has bought. [10] cralaw This is founded on the purchaser's right of ownership over the property which he purchased at the auction sale and his consequent right to be placed in possession thereof". [11] cralaw
Here, the mortgagors, the spouses Jose Reyes and Corazon Reyes, and Emeline Abella defaulted in their loan obligation to the respondent bank and the latter caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage pursuant to Act. 3135, as amended. As the highest bidder, the respondent bank was issued a sheriff's certificates of sale which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on May 21, 1987. The mortgagors failed to redeem said property within the one-year redemption period allowed by law. Hence, the right of the respondent bank to possess the foreclosed assets has become absolute.
To reiterate, the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function. As such, proceedings thereon are summary in nature and conducted ex-parte. And whatever decision may have been rendered thereon is not a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title. [12] cralaw
In fine, there is no need for the trial court to await the outcome of the pending case for quieting of title. In execution sale, proceedings incident to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage to resolve the possession of third-party claimants may proceed independently of the action which said claimants may bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership over the property. The trial court, therefore, did not err in acting on the respondent bank's petition for the issuance of writ of possession despite the dependency of Civil Case No. Q-97-31006, which raises a question of ownership. Needless to say, the order of the trial court directing the issuance of a writ of possession can not prejudice the outcome of said case.
To recapitulate, when title is consolidated in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. As such, the issuing court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. And if only to stress the writ's ministerial character, we have, in previous cases, disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
WHEREFORE, the petition is herby DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando and Danilo B. Pine of the Special Sixth Division.
[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 101-104.
[3] cralaw Rollo, pp. 105-106.
[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 88-99.
[5] cralaw 212 SCRA 700 [1992].
[6] cralaw Tan Soo Huat v. Ongkiko, 63 Phil. 746 [1936].
[7] cralaw F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 191 Phil. 516 [1981].
[8] cralaw Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 68, citing 6 Von Tuhr, 294-299, I-II Ennecceus Kipp & Wolff 546.
[9] cralaw IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance, Corporation v. Nera, 125 Phil. 595 [1967]; Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746 [1936]; Rivera v. CFI of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201 [ 1935].
[10] cralaw Garcia R. Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, August 20, 1992.
[11] cralaw 167SCRA43[1988].
[12] cralaw 388 Phil. 857 [2000].
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