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[G.R. No. 166257.� February 14, 2005]

PATAWARAN vs. CA

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 14 2005.

G.R. No. 166257 (Ernanie Patawaran vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo K. Luz.)

Under consideration is this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, in its CA-G.R. SP No. 81501, to wit:

1.� Decision dated 23 August 2004, [1] granting the petition for certiorari filed by herein respondent contra three (3) orders respectively dated 2 August 2002, 23 August 2002 and 3 September 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Pasay City, Branch 118; and

2.� Resolution dated 7 December 2004 , [2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The material facts may be briefly stated, as follows:

Hospicio de San Jose, a religious and charitable institution, is the owner of two (2) lots located at 2110 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. On 3 September 1986, it entered into a lease contract [3] cralaw with Dominador Luz, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondent Edgardo Luz. As agreed upon by the parties, the lease period shall be from 1 October 1986 up to 30 September 2001.

While the above-mentioned contract was still in force, Dominador Luz introduced permanent improvements on the property. One such improvement introduced by him is the building subject of the instant controversy.

Later, respondent Edgardo Luz, through a document denominated as a Contract of Lease, [4] cralaw subleased the subject building in favor of Campo Assets Corporation, represented by its president, Ofelia Trinidad.

Afterwards, Campo Assets Corporation, in a Memorandum of Agreement dated 3 December 1998, [5] cralaw likewise subleased the subject building to herein petitioner Ernanie Patawaran who operated thereon the Athena KTV business.

On 23 October 2001, respondent Luz filed a complaint for ejectment with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City against Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad. The complaint is grounded, among others, on the failure of Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad to pay rentals for the months of August, September and October 2001 at P90,000.00 a month, or a total of P270,000.00.

Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad filed a motion for extension of time to file an Answer. However, since the motion was filed beyond the reglementary period, coupled with the fact that such motion is a prohibited pleading under Section 13 (5), Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the MeTC denied it via an Order dated 12 February 2002. [6] cralaw Further, the same court resolved to consider the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings then on record.

Thereafter, the MeTC rendered a Decision dated 19 February 2002 [7] cralaw in favor of respondent Luz and against Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad, ordering the latter "and all persons claiming rights under them" to vacate the subject property.

Then, inasmuch as Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad failed to post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the same judgment, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution on 5 April 2002.

Accordingly, a Notice to Vacate addressed to Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad, c/o Athena KTV, Roxas Boulevard corner San Luis Street, Pasay City, Manila was issued by Sheriff Ariel C. Valero on 9 July 2002.

However, before Sheriff Valero could implement the writ, a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate dated 10 July 2002 [8] cralaw was filed by herein petitioner Ernanie Patawaran before the same MeTC which heard the ejectment case.

In his aforesaid Motion to Quash, petitioner contended, inter alia, that: [a] when respondent Edgardo Luz filed the complaint for ejectment on 23 October 2001 against Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad, said respondent had no more possessory right over the subject property since his predecessor's Contract of Lease with the owner Hospicio de San Jose already expired on 30 September 2001; [b] petitioner's right of possession is derived from a Contract of Lease which he contracted directly with the owner Hospicio de San Jose; and [c] such being the case, petitioner is considered a third party whose possessory right over the subject property was not derived from Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad. Hence, he is not an agent, assignee, transferee or a person claiming any right from Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad. Consequently, his rights cannot be prejudiced by the decision rendered in the ejectment case.

In an order dated 23 July 2002, [9] cralaw the MeTC denied petitioner's Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate, for lack of merit.

Failing to obtain a favorable ruling from the MeTC, petitioner Patawaran filed on 30 July 2002 a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO with RTC-Pasay City. The case was raffled to Branch 118 thereof, then presided by its pairing judge, Judge Gutierrez.

After conducting a summary hearing, Judge Gutierrez issued an order dated 2 August 2002 [10] cralaw , the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued restraining the Honorable Judge of MTC, Branch 44, her Sheriff and all persons acting under her direction from implementing the writ of execution dated April 5, 2002, Notice to Vacate, Notice of Levy or other court processes against petitioner [referring to Patawaran] and/or ATHENA KTV Disco effective twenty (20) days from receipt hereof until further orders of the Court.

x x x

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, or on 23 August 2002, Judge Gutierrez issued another order, [11] cralaw to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Consolidation of respondent Edgardo K. Luz is denied for lack of merit. Likewise, the prayer for preliminary injunction of petitioner Ernanie Patawaran is hereby granted. Hence, a preliminary injunction is hereby issued restraining and/or enjoining the Hon. Judge of MTC, Br. 44, Pasay City, her Sheriff and all persons acting under her direction and respondent Edgardo K. Luz from implementing the writ of execution dated April 5, 2002, Notice to Vacate dated July 09, 2002, Notice of Levy or other Court processes against petitioner Ernanie Patawaran and/or ATHENA KTV Disco until further Orders of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent Luz moved for reconsideration but Judge Gutierrez, through an order dated 3 September 2003, [12] cralaw denied his motion for lack of merit.

Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Gutierrez in issuing the three (3) orders respectively dated 2 August 2002, 23 August 2002 and 3 September 2003, respondent Luz filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, thereat docketed as CA-G.R.SP No. 81501.

As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 23 August 2004, [13] cralaw granted the petition and accordingly declared null and void all the above-mentioned assailed orders of Judge Gutierrez. Petitioner Patawaran filed a motion for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution dated 7 December 2004. [14] cralaw

Hence, Patawaran's present recourse.

As we see it, the pivotal issue to be resolved herein is whether or not petitioner Patawaran is included in the phrase "Campo Assets Corporation and Ofelia P. Trinidad x x x and all persons claiming rights under them". If indeed he is, then he is bound to comply with the judgment rendered by the MeTC-Pasay City, Branch 44, which ordered Campo Assets Corporation, Ofelia P. Trinidad "and all persons claiming rights under them" to vacate the subject building.

In the main, petitioner argues that he does not derive his right to possess the building from Campo Assets Corporation. Instead, according to him, he entered into a contract of lease directly with Hospicio de San Jose, the owner of the subject property. Hence, his rights are independent from those of Campo Assets Corporation and consequently, he cannot be ordered to vacate the subject building.

We are not persuaded.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is encompassed by the phrase "and all persons claiming rights under them". This ruling was arrived at because both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found petitioner to be merely a sub-lessee of Campo Assets Corporation and hence, he cannot have greater rights than the latter.

In the order of Judge Gutierrez dated 2 August 2002, he himself found out that petitioner Patawaran was merely a sub-lessee of Campo Assets Corporation, to wit:

"The petitioner was a sub-lessee of Campo Assets Corporation of a building and improvements at Roxas Blvd. corner San Luis St., Pasay City per Memorandum of Agreement of the parties dated December 3, 1998 which has expired (Exh. "A" petitioner). x x x" (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court of Appeals also found Judge Gutierrez to have gravely abused his discretion when he admitted in evidence the contract of lease dated November 2001 allegedly entered into by and between Hospicio de San Jose and Patawaran effective 1 November 2001 to 1 November 2002, and introduced in evidence by petitioner Patawaran. The judge should not have given credence to this supposed contract of lease because the document does not bear the signature of the person who represented Hospicio de San Jose. On the left bottom portion of the 3rd page thereof, there appears the name and signature of Jovencio C. Avila, President, Five Star Multi-Services, Inc. (Property Administrator). Noteworthy it is to emphasize that the supposed contract does not state in what capacity Jovencio C. Avila was signing. And, there is nothing in said contract from which it can be inferred that he is signing for Hospicio de San Jose. More importantly, the contract does not bear any signature of the supposed parties on each and every page thereof. Neither was it notarized nor did it bear the signature of the instrumental witnesses. Considering all these, therefore, it is safe to say that petitioner Patawaran was not able to establish conclusively, or at least convincingly, that his rights are independent from those of Campo Assets Corporation.

We emphasize that this factual finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, can no longer be disturbed by this Court because of the settled rule that the lower court's findings of fact cannot be disturbed in a petition for review on certiorari. Thus, in Dihiansan, et al. vs. CA, [15] cralaw we said:

"Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and the Supreme Court, subject to certain recognized exceptions which have no application here. In reviews on certiorari, the Court addresses only the questions of law, since it is not its function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again (which has already been done by the trial court as the trier of facts and the appellate court as the reviewer of facts) and its jurisdiction is confined to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review."

Desperately, petitioner insists that he is not bound to comply with the judgment rendered by MeTC-Pasay City, Branch 44, because at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, or on 23 October 2001, respondent Luz was no longer the lessee of the land much more of the building or improvements erected thereon, as the contract of lease between respondent Luz and Hospicio de San Jose had already expired on 30 September 2001. In fact, petitioner alleged that said contract of lease provides for an automatic termination on the date of its expiration on 30 September 2001.

Again, this argument is devoid of merit.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, respondent Luz' contract of lease does not have an automatic termination clause. Neither was there evidence showing the fact that Luz had abandoned his leasehold rights over the property, nor were there talks between the lessor (Hospicio de San Jose) and the lessee (respondent Luz) concerning the termination or renewal of the lease. Hence, an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion is created between the parties. Consequently, the leasehold rights of respondent Luz continued even beyond 30 September 2001, clothing him the right to institute the ejectment case. As held in Bowe and Arbolario vs. CA, et al., [16]

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in if it is shown that: (a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and (c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor. This acquiescence may be inferred from this failure to serve a notice to quit.

Given the above, we find that petitioner Patawaran is included in the phrase "all persons claiming rights under them". Hence, he is bound to comply with the judgment rendered by the MeTC-Pasay City, Branch 44.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Asst. Clerk of Court



Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Rollo, pp. 9, et seq.

[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 22, et seq.

[3] cralaw Annex "J", Petition; Rollo, pp. 93, et seq.

[4] cralaw Annex "K", Petition; Rollo, pp. 96 et seq.

[5] cralaw At page 1 of the Order of RTC-Pasay City dated 2 August 2002 and page 7 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2004.

[6] cralaw CA decision, Rollo, p. 10.

[7] cralaw Annex "G", Petition; Rollo, pp. 83, et seq.

[8] cralaw Annex "H", Petition; Rollo, pp. 86, et seq.

[9] cralaw Annex "I", Petition; Rollo, pp. 91, et seq.

[10] cralaw Annex "B", Pettion; Rollo, pp. 55, et seq.

[11] cralaw Annex "C", Petition; Rollo, pp. 59, et seq.

[12] cralaw Annex "D" Petition; Rollo, pp. 62, et seq.

[13] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.

[14] cralaw Rollo, pp. 22, et seq.

[15] cralaw 153 SCRA 712, 714 [1987].

[16] cralaw 220 SCRA 158, 166 [1993].


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