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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2064-RTJ.� February 28, 2005]
DE LA CRUZ vs. YGA�A
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 28 2005 .
A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2064-RTJ (Purita de la Cruz vs. Judge Briccio C. Yga�a, RTC, Branch 153, Pasig City, and Deputy Sheriff Benjamin L. Cabusao, Jr., MeTC, Branch 68, Pasig City.)
Acting on the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 5, 2005, to wit:
REASON FOR AGENDA: The following were received by the Office of the Court Administrator:
1. COMPLAINT signed by Onofre D. Manalad, as counsel for the complainant Purita de la Cruz, dated 9 August 2004, charging the two respondents with violating Art. 204, Revised Penal Code; Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; Art. 318, Revised Penal Code; Art. 32, Civil Code of the Philippines; Section 1, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution; and the Code of Judicial Conduct, in connection with their actuations relative to Civil Case No. 9686 filed with and decided by the MeTC, Branch 68, Pasig City and affirmed by RTC, Branch 153, Pasig City on appeal. Attached to the aforementioned complaint is an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT executed by Purita de la Cruz relating the basis for her complaint against the two respondents named above.
It appears from the said affidavit-complaint that complainant was a lessee of Stall No. 6 at the Fruit & Vegetable Plaza Mart, Caruncho Market Complex, Barangay Malinao, Pasig City for fifteen (15) years. She paid the owner, Gerry Chua of Gerry Commercial Inc., No. 11 A. Luna St., Pasig City, a daily rental of Php100.00 or a monthly rental of Php3,000.00. Complainant and the other fruit and vegetable vendors have lease agreements with the said Gerry Chua for an indefinite period which provided that there would be no increase in the rental provided that the lessees would see to the repair of the stalls they occupied.
It is alleged that because they were religious in performing their obligations under the lease, Gerry Chua never had any occasion to make demands for the payment of rental arrearages nor did said owner send them any notice to terminate their leases. On October 17, 2002, complainant received [a] notice from one Maribeth C. Gavino increasing the rentals by 100 to 150% effective December 2002, with a warning that their failure to pay the increased rent would cause their eviction from the leased premises.
Because the lessees, including the complainant, believed that this sudden increase was in violation of their verbal agreements with Chua, they went to see the said owner-lessor to ask for an explanation for this increase. The owner-lessor informed the members of the vendors' association, including the present complainant that he had nothing to do with the increase of the rentals. He advised them to deposit their rentals in a bank (in trust for him) because he did not want to get involved in any dispute with Benjamin Cabusao, Jr., a deputy sheriff in Pasig City.
The complainant and the other stall holders refused to pay the increased rental. Thus Maribeth Gavino, as Administrative Officer of Jellicom Manpower & Transport Services, which was owned by her father, respondent Benjamin L. Cabusao, Jr., filed ejectment suits against all of the stall holders.
Complainant and the other stall lessees filed their answers wherein they interposed the defenses of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action because they averred that the purported contract between Gerry Chua and Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. was inexistent arid void ab initio as provided in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. As such, there existed no lessor- lessee relation between the plaintiff and defendants. Consequently, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure would not be available. In said answers, they alleged compulsory counterclaims for damages based on Art. 32 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., Inc., 145 SCRA 268.
Complainant and the other stall holders filed a position paper before the MeTC citing jurisprudence that "if the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action." In the position paper submitted by the plaintiff Cabusao/Jellicom, he admitted that the agreed rental for Stall No. 6 was Php100.00 a day and this had been the rental since 1998 thereby admitting the pre-existing contract of lease between the owner and the stall holders.
On 15 October 2003, Judge Jose P. Morallos of MeTC, Branch 68, Pasig City, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, without resolving directly the validity or nullity of the contract of lease between Chua and Jellicom. The decision was based on the following conclusions: (1) as owner of the subject premises, Gerry Chua has the right to dispose, lease, rent out his property to whoever he chooses; (2) the contract of lease in favor of the plaintiff Jellicom had the effect of terminating the lease agreement between the owner and the defendant stall holders; (3) by virtue of the said contract of lease, the defendant stall holder became the sub-lessee of Benjamin Cabusao; (4) the verbal contract between the plaintiff and the defendant had been terminated; and (5) the failure/refusal of the stall holders to pay the rentals demanded by Jellicom gave it the right to eject said defendants.
The case was appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the same was raffled to Branch 153, presided by respondent Judge. In said appeal, complainant assigned the following errors: (1) holding the contract of lease of the plaintiff over the property valid over and above the still valid and existing lease agreements of defendant stall holders; (2) sanctioning the summary and arbitrary termination of the 15-year old lease contract of complainant and 40 other stall holders; (3) failing to dismiss the complaint filed by 3rd party intruder Cabusao who is not the real party in interest; (4) finding for the plaintiff and granting relief contrary to the facts and controlling provisions and applicable jurisprudence; and (5) rendering an unjust judgment with manifest partiality and undue prejudice to the defendant.
Respondent Judge Yga�a, presiding judge of RTC, Branch 153, Pasig City, rendered judgment on May 31, 2004, affirming in all respects the decision appealed from. Said respondent based his affirmance on the following: (1) there was no evidence to prove the 15-year-old lease or any pre-existing agreement between defendant (complainant herein) and owner-lessor Gerry Chua; (2) the contract of lease is the authority of the plaintiff to sublease the property to complainant hence that contract is valid and binding; (3) plaintiff Jellicom/Cabusao is the real party in interest because he is the lessee of the property pursuant to the contract of lease; (4) Cabusao, being the lessee of the property subleased the subject to complainant; (5) Cabusao being the lessee of the subleased property has the right to institute any cause of action that may arise from a violation of the terms and conditions of the sublease; and (6) the court a quo correctly decided the case in consonance with law and existing jurisprudence, citing Art. 1673 of the Civil Code which provides the grounds for ejectment.
Complainant sought reconsideration. She pointed out the fact that the pre-existing lease agreement between her and the lessor Gerry Chua need not be established by evidence because: (1) in all the pleadings filed by the plaintiff, from the complaint to the position paper and up to the Memorandum on Appeal, it was judicially admitted by the pleader that defendant-appellant had been renting the property since August 1999; (2) although the date of the commencement of the lease contract shortened the actual period of defendant's use and enjoyment of the lots, the uncontroverted fact is that when the lease to plaintiff was executed the lease to the complainant was still valid and subsisting; (3) it was also not controverted that before, during and after the execution of the lease contract fraudulently obtained by Cabusao, Chua's contract with the complainant and the other lessees had not been terminated by the lessor-owner; (4) it is a rule of law that an admission, whether written or oral, made by a party in the same case needs no proof; and (5) the position of the appellate court regarding the lack of evidence is uncalled for, misleading and unprocedural.
In her pleading for reconsideration, the present complainant argued that without prior termination of their lease agreement, the lessor can not legally and validly re-lease or re-encumber the same property to another person. This is supported by Art. 1654 of the Civil Code which enjoins the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease during the entire duration of the lease contract. This position is further supported by Art. 1676 of the same Code which enjoins the buyer or transferee of a leased property to respect the lease and the law does not allow him to terminate the lease especially if he is aware of the same.
Proceeding from the above, complainant insists that respondent judge erred in affirming the judgment of the MeTC. She concludes that by said affirmance, respondent judge violated Art. 1409, Art. 1643, Art. 1654, Art. 1676, Art. 1314 and Art. 32 of the Civil Code. He is further charged of having violated Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, 1997 (sic) Philippine Constitution; Rule 70, Sections 1 and 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 129, Section 4, Revised Rules of Evidence, as well as controlling jurisprudence that "Employment, profession, business, trade or calling is a property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be properly within the protection of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law" (Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., Inc., 145 SCRA 268; Sibal vs. Notre Dame de Manila, 183 SCRA 1990).
Finally, complainant asserts that for the wanton violations described above, respondent Judge Yga�a is administratively and criminally liable for violations of Art. 204, Revised Penal Code; Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; Adm. Order No. 162 (Canons of Judicial Ethics) Rules 1.01, 1.02, 2.01 and 3.01.
2.������ COMMENT filed by respondent Judge Briccio Yga�a in compliance with the 1st Indorsement of the Court Administrator requiring him to submit the same.
Respondent judge submits that the administrative complaint against him is baseless and should be dismissed. He avers that his involvement in the case was his decision affirming the decision dated December 1, 2003, rendered by MeTC Judge Jose Morallos, MeTC Branch 68, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 9686 for unlawful detainer entitled "Maribeth C. Gavino vs. Purita de la Cruz and All Other Persons Claiming Rights under her."
Judge Yga�a copiously quoted with approval the decision rendered by Judge Morallos. He did not find any reversible error; hence, he affirmed the same. He claims that he had affirmed the appealed decision because he believed that it conformed with the law on the matter.
3.������ COMMENT filed by respondent Sheriff Benjamin L. Cabusao, Jr. as required by the 1st Indorsement of the Court Administrator.
Commenting respondent avers that a reading of the complaint shows that both he and Judge Yga�a are charged with rendering an unjust judgment. He avers that he cannot be liable for doing so because he does not render any judgment. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct is applicable only to judges and not to him. He further avers that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act refers to officials and employees of the government or of government corporations in charge with the grant of licenses, permits and other concessions.
He further alleges that the intention of the complainant in filing the present administrative case is to intimidate and harass the other judges before whom other illegal detainer cases are pending.
4.������ REPLY filed by the complainant which is but a repetition of her original complaint.
EVALUATION : It is evident from a careful reading of the complaint that respondent judge is being charged for affirming a decision appealed to him from a first level court. It eludes us why complainant did not include Judge Jose P. Morallos in the present case. If respondent judge has committed an act that deserves sanction because he affirmed a judgment appealed to him, why should the writer of the original decision not be also charged[?]
It is evident that complainant was arguing an appeal. She presented reasons which she believes to be sufficient to have the judgment appealed from reversed. Her complaint appears more like an appellant's brief. We think that these arguments are misplaced in an administrative case because the same is not a substitute for appeal and the judgment she complains about can not be reversed by way of an administrative matter.
The complainant tried to show that the judgment affirming the original decision suffers from what she perceives to be flaws. We think that her conclusions are premature because she has elevated the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals for review. Until the latter court shall rule with finality that the judgment penned by respondent judge is indeed flawed, respondent cannot be considered to have rendered an unfair judgment. Moreover, even if we assume that the judgment appealed from is in fact an unjust one, there is no proof that respondent rendered such unjust judgment knowingly.
It has been consistently held by the Court that a judge can not be held accountable for every error he commits. It is only when the error is committed in bad faith and for some other corrupt motive that the magistrate becomes liable administratively or criminally. Since there is no evidence that respondent judge was motivated by any corrupt motive, we can not hold him answerable.
As regards the other respondent, suffice it to say that there is nothing in the complaint which could authorize us to chastise him.
RECOMMENDATION : It is our recommendation that 'the above-entitled proceeding be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The findings of the OCA are well taken.
It must be stressed that the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. In the absence of fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the assailed decision or order, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. [1] cralaw Moreover, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are ordinarily not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. [2] cralaw Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. [3] cralaw To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [4] cralaw
There is, likewise, no evidence that respondent Cabusao, Jr. was remiss in the performance of his duties.
Indeed, while it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints against judges and other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are protected and exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The Court will not shirk .from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.5
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint against Judge Briccio C. Yga�a and Deputy Sheriff Benjamin L. Cabusao, Jr. for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sdg.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Pitney v. Abrogar . 415 SCRA 377 (2003).
[2] cralaw Balsamo v. Suan , 411 SCRA 189 (2003).
[3] cralaw Cruz v. Iturralde , 402 SCRA 65 (2003).
[4] cralaw Sacmar v. Reyes-Carpio , 400 SCRA 32 (2003).
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