ChanRobles Virtual law Library
[G.R. No. 155451. January 10, 2005]
PEOPLE vs. ODILAO
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 10 2005.
G.R. No. 155451 (People of the Philippines vs. David S. Odilao.)
R E S O L U T I O N
Before the Court is respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Manifestation to the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on April 14, 2004 and petitioner's Comment thereto.
On April 14, 2004, this Court upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City and directed the trial court to proceed with the arraignment of herein respondent and the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. CBU-55283. In his motion for reconsideration and supplemental manifestation, respondent argues as follows:
1)� The Decision of this Court is contrary to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure because Rule 112, Sec. 6 applies only in the determination of probable cause for purposes of issuance of warrant of arrest, thus, it finds no application in resolving a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor based on his reinvestigation report that no probable cause exists.
2)� The Court, in affirming the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 12, 2003, disregards judicial courtesy, asserts judicial supremacy over the executive body and contradicts jurisprudential doctrines previously established. The CA Resolution dated June 12, 2003 ignored the Resolution of the Department of Justice finding no probable cause against herein respondent. It is imperative and logical to note that when the court granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the prosecution to conduct reinvestigation, it is bound by judicial courtesy to respect the findings of a co-equal and independent body of the government.
3)� The ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul cannot be strictly applied to the instant case since the dissimilarities of the facts of the two cases warrant different rulings, and the Supreme Court in the Crespo case merely enunciates an advisory opinion. In the Crespo case, the presiding judge did not order for a reinvestigation of the case by the Prosecutor's Office, while in the present case, the presiding judge ordered the Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
4)� The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 12, 2003 is moot and academic because before said Resolution was issued, i.e., on May 27, 2003, the Department of Justice had already issued its Resolution finding no probable cause.
5)� The 60-day period of suspension of arraignment counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office is not absolute.
6)� The private complainant herself was the one who appealed the City Prosecutor's Office Resolution finding no probable cause, hence, herein respondent should not be the one faulted for the delay in the issuance of the Resolution of the DOJ.
7)� Private complainant Bugash is in a malicious hurry and impatient to secure the conviction of herein respondent with the ultimate goal of bringing him to public ridicule.
On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that:
1)� It is within the power of the trial court to resolve the City Prosecutor's motion to dismiss despite the pendency of an appeal before the DOJ.
2)� This Court's Decision dated April 14, 2004, affirming the trial court's Orders dated May 21, 2002 and June 13, 2002 was not rendered moot and academic by the DOJ's Resolutions dated May 27, 2003 and May 21, 2004.
3)� Section 11 (c ), rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure limiting the period of suspension of arraignment to sixty (60) days from the filing of the review with the DOJ does not provide for exceptions.
4)� Respondent was not deprived of his right to due process that would warrant the nullification of this Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated June 12, 2003.
At the outset, the Court hereby emphasizes that contrary to respondent's argument, the ruling in the Crespo case was not merely an advisory opinion. The Court's ruling therein squarely settled the main issue raised in said case, which was "whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits." [1] cralaw That is the very same issue presented here before the Court. Hence, the ratio decidendi in the Crespo case that the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion may grant or deny the prosecution's motion to dismiss and require that arraignment or trial on the merits proceed regardless of whether the accused had been arraigned or whether the case was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice, [2] cralaw is perfectly applicable to the case at bench. The difference in the factual milieu in Crespo and in the present case, i.e., that in the present case, the trial court, upon motion of herein respondent, ordered the reinvestigation of the case, while in Crespo, there was no such order from the court, is not significant enough to bring the present case outside the ambit of the Court's ruling in Crespo.
There is likewise no merit to respondent's asseveration that the Court, by affirming the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 12, 2003, disregarded judicial courtesy, asserted judicial supremacy over the executive body and contradicted jurisprudential doctrines previously established. It is precisely because of the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch of government that the trial court is "not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case." [3] cralaw Clearly, it is incumbent upon the courts to ascertain the existence of probable cause once an information has been filed before it, to determine whether the court should issue a warrant of arrest or, in the event a reinvestigation or review has been conducted, to consider the recommendation of the prosecutor and independently come to a resolution on whether or not to proceed with the accused's arraignment and trial on the merits.
Respondent's insistence that the Court of Appeals erroneously disposed of the case in strict observance of the 60-day period for the suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, arguing that said period is not absolute, is also unmeritorious. Respondent's thrust is that the lapse of said 60-day period does not mean that the trial court should ipso facto deny the prosecution's motion to dismiss and thereby proceed with the trial of the case. Note that the issue of whether or not the 60-day period of suspension of arraignment should be strictly applied to this case is not the crux of the matter. The core issue here is whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it determined that there was probable cause and based on said finding, denied the prosecution's motion to dismiss. As discussed above, it is the trial court's mandated duty to make such an independent assessment of the existence of probable cause, and having made such a finding, whatever resolution is arrived at by the Department of Justice was merely recommendatory to the court.
In the sum, there is no cogent reason raised in respondent's motion for reconsideration or in his supplemental manifestation that merits the reversal or modification of the Decision dated April 14, 2004.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 464 (1987).
[2] cralaw Id., p. 470.
[3] cralaw Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Rolando How, 338 SCRA 511, 518 (2000).
HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
QUICK SEARCH
