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[G.R. No. 165674.� January 12, 2005]
TULAWIE vs. GATA
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 12 2005 .
G.R. No. 165674 (Bensaudi O. Tulawie vs. The Heirs of Justiniano G. Gata, namely Virginia A. Gata, Segismundo A. Gata, Emelyn Gata-Toribio, Jane Gata-Lutz, Luis Enrico A. Gata, Theodore Gata, Patricia Gata-Sticka and Maria Gata-Gumm.)
Before us is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 23, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City and reinstated with modification the original decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for unlawful detainer thereat filed by Justiniano G. Gata against the herein petitioner. The assailed CA decision dispositively reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the RTC's Decision dated September 9, 1999 and Resolution dated February 3, 2000 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The MeTC's Decision dated March 8, 1999 is HEREBY REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED".
On September 1, 1992, petitioner Bensaudi O. Tuiawie and
Justiniano G. Gata, predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondents, entered
into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, involving Justiniano's
house and lot at No. 31, Road 12, Toro Hills, Project 8, Quezon City for a
monthly rental of P10,000. The lease was for a period of one year from October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993, while the option to buy was to be exercised from
November 1992 to June 1993 for a purchase price of P3.5 Million.
The lease contract was renewed for another year beginning April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1995, with an increased monthly rental of P12,000.
Petitioner, however, did not regularly pay the rent, such that as of March 30,
1998, his rental in arrears amounted to P568,000. Justiniano repeatedly
demanded of respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay his rental
arrearages. However, instead of vacating, petitioner paid on March 31, 1998 the amount of P100,000 as partial payment for his rental indebtedness.
On June 1, 1998, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City, Justiniano filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
petitioner. In his Answer, petitioner alleged that he had exercised his option
to buy in 1994 and in fact paid Justiniano P3.5 Million through their
common relative, Soraya Tulawie.
Petitioner, however, failed to adduce in evidence the special power of attorney purportedly showing Soraya Tulawie's authority to act as Justiniano's agent in the sale of the same property.
In a decision dated March 8, 1999, the MeTC rendered judgment
ordering petitioner to pay the respondents the amount of P480,000 as unpaid
rentals; P12,000 as rental per month from April 1998 until he shall have
vacated the premises; and P10,000 as attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, petitioner submitted a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) to prove that Justiniano authorized Soraya Tulawie
to broker the sale of the subject property. He also submitted Soraya Tulawie's Affidavit
stating that she received the P3.5 Million purchase price from
petitioner but failed to remit the same to Justiniano. To justify the belated
submission of the SPA, petitioner claimed that he was able to locate
Soraya Tulawie only after the MeTC had already decided the unlawful detainer
case.
In a decision dated September 6, 1999, the RTC reversed that of the MeTC on the basis of the aforesaid SPA. According to the RTC, the SPA, while adduced only on appeal, did not change petitioner's theory of defense that he already paid the purchase price through Soraya Tulawie. Further, the RTC ratiocinated that while Justiniano may not have received the purchase price, his duly authorized agent has nonetheless acknowledged receipt thereof. Ergo, the sale of the subject property through Justiniano's duly authorized agent was consummated. Accordingly, so the RTC concluded, petitioner is entitled to the possession of the premises and may not be ejected therefrom. On February 3, 2000, the RTC issued a resolution denying Justiniano's motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Justiniano elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. On February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed decision setting aside the decision of the RTC and reinstating that of the MeTC, minus the award for attorney's fee.
In its aforementioned decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the RTC erred when it admitted the SPA as additional evidence on appeal.
Citing Section 7, Rule 40 and Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the appellate court held that the RTC should have decided the appeal
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be filed. There is no trial de novo where
new evidence may be adduced by the parties and considered by the court.
Likewise, the same court casted a doubtful eye on the authenticity of the SPA
in the light of the fact that Justiniano's passport and a Certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration show that he was not in the Philippines when the
SPA was allegedly executed on September 7, 1992 and notarized on September 9,
1992, having left the country on September 1, 1992 and returned only in 1993.
The court concluded that indeed, no sale took place between petitioner and
Justiniano, as in fact petitioner himself admitted in his January 8, 1998
letter to Justiniano that the latter remains the owner of the subject property.
And that, while petitioner claims to have deposited P3.5 Million in
Soraya Tulawie's bank account for payment to Justiniano, no direct evidence of
payment, such as a deposit slip or passbook, was ever presented by him. The
appellate court further noted that what petitioner had in fact presented in
evidence are receipts issued by Justiniano for petitioner's payment of rentals
after the purported sale. Specifically, the said court observed that on March
31, 1998, years after petitioner supposedly purchased the subject property, he
even paid P100,000 also as rentals, adding that there is no showing that
petitioner ever demanded that the title to the subject property be transferred
to him, which title remains very much registered in the name of the Justiniano
who continues to pay for the taxes on the subject property.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 12, 2004.
Thus, the instant petition which must necessarily fail.
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in declaring that the RTC erred when it admitted the SPA as additional evidence on appeal.
It is striking to note that in none of the pleadings he filed with the MeTC did petitioner ever allude to the existence of the SPA in question. To stress, it was only when the case was already on appeal at the RTC that petitioner alleged the existence thereof and introduced the same in evidence.
When, on appeal, petitioner submitted the SPA to prove that Justiniano authorized Soraya Tulawie to broker the sale of the properly in dispute, petitioner in effect asked the RTC, which readily obliged, to make a finding of fact as to the authenticity and due execution of the same document to establish the existence of an agency to sell between Justiniano and Soraya Tulawie. This cannot be countenanced, what with the hard reality that said document is being introduced only for the first time on appeal. It is well-settled that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without violating the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [1] cralaw The SPA should have been presented before the MeTC, in accordance with existing procedural rules.
Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court governing appeals to the RTC from a judgment or final order of the first level courts is clear and explicit.� It partly says:
"(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period 10 do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed" (Emphasis supplied),
which provision is reechoed in Section 18 of Rule 70, mandating the RTC to decide the appeal "on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties as required by the Regional Trial Court".
Thus, for all intents and purposes, there is no SPA to speak of in the present case. And absent any special power of attorney, Soraya Tulawie could not bind Justiniano in the purported sale of the subject property to petitioner. As it is, Article 1878 of the Civil Code requires a special power of attorney in contracts "by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration1; while Article 1874 of the same Code provides that "(w)hen a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void".
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Assistant Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Salao vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493 [1998].
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