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[G.R. No. 165808.� January 26, 2005]
ABELLA vs. ABELLA
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 26, 2005
G.R. No. 165808 (Ma. Isabelita G. Abella, M.D., operating under the name and style of "CHRISTIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL", vs. Araceli V. Abella.)
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 14, 2004 decision [1] cralaw of the Court of Appeals upholding the Orders dated February 4, 2002 and April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court at Muntinglupa City in its Civil Case No. 01-157, which orders respectively reinstated the complaint therein filed but only as against petitioner, and denied its motion for reconsideration.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for damages filed by plaintiff, now private respondent Araceli V. Abella against six (6) defendants, namely: the Holy Infant Academy of Muntinglupa, Inc. (Holy Infant), Sally Olivar, Liza Olivar, Anita Olivio, Andres Taguinayo and petitioner Christian General Hospital (CGH).
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that her son died because CGH did not give him the needed proper medical attention.
On July 3, 2001, defendant, now petitioner CGH, a single proprietorship owned by Dr. Isabelita G. Abella, filed its answer to the complaint. For their part, co-defendants Holy Infant, et al., filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to comply with a condition precedent to the filing of the complaint; and (2) plaintiff's claim or demand against them had been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
In an Order dated September 11, 2001, [2] cralaw the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed the complaint for non-compliance with Section 408 of Republic Act No. 7160. [3] cralaw More specifically, the order of dismissal pertinently reads:
"Going over the records the Court indeed noticed that all of the parties except for Holy Infant Academy, which is (a) Corporation are residents of the same Barangay, and the Complaint bound by the said Republic Act. It also shows that although complainant filed the Complaint with the Barangay, however it was only against Holy Infant Academy and Sally Olivar. She did not implead the other defendants hence there was no certification issued by the Barangay Chairman, authorizing her to institute this action in Court.
The Referral before the Lupon is mandatory and jurisdictional, the omission of which renders the complaint dismissable".
Thereafter, on October 1, 2001, plaintiff Araceli V. Abella filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the order of dismissal did not specify the defendants against whom the complaint was dismissed, adding that where any of the parties to a case is a juridical person like defendant Holy Infant, the complaint need not pass the barangay lupon but may be filed directly in court.
In its subsequent Order dated November 12, 2001, [4] cralaw the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, albeit limiting the dismissal of the case only with respect to the individual defendants except Holy Infant, due to plaintiff's failure to course the complaint through the barangay lupon.
Plaintiff Abella questioned the aforesaid Orders of September 11, 2001 and November 12, 2001 before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. [5] cralaw
Pursuant to a Motion for Clarification [6] cralaw filed by Holy Infant of the Order of November 12, 2001, the trial court issued its challenged Order dated February 4, 2002, [7] cralaw this time reinstating the complaint but only as against CGH, thus:
"The Court in its Order dated 12 November 2001 dismissing the complaint failed to note that the hospital is not an individual person, so that the complaint against (it) should not be dismissed. Therefore, this Order amends and corrects that unintended mistake. The Complaint is reinstated with respect to Christian General Hospital.
CGH moved for a reconsideration of the aforequoted order but its motion was denied by the trial court in its next assailed Order dated April 1.2002. [8] cralaw
Therefrom, CGH went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when, in its challenged Order of February 4, 2002, it caused the reinstatement of the complaint against it, even as the earlier order of dismissal dated September 11, 2001 had already become final and executory.
In the herein assailed decision dated June 14, 2004, [9] cralaw the Court of Appeals upheld the challenged Orders dated February 4, 2002 and April 1, 2002 and accordingly dismissed CGH's petition, thus:
"The records of the case show that the assailed Orders were issued absent the patent and gross abuse of discretion upon which a writ of certiorari may be properly applied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED".
Petitioner CGH is now with us, contending that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the reinstatement of the case against it even as the order dated November 12, 2001, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier order dismissing the complaint against all defendants, including itself had already became final and executory.
Petitioner's argument is specious.
It bears stressing that petitioner CGH filed its answer to the complaint on July 3, 2001. Thus, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over it. On the other hand, Holy Infant and the other remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 9, 2001. The motion to dismiss did not include petitioner CGH. The motion was resolved by the trial court in its Order dated September 11, 2001 which dismissed the complaint as regards the individual defendants for non-compliance with Section 408 of RA 7160. Subsequently, the same court modified the said order on November 12, 2001 by specifically excluding Holy Infant Academy in the dismissal, being a juridical entity.
Pursuant to a motion for clarification filed by Holy Infant, the trial court issued the challenged Order dated February 4, 2001, reinstating the complaint only as against petitioner CGH.
Petitioner CGH was clearly not a party to the motion to dismiss filed by the other defendants. Thus, it cannot claim that the Order dated September 11, 2001 has become final and executory against it. To stress, CGH filed its own answer to the complaint. Under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, a motion to dismiss may be made before a responsive pleading is filed. By filing its answer, petitioner CGH obviously cannot claim that it is included in the motion to dismiss subsequently filed by the other defendants, and benefit from the same.
Moreover, it is provided in Rule 3, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, that all persons "against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules", be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such defendants may arise in the action.
Admittedly, a single complaint was filed against Holy Infant, certain individual defendants and petitioner CGH. It is noted, however, that Holy Infant and the individual defendants were impleaded based on different causes of action asserted against petitioner CGH. Thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed by the trial court against the five (5) defendants and reinstate it against petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Assistant Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Vicente Roxas of the Eleventh Division.
[2] cralaw Rollo, p. 98.
[3] cralaw Local Gov't. Code of 1991, Sec 408. Subject Matter for amicable settlement; Exception Thereto. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
xxx������ xxx������ xxx
(f) Dispute involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.
[4] cralaw Rollo, p. 63.
[5] cralaw Rollo, pp. 64. et seq.
[6] cralaw Rollo, pp. 71, et. seq.
[7] cralaw Rollo, pp. 71, et seq.
[8] cralaw Rollo, p. 120.
[9] cralaw Rollo, pp. 29, et seq.
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