ChanRobles Virtual law Library
[G.R. No. 166207.� January 31, 2005]
VALBROS vs. ALIM
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 31 2005.
G.R. No. 166207 (VALBROS REALTY, INC., represented by AMBROCIO VALERO III vs. THE HONORABLE ROSE MARY R. MOLINA-ALIM, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, LUTGARDA FERNANDEZ and TRILLAMAR, INC., represented by ANTONIO G. TRILLO.)
Under consideration is this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 80028, to wit:
1.� Decision dated 8 October 2004, [1] dismissing, for utter lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner contra the order dated May 21, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33; and
2.� Resolution dated 23 November 2004, [2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The material facts may be briefly stated, as follows:
On August 27, 2001, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Bauang, La Union petitioner Valbros Realty, Inc. filed a complaint for legal redemption, rescission of contract and damages against private respondents Lutgarda Fernandez and Trillamar, Inc. Docketed as Civil Case No. 1343-BG, the complaint was raffled off to Branch 33 of the court, presided by the respondent judge.
Trial of the case commenced on March 13, 2002 during which petitioner adduced the testimony of its first witness, Ambrocio Valero III. Thereafter, petitioner asked for a continuance of the hearing to April 10, 2002, to which the court acceded. Counsel for the private respondents started to cross-examine Valero III on May 23, 2002. Said counsel was to continue and complete the cross-examination on June 20, 2002 but was not able to do so because on said date, both Valero III and petitioner's counsel failed to appear without any motion or notice to that effect. As a result, private respondents waived their right to further cross-examine Valero III. They likewise moved that petitioner be declared to have waived its right to present further evidence. The trial court acted favorably on private respondents' motion and accordingly declared petitioner to have waived its right to present further evidence.
Thereafter, petitioner moved for reconsideration. In an order dated November 14, 2002, the respondent judge granted the motion and gave petitioner another chance to complete the presentation of its evidence. The presentation of petitioner's further evidence was reset to December 11, 2002 but counsel for private respondents was not available on that date, so the court fixed January 23, 2003 as the next hearing date. However, petitioner had it again reset to March 27, 2003.
Again, on the date thus set, petitioner was not able to present its further evidence, allegedly because its unnamed witness got sick. Hence, the hearing was once more reset to May 21 and 28, 2003, both at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
When May 21, 2003 came, petitioner's counsel failed to appear in court. Instead, he sent Atty. Rivera, his supposed collaborating counsel, to ask for another postponement of the hearing on the ground that its witness, Valero III, was still in the United States for medical treatment. Approximately one (1) hour after the scheduled hearing, private respondents and their counsel were not yet around. Due to this, Atty. Rivera, thinking that they were no longer arriving, just signed in the expediente and left the courtroom.
Before the next scheduled hearing date came, or on May 27, 2003, a representative of petitioner's counsel called up the trial court to inquire whether the scheduled hearing on May 28, 2003 would push through as there was then a strong typhoon. A certain employee of the court named Richard replied in the affirmative. When the witness, Valero III, and petitioner's counsel arrived at the trial court on May 28, they were told that the case was not set for hearing and that they should just wait for the corresponding court order. Hence, they left.
On June 9, 2003, petitioner's counsel received an Order dated May 21, 2003, [3] cralaw allowing the private respondents to present their evidence and declaring petitioner's right to present further evidence to have been waived.
To this order, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court on September 15, 2003.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80028. However, as stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals in a decision dated October 8, 2004, dismissed the petition "for lack of merit". In a resolution dated November 23, 2004, the same court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner's present recourse.
We find the Court of Appeals not to have committed any reversible error in dismissing, for utter lack of merit, the petition for certiorari thereat filed by petitioner.
As held in the case of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc vs. CA [4] :
"A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. Section 4 of Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically requires that '[a] motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it. xxx'"
Clearly, the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the postponement of the hearing once again and in declaring that petitioner has waived its right to present further evidence. As can be seen from the circumstances obtaining in this case, petitioner has employed so many tactics just to delay the proceedings. Petitioner has moved, countless times, for the postponement of the hearing due to the unavailability or sickness of its witness. We note that the trial has dragged on for more than one year due to this. There likewise was an instance when both the petitioner and its counsel, without any motion or notice, did not appear on the scheduled date of hearing.
Because of petitioner's delaying tactics, the respondent judge has once declared petitioner to have waived its right to present evidence. We emphasize, it was only upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration that the respondent judge resolved to give it another chance. Hence, it should have been incumbent upon petitioner to diligently attend the hearings set and not anymore waste the court's precious time. Under the circumstances, we find the trial court's assailed orders to have been properly issued and the Court of Appeals to have rightly upheld the same.
Finally, we stamp our approval to the following pronouncements of the appellate court in its challenged decision of October 8, 2004, to wit:
"Quite carelessly, petitioner's counsel had himself caught with his pants down, so to speak. He succeeded before in utilizing the excuse of his unnamed, and therefore, unknown witness getting sick when the March 27, 2003 trial date came. This time, he slipped and named the sick witness to be Ambrocio Valero III. He thereby betrayed his predilection to play fast and loose with the court. He ought to have borne in mind that Valero's testimony was already terminated with the respondents' waiving their further cross-examination of him on June 20, 2002. What the petitioner asked for and was granted was its presentation of "further evidence" which could only mean, in the context of what had already transpired, evidence other than the testimony of Valero III. What is more, he has not up to the present submitted a sworn medical certificate of Valero III. Neither has he shown by affidavit the relevancy of the further evidence that he was to offer. All these are required by the rules. Nor did he deem it proper to extend to opposing counsel, who also holds office in Metro Manila, the courtesy of giving him prior notice of the intended postponement to spare him the inconvenience of travelling all the way to La Union. Above all, the allowable trial period had long ago been exhausted and delayed for nearly a year.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Annex "K", Petition; Rollo, pp. 64, et seq.
[2] cralaw Annex "M", Petition; Rollo, pp. 90, et seq.
[3] cralaw Annex "E", Petition; Rollo, p. 67.
[4] cralaw 359 Phils. 859, 867 [1998].
HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
QUICK SEARCH
