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[G.R. No.� 155609.� July 18, 2005]

ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE vs. SAMAHAN

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 18 2005.

G.R. No. 155609 (ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE vs. ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE WORKERS' ASSOCIATION (SAMAHAN).)

Before the Court are (1) petitioner's February 21, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration; (2) the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines' March 16, 2005 Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment in Intervention, as well as the Comment in Intervention itself; and (3) respondent's May 18, 2005 Comment on the aforesaid pleadings.

Petitioner, in its Motion for Reconsideration, insists that the intention of the law is to compute the 70-30 scheme, based not merely upon the increase in tuition fee rates, but upon the actual incremental proceeds that would result from comparing the tuition fee income of the school year in question with that of the previous school year. It also argues that bad debts, discounts and scholarships should be considered in computing the incremental proceeds.

On the other hand, the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) in their Comment in Intervention, contends that the Court� in effect obligates all private schools, colleges and universities to give 70 percent of the proceeds from the tuition fee increase to the teaching and the non-teaching personnel of the school in the form of increases in salaries and benefits. This obligation holds, even if the tuition fee increase may not have enabled the school to realize an income increase.

The CEAP also contends that students who have not actually paid the increased tuition fee, like scholars and dropouts, must not be considered in the computation of the incremental proceeds.

Preliminarily, we address the CEAP's Motion for Leave to Intervene. Section 2 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

"SEC 2. Time to Intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties."

In the present case, judgment has long been rendered by the trial court. In fact, even the Supreme Court has already rendered its Decision. Clearly, the proper time for CEAP to intervene has passed. It is not an indispensable party to this case, unlike the intervenor in Director of Lands v. CA. (93 SCRA 238, September 25, 1979)

Furthermore, there is no need to grant intervention just to issue the clarification desired by CEAP, for to do so, will not change the Decision or adversely affect the original parties. The clarification can be made after admitting the position of the CEAP, as expressed in its Comment in Intervention, in a similar vein as the Court would regard an amicus brief.

Now, on the matter to be clarified. Unlike the CA, this Court made no ruling obliging petitioner to allot 70 percent of the proceeds for increases in the salaries and benefits of the school's personnel. Our affirmance of the CA Decision was not in toto and referred only to the dispositive portion reversing the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Naturally, those parts or statements in the CA's discussion that are different from and inconsistent with our won are not affirmed. Hence, differing from the CA's statement, we clearly ruled that, as plainly stated in the law, "70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the non-teaching personnel." Private schools are not obligated at all times to increase or raise personnel compensation if the tuition fee increase does not allow such raise in compensation. However, they are obligated at all times to expend 70 percent of the tuition fee increases for salaries and benefits of personnel, not for any other purpose like the purchase of equipment or modernization of buildings.

We now go to the matter raised in both the Motion for Reconsideration and the Comment in Intervention: whether it is only the number of students who have actually paid the tuition fee increase that should be used in computing the incremental proceeds.

The position of petitioner and CEAP is commonsensical and indeed also what the Court means. In the discussion of this Court's ruling, the focus was on how the proceeds were to be disbursed. Proceeds are sums that are actually received. Naturally, tuition fees that are not paid by students are not received by the school. Hence, these unpaid fees can never form part of or be included in the computation of the incremental proceeds. Consequently, in determining such proceeds, only those students who have actually paid the increased tuition fees should not be considered. The number of students, like scholars, who have not paid the increased tuition fees should not be included in the computation.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Leave to Intervene of the CEAP is DENIED for having been filed out of time. However, its Comment is deemed an amicus brief. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is also DENIED. But, the Decision is hereby CLARIFIED in the sense (1) that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase should be "allotted for the teaching and non-teaching personnel," not necessarily for an increase in personnel compensation; and (2) in computing the incremental proceeds from the tuition fee increase, such increase for the current year is to be multiplied by the number of enrollees in the same year who have actually paid for the increased tuition fees.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court

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