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[G.R. No. 159754.� July 25, 2005]
BORLONGAN vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
THIRD DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 25 2005.
G.R. No. 159754 (Teodoro C. Borlongan vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.)
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Teodoro C. Borlongan, former President and Director of Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI), challenges the following issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-01-1504:
1)� Resolution dated July 2, 2002, [1] cralaw dismissing petitioner's complaint against herein respondents Rafael B. Buenaventura, Governor, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and Norberto C. Nazareno, President, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC), for violation of Section 16 and 30 of R.A. 7653 [2] cralaw , Article 315 [3] cralaw (1)(b) or Article 318 [4] cralaw of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Section 3(e) and 3(j) of R.A. 3019; [5] cralaw and
2)� Order dated November 29, 2002 [6] cralaw , denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In a sworn complaint-affidavit
[7]
cralaw
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and thereat docketed as OMB-0-01504,
petitioner Borlongan charged respondents Rafael B. Buenaventura and Norberto C.
Nazareno in their respective capacities as Governor, BSP, and President, PDIC,
of giving undue preference to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) when they
allowed LBP to enforce collection from Urban Bank Inc. on the promissory notes
of the National Food Authority in the amount of P562,500,000. The
ordained collection was allegedly in violation of Section 30 of RA 7653 because
it was effected after UBI was already placed under receivership of the PDIC and
the latter had already taken over the operations of UBI.
In a Resolution dated July 2, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer I, Joseph L. Licudan, dismissed Borlongan's complaint for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause against respondents, saying, inter alia, thus:
Respondents did not give undue preference to Land Bank of the Philippines when the latter was allowed to enforce collection on the subject National Food Authority Promissory Notes.
The assignment of said NFA notes to LBP was completed on 29 March 2000 before the closure of UBI on 26 April 2000. as of that date, LBP, as assignee, had full rights to enforce collection of the subject NFA notes. Respondent Nazareno merely confirmed LBP's authority to enforce collection on the subject NFA promissory notes on the basis of the perfected Deed of Assignment executed by UBI in favor of LBP, which was notarized on 29 March 2000 or before the closure of UBI.
The "confirmation of outright purchase of Government Securities" relied upon by complainant is not the document that established LBP's rights to collect the proceeds of the NFA notes. It was clear that it was the Deed of Assignment notarized on March 29, 2000, which gave LBP the right to collect. Even without the "Confirmation of Outright Purchase of Government Securities", NFA is duty bound to pay the proceeds of the NFA notes to LBP because of the provisions of the Deed of Assignment, and the fact that LBP has physical possession of the NFA notes.
xxx��������������������������� xxx������������������������������ xxx
Anent the charge of violation 30 of Republic Act No. 7653(New Central Bank Act) the same has no factual or legal basis as respondents' transactions on the assets or affairs of UBI were in accordance with polices, rules, and procedures in the discharge of respondents' functions and duties as a receiver. This is because the assignment of NFA notes was completed before the closure of UBI.
As for the alleged violation of Sec. 16 of the same law, the same has no application in the proffered criminal action. The said section applies obviously to administrative infractions but never as a punitive measure for it does not provide a penalty of imprisonment or imposition of fines in case of violation. To be liable under it, it must be proven that the alleged illegal act was committed with deliberateness, which is difficult to prove. With respect to negligence and the like, the culprit should be found guilty first.
In the case before us, it was not shown that there was willful violation of the law, neither was it indicated that the respondents have been found guilty of negligence.
Anent the charge of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, suffice it to state that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause for the prosecution of respondents in the instant case.
Anent the charge of violation Section 3(e) and (j) of R.A. 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, there is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause for the prosecution of respondents in a court of law.
This is because as explained earlier, respondents did not give undue preference to Land Bank of the Philippines when it (sic) allowed the latter to enforce collection on the subject National Food Authority promissory notes.
In order that the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended, may prosper, it is essential that there be undue injury caused to any party, including the Government, and that the public officer in the exercise of his official functions must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Undue injury in Section 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or violation of a right has been established. The causing of undue injury or the the giving of preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitute the very act punished under the section. it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty. Speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient.
Anent the charge of Section 3(j), RA 3019, the same must necessarily fail for lack of basis.
Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019, punishes the act of:
"(j)��������� Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of another person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled."
It is clear that respondents did not give undue preference to Land Bank of the Philippines when it allowed the latter to enforce collection on the subject National Food Authority promissory notes. Hence, no basis to charge respondent with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019.
As far as the charges against respondent Buenaventura, the same may not prosper as they are based on hearsay reports in the newspapers as well as on conjectures made by complainant himself without any bases in fact and in law. Respondent cannot be indicted simply on the basis of his being a director of PDIC and member of the NFA Council representing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant are not sufficient to substantiate the charges against respondent. Such charges against respondent must be buttressed by clear and convincing proof. Well settled is the rule that "circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility, cannot rest on mere conjectures no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence." (People vs. Rapanut, 263, SCRA 515)
All told, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause against respondents.
Based on the above findings, the Graft Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, which recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Ombudsman in a subsequent Resolution of November 29, 2002.
Aggrieved, petitioner interposed the present recourse challenging the findings of the Ombudsman.
Incidentally, pending resolution of the instant petition, counsel for petitioner filed a notice dated May 10, 2005 informing the Court that petitioner Teodoro C. Borlongan passed away on April 11, 2005.
A perusal of the records shows that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, hence the same should be considered conclusive. [8] cralaw Moreover, the assailed Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature. In assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact. As it is, his arguments are anchored on the propriety of or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts.
Time and again, we have stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. [9] cralaw
We have repeatedly ruled that the function of the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari is to correct errors in the exercise of jurisdiction. Certiorari was never meant to correct an office's judgment based on its evaluation of the evidence and the facts. The writ is issued only when it is sufficiently shown that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. [10] cralaw It does not include correction of the respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon.
For sure, in People vs. Court of Appeals, [11] the Court explained that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence:
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctable by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than error of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.
Thus, while the appreciation of evidence may have resulted in possible lapses in its evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. As such, the lapses are improper objects of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. [12] To reiterate, errors of judgment are not be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Besides, to justify issuance of the writ on ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. [13] cralaw
Here, the Ombudsman's dismissal of petitioner's complaint due to lack of probable cause against the herein respondents, based on the former's appreciation and review of the evidence presented by the parties, is, to our mind, far from constituting a grave abuse of discretion.
We thus reiterate the rule of long standing that in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. [14] cralaw His findings of probable cause, or lack of it, are entitled to great respect. [15] cralaw
Absence a showing of grave abuse of discretion, as here, this Court, recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, and for reasons of practicality, will neither interfere with the findings of that office nor review the exercise of its discretion in filing an information in court or dismissing a complaint. Otherwise, this Court will be swamped by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [16] cralaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo pp. 60-73.
[2] cralaw The New Central Bank Act.
[3] cralaw SWINDLING (estafa).
[4] cralaw OTHER DECIETS.
[5] cralaw Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
[6] cralaw Rollo, pp. 74-80.
[7] cralaw Rollo, pp. 82-95.
[8] cralaw Roman A. Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, the Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman, 233 SCRA 439 [1994].
[9] cralaw Romana A. Cruz, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), and Office of the Ombudsman, 233 SCRA 439.
[10] cralaw Jaladoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107, 121 [2000] citing the case of Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[11] cralaw 308 SCRA 687, 699[1999].
[12] cralaw People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 [2000].
[13] cralaw San Miguel Corporation vs. Sandiganbayan, 340 SCRA 289, 310-311 [2000].
[14] cralaw Alba vs. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753 [1996]; Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 228 SCRA 718 [1993].
[15] cralaw Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725 [1993].
[16] cralaw G.R. No. 119355, Gulpo, et al. vs. Ombudsman, May 24, 1995; G.R. No. 116161, Labita vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Sariego, August 8, 1994, 235 SCRA; Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman,� 225 SCRA 725 [1993]. Benedicto E. Kuizon, Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto and Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) [March 9, 2001].
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