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[G.R. No. 168231.� July 20, 2005]
ROURA vs. SALONGA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 20 2005.
G.R. No. 168231 (Dominga R. Roura vs. Jose L. Salonga, Mercedita C. Salonga, Almar Salonga and the Office of the Ombudsman, thru its Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Victor C. Fernandez.)
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari dated 14 June 2005 questioning the Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 28 October 2004 and 29 March 2005, respectively, dismissing petitioner's complaint against private respondents for estafa thru falsification of public document.
Petitioner Dominga R. Roura alleges in her Complaint-Affidavit that on or about 21 October 2001, she entered into a Contract To Sell with Jose Salonga, the incumbent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and his wife, Mercedita Salonga, for the sale of a piece of land. The contract price was P1.5 Million of which P250,000.00 was given to her as downpayment. The balance was yet to be paid. Despite this, petitioner surrendered the title to the lot in question to the spouses Salonga as security. A month later, petitioner discovered that the spouses Salonga used a forged Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property and other falsified documents such as a Documentary Stamp Tax Declaration/Return, Certificate Authorizing Registration and Capital Gains Tax Return from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to transfer the property to their son, private respondent Almar Salonga.
Petitioner maintains that she never transferred her property to Almar and that she has not seen him in a very long time. To her knowledge, Almar does not even have the financial capacity to buy the land as she knows him to be feeble-minded from birth. She contends that she never received the P1 Million contract price mentioned in the falsified absolute deed of sale; that she has never met the witnesses stated therein; and that the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) indicating her residence as Nueva Ecija mentioned in the falsified deed is likewise fake. She has been a resident of Quezon City for over 30 years. That the CTC is fake is obvious from the fact that it is similar on all respects to the CTC of respondent Almar except for the middle digit, i.e., her purported CTC has 7 digits (C4264225) while that of Almar has 8 (C42664225), number 6 being repeated in the case of the latter.
Through her lawyer, petitioner sent the spouses Salonga a letter of demand for the balance of the purchase price under the original and true contract to sell.
Finally, petitioner stressed that the National Bureau of Investigation -- after comparing her purported signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale with her standard signature -- certified that these signatures were not made by one and the same person.
All of the private respondents denied the above allegations.
On 28 October 2004, Graft Investigation Officer II Ismaela B. Boco, as approved by Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez, resolved to dismiss without prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Mayor Salonga. On the other hand, he referred the case against Mercedita Salonga and her son Almar to the provincial prosecutor of Nueva Ecija.
Basically, public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, thru the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, dismissed the complaint against Mayor Salonga for failure of petitioner to present concrete proof that he conspired with his wife and/or son to falsify the documents subject matter of the case. Absent proof of conspiracy, Mayor Salonga cannot be indicted for the alleged falsification of the deed of sale as he is not a party thereto. As explained by public respondent:
With respect to the charge for falsification of public document, we find no adequate evidence that public respondent Jose Salonga has participation or is privy in forging the signature of herein complainant in the disputed Deed of Absolute Sale. For one, public respondent Jose Salonga is not a party to the deed, but rather his son, private respondent Almar Salonga. Secondly, no well-meaning parent would sacrifice and expose his child to possible criminal prosecution if only to shield himself from suit if it were not true that the transaction involving the sale of the subject lot was in fact between complainant and private respondent Almar Salonga. . . .
In its Order dismissing petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent admitted the possibility that the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents was committed against petitioner. It did not, however, reconsider its previous resolution for the reason that:
The existence of conspiracy between public respondent Jose Salonga and private respondents Mercedita and Almar Salonga to commit the crime charged was likewise not duly shown by the evidence presented. The mere fact that the respondents are relatives does not prove conspiracy. There must be an obvious showing of common design that the acts of the respondents were meant to defraud and swindle the complainant of the payment due to her for the lot subject of the sale.
With the showing of non-participation of public respondent Jose Salonga to the crime charged, this Office cannot continue with the preliminary investigation of the case against private respondents Mercedita and Almar Salonga as it already lost jurisdiction over them. It must be noted that this Office acquires jurisdiction over private individuals only in case they are in conspiracy with a public officer in the commission of the crime.
However, the dismissal of the case against Jose Salonga does not mean that the complainant has totally lost her cause of action. It is for this purpose that this Office has resolved to refer the entire records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija for the conduct of appropriate investigation against private respondents Mercedita and Almar Salonga.
Hence, the present petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent as the assailed Resolution and Order in effect "validate ... the land grabbing by private respondents, who belong to a powerful and influential political clan in Nueva Ecija, of a modest possession of petitioner, who is a helpless widow."
We are not persuaded.
Well-enshrined and time-tested is the principle of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman unless there is present a case of grave abuse of discretion on its part, thus:
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [1] cralaw (Emphasis supplied)
We do not perceive here a case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent. Its dismissal of the case against Mayor Salonga was based on its considered evaluation of the evidence on hand as it found insufficient petitioner's claim of conspiracy among the three private respondents. Perhaps, if petitioner were able to show a criminal link between the Mayor and his wife and son apart from her mere say so, our disposition of the present controversy would be different. Perhaps, if petitioner presented proof of the first contract over the property entered into between her and the spouses Salonga and proof as well of the downpayment received by her, there would be no question that probable cause sufficient to indict Mayor Salonga exists.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, 09 December 2004; Soria v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 153524-25, 31 January 2005; Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131445, 27 May 2004, citing Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767 and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136192, 14 August 2001, 362 SCRA 730.
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