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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2154-RTJ.� July 11, 2005]
LAND REFORM vs. QUERUBIN
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 11 2005.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2154-RTJ (Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc., represented by Manuel Estrada vs. Judge Francisco A. Querubin, RTC, Br. 74, Antipolo City.)
Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated May 4, 2005, to wit:
REASON FOR AGENDA: Filed with the Office of the Court Administrator are the following:
1.������ A VERIFIED COMPLAINT, with attachments, dated 4 December 2004 of Land Reform Beneficiaries Association Inc. represented by Manuel Estrada charging Judge Francisco A. Querubin, RTC, Branch 74, Antipolo City, with Ignorance of the Law and Violation of Canon 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to LRC Case No. 93-1316 entitled, "In the matter of the application for registration of land. Honorata S. Lico, et al., applicants."
The antecedents:
Complainants are occupants of a parcel of land situated in Antipolo City subject of the application of Honorata Lico, et al., for land registration before RTC, Branch 74, Antipolo City, wherein they filed a motion for intervention alleging that they have an interest in the matter in litigation being the present occupants of the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation subject of Proclamation No. 1637 of former Pres. Marcos and that the said land is a portion of the townsite reservation which is part of the public domain.
Complainants fault respondent Judge Querubin for accepting the application for registration (LRC No. 93-1316) and conducting hearings thereon. According to them, the actuation of respondent is contrary to law considering that the townsite reservation or portion thereof being public land is within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. They also contend that as actual occupants of the subject land they have "priority rights" over the same.
2.������ A COMMENT, dated 1 February 2005, of Judge Francisco A. Querubin explaining the following:
A. In an Order dated 10 September 2004, he denied complainants' motion for intervention in this wise: "Court, therefore, finds the movants have neither the personality nor interest to intervene in their own right as they allege no ownership over the subject property but instead admit that it is part of the public domain in which case only the government or State should be the proper party with personality to intervene and protect its interest and not parties who do not claim to be the owners of subject property such as movants x x x";
B. Ignorance of the law is instead applicable to complainants. Complainants' assertion that all the lands embraced within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation in the aforesaid municipalities have thereby become government-owned lands or public domain simply because of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 is wrong because most of the lands embraced therein are privately-owned lands which are, therefore, susceptible of possible land registration proceedings. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 emphatically states that the establishment of the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation of lands in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal, is subject to private rights, if any there be;
C. Complainants who claim "priority rights" under the mistaken notion that such private lands are already public domain by sheer force of the said proclamation are plain squatters on privately-owned lands including the land sought to be registered in LRC Case No. 93-1316; and
D. If complainants disagree with the order denying their motion for intervention, their remedy is to go to the Court of Appeals.
EVALUATION: The charges must be dismissed.
Complainants anchored their complaint on their own interpretation of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637. They are assigning an error in the judgment of respondent per their own evaluation of the case. They must have felt that their own personal evaluation of the case and the application of the aforesaid legal provision is more in accordance with the rule of law.
If complainants' camp feels that they are prejudiced by the orders and actuation of a judge, their remedies lie with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator (Dionisio vs. Escano, cited in Almendrala vs. Judge Enrique C. Asis, AM No. RTJ-00-1550, April 6, 2000). This is because a party-litigant abuses the process of the court if he resorts to an administrative proceeding for disciplining judges, notwithstanding that the determination of the correctness of the order of the judge - upon which the viability of his recourse depends - has not been made. The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings against judges are neither complementary or supplementary nor a substitute for the judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted or when the appellate tribunal has spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into this administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed (Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302).
RECOMMENDATION:��������� Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant case be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The foregoing findings and recommendation are well taken.
As correctly pointed out by the OCA, the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. In the absence of fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the assailed decision or order, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. [1] cralaw Moreover, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. [2] cralaw The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. [3] cralaw To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [4] cralaw
The Court, thus, Resolves to DISMISS the complaint against Judge Francisco A. Querubin for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Pitney v. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1748,11 November 2003, 415 SCRA 377.
[2] cralaw Casta�os v. Esca�o, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 12 December 1995, 251 SCRA 174.
[3] cralaw Mayor Abdula v. Hon. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000).
[4] cralaw Sacmar v. Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766, 28 March 2003, 400 SCRA 32.
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