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[A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2162-RTJ.� July 18, 2005]
DELA ROSA vs. SOLIS
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 18 2005.
A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2162-RTJ (ATTY. ROSALIO G. DELA ROSA vs. JUDGE CESAR M. SOLIS.)
For dismissing the main case before resolving the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Cesar M. Solis was charged with gross ignorance of the law. The complaint was filed by Atty. Rosalio G. dela Rosa, plaintiff's counsel in an ejectment case entitled, "Safeway Property Management, Inc. v. Engr. Jerry C. Lui."
The case was appealed to the RTC, Branch 24, Manila, from the decision of Judge Yolanda Leonardo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila, in favor of plaintiff.
On 12 August 2004, defendant filed a notice of appeal but did not file a supersedeas bond. When the case was forwarded and raffled to the RTC, defendant filed a Manifestation with Motion stating that a supersedeas bond is no longer necessary. On 31 August 2004, plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On 17 September 2004 the motion was submitted for resolution.
On 13 October 2004, Judge Cesar M. Solis rendered a decision reversing the verdict of the court a quo, thereby dismissing the case. Thereafter, on 20 October 2004, Judge Solis issued an order denying the motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
The complainant assailed the action of the Judge. He said the latter seems to be unmindful that when a judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution should be issued immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution shall file a supersedeas bond. He pointed out that the issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty of the court if the supersedeas bond is not filed.
The dismissal of the case before the resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution renders plaintiff's motion moot and academic. Thereupon, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was submitted for resolution on 12 November 2004.
In his Comment, Judge Solis admitted he dismissed the appealed case on the ground of reversible errors in the decision of the court a quo. Before the Judge can resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, complainant filed a Motion for Inhibition on 5 January 2005 which was granted. Thereafter, the records of the case were transmitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle.
Complainant, instead of questioning the propriety or impropriety of the ruling, filed an administrative complaint.
Judge Solis admitted that the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and failure to do so, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order execution. He explains, however, that this rule admits of exceptions. Thus, he said, the rendition of the judgment dismissing the case has made the issue raised by the complaint moot and academic. Accordingly, he added, to allow execution after the ejectment complaint has been dismissed would be iniquitous and unjust. Moreover, Judge Solis claimed that there is no rule that directs the court to first resolve motions before the rendition of the decision in the main case.
Complainant, in his Motion to Inhibit, claimed that Judge Solis failed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period. This was denied by the Judge. He pointed out that the Constitution grants judges a period of three (3) months and not thirty (30) days to resolve incidents pending before them.
Judge Solis further averred that assuming there are errors in the decision and/or order denying the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, same is not a valid basis for an administrative inquiry. He argued that to merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. Absent any proof to the contrary, he said, the defective or erroneous decision is presumed to have been done in good faith. He further explained that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every actof a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where judicial remedy exists and is available.
Judge Solis took to task the complainant saying that being a lawyer, he should know that grievances against judges should not be coursed through the media. That is not the proper forum. Apparently, he said, it was the complainant who caused the publication in the newspapers of the story about the complaint against him. The publication, he said, caused him and his family mental anguish and embarrassment.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that investigated the complaint against the Judge submitted its evaluation of the case and recommended on the basis thereof, the dismissal of the complaint.
We agree and conform to the OCA's evaluation, which we find to be in accord with the law and the facts of the case on record. Thus:
Section 19 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "if a judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately." The aforesaid Rule further provides execution shall be stayed when "an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, and during the pendency of the appeal, deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract." Under the above provision, it is clear that immediate execution of the judgment in ejectment can be stayed by the defendant only by (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a supersedeas bond; [and] (3) paying promptly either to the plaintiff or making a periodic deposit with the Regional Trial Court of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal (San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. vs. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466). If the defendant fails to comply with any of the abovementioned requisites and such failure does not fall in any of the exemptions, then it becomes a mandatory and ministerial, even imperative, duty of the Regional Trial Court to which the appeal was made to order the immediate execution of the judgment, upon application of the plaintiff (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136).
There are only two (2) exceptions to the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal when defendant fails to comply with the requisites of posting a supersedeas bond and depositing current monthly rental: first, the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from complying with said requisites, and second, the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable (San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 145).
Respondent Judge cannot be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for the reason that he was well-aware of the above-quoted Section 19, Rule 70 and relevant jurisprudence. In fact, in his Comment, respondent Judge stated that he was "neither unaware nor ignorant of the ruling in the case of Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178)" but he explained that "while it is conceded that the filing of the supersedeas bond is mandatory and it is the ministerial duty of the court to order execution if defendant failed to do so, in actual application, the ruling is not absolute." Citing the case of Hualam Construction and Development Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85466, October 16, 1992), respondent Judge claimed that complainant's case falls under one of the exceptions, particularly the occurrence of a supervening event which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make execution inequitable.
The propriety of respondent Judge's ruling and the related question of whether the rulings cited by the latter have been rendered inapplicable by the case of Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals are judicial matters that cannot be resolved in the instant administrative matter. At most, respondent Judge's act may only be considered as an error of judgment.
As a matter of public policy, not every error of judgment or an abuse of discretion can be punished administratively (Locadin vs. Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1346, July 9, 2003). In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. For administrative liability to attach, it must be established that the respondent Judge was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of sworn duty through some motive or interest or ill-will, partaking of the nature of fraud (Ang vs. Asis, 373 SCRA 91).
In this case, complainant failed to show the existence of fraud, bad faith or any other motive on the part of respondent Judge to warrant the imposition of administrative penalty for gross ignorance of the law. Thus, the instant case must be dismissed.
Finally, this Court in Buhayo v. Pine, [1] cralaw quoting De Guzman v. Pamintuan, [2] cralaw said:
Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Judge Cesar M. Solis is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw A.M.OCA IPI No.05-84-CA-J, 28 June 2005.
[2] cralaw A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 22, 26-27.
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