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[OCA I.P.I No. 03-1389-MTJ.� July 11, 2005]
MARCENADEZ vs. BARILLO
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 11 2005.
OCA I.P.I No. 03-1389-MTJ (Erlich Marcenadez, et al. vs. Judge Hector B. Barillo and Clerk of Court Lucila L. Tangeres.)
In a letter-petition [1] cralaw dated July 1, 2002, complainant Erlich Marcenadez [2] cralaw and 47 others [3] cralaw pray for the dismissal of Judge Hector B. Barillo and Lucila [4] cralaw L. Tangeres, Acting Judge and Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental for Abuse of Authority and Manifest Bias and Partiality.
Complainants allege that: they are small tenant-farmers or farmer beneficiaries of the land owned by the late Federico Sumugod (Sumugod); respondent Tangeres is the administratrix of the Sumugod estate; respondent Tangeres, in conspiracy with respondent Judge, fabricated charges against them, such that some of them were imprisoned; they were forced to give the products of their farms to the respondents; the respondents gathered and harvested the coconuts from complainants' cultivations; respondent Tangeres, as administratrix of the Sumugod estate, was paid by the government pursuant to the land reform but she persists in getting crops produced from complainants' farms; respondent Tangeres gathered the fruits of the trees of Eduardo Dayuno (Dayuno), one of the complainants, and when the latter demanded its return, the former threatened to file charges against the latter; respondent Judge issued a subpoena against Dayuno to instill fear on him and the other tenant-complainants to obey the whims and caprices of respondent Tangeres.
In a letter-complaint [5] cralaw dated February 20, 2003, complainant Marcenadez further alleges that respondent Tangeres filed a complaint against him for theft of coconuts; respondent Judge issued a resolution finding him liable for the crime charged, inspite of the fact that no affidavit was executed by respondent Tangeres; Dayuno was accused of qualified theft of coconuts at the instance of respondent Tangeres; respondent Judge found the accused guilty as charged but upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental, the charge was dismissed for being baseless and unfounded.
In her Comment [6] cralaw dated January 28, 2004, respondent Tangeres denies the allegations in the complaint and alleges that: she retired from government on June 25, 2003; complainant Marcenadez filed before the Ombudsman of the Visayas a complaint against her for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which was dismissed on September 30, 2002 for lack of prima facie evidence; on June 10, 2002, complainant Marcenadez filed before this Court the same charge of violation of R.A. No. 3019 and in a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, she was admonished and advised to give up her work as administratrix of the Sumugod estate; before she received said resolution, she had already resigned as administratrix due to her heart ailment and old age; the charges in the complaint are the same as in OCA IPI No. 02-1277-MTJ filed by Dayuno; she has not been paid by the government and the coconut plantation is not covered by land reform, such that the complainants are not beneficiaries of the same.
In his Comment [7] cralaw dated February 5, 2004, respondent Judge alleges that: some of the complainants were the accused or parties of criminal and civil cases filed before him; complainant Marcenadez was charged in Criminal Case No. 5626 for Qualified Theft of Coconuts and he forwarded the case on June 29, 1995 to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office which, in turn, filed the corresponding Information in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; complainant Dayuno was charged in Criminal Case No. 2-00-019 for Qualified Theft and he forwarded the case on August 16, 2000 to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office which, in turn, dismissed the case; complainants Pedro Tiana, Charles Amosco, Rosenda Damandaman, Arminda Villegas and Rodolfo Gako were some of the defendants in Civil Case No. 390 for forcible entry and damages which was dismissed for lack of merit on April 28, 1999; complainants Proculo Gako, Policarpio Ogabang and Hermes Ogabang were three of the defendants in Civil Case No. 432 for ejectment and damages which was decided against the defendants on March 28, 2001; the other complainants have no pending criminal or civil cases in his court but are victims of exploitation by politicians to harass him and blemish the integrity of the court; he is not the protector of respondent Tangeres because they have separate functions and duties and all of the cases filed or dismissed were based on the fair, factual and legal evidence presented and not on presumptions, speculations and conjectures.
After due evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
The recommendation is well-taken.
A judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. This is the standing policy of this Court.
In the recent case of Bello III vs. Diaz, [8] the Court reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. The Court laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores vs. Abesamis, [9] cralaw to wit:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had caused him "undue injury." This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof." Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. [10] cralaw
This Court has repeatedly stressed that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. [11] cralaw
As to allegations of manifest bias and partiality, the Court finds the same to be bereft of factual support. Bias and partiality can never be presumed. Bare allegations of partiality cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich. [12] cralaw
With respect to respondent Tangeres, her filing of criminal complaints against some of the complainants is not per se an indication of abuse of authority since all persons have free resort to the courts for redress of wrong and vindication of their rights. [13] cralaw The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution cannot make one liable for administrative charges, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Before she can be administratively liable, it must first be shown that respondent Tangeres acted in wanton and gross bad faith and injustice in instigating the criminal suits against the complainants; there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and that the prosecution was initiated with the deliberate knowledge that the charge was false and baseless, which can be properly addressed in a civil case for malicious prosecution. [14] cralaw Thus, the charges against respondent Tangeres must be dismissed.
We reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. [15] cralaw This Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. [16] cralaw
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw The letter-petition was addressed to the Chief Justice and written in the Visayan dialect. The letter-petition was referred to the OCA. In a letter dated June 3, 2003, the OCA required that an English or Filipino translation of the petition be furnished them. Rollo, pp. 21, 49.
[2] cralaw Spelled as Erlic Marcenades elsewhere in the Rollo.
[3] cralaw Namely: Crispin Caracot, Eduardo Dayuno, Rodolfo Gako, Pedro Tiana, Cristita Gako, Rosenda Damandaman, Minda Villegas, Charles Amosco, Roman Belvestre, Mila Belvestre, Antonia Dumagpi, Conchita Belvestre, Vecky Belvestre, Rosita Belvestre, Proculo M. Gako, Policarpo Ogabang, Hermes Ogabang, Herminia Ogabang, Epifania Arculo, Lilia Bayer, Windelino Bayer, Francisca Bayer, Patricia Marcenades, Felomino B. Marcenades, Charito Ignalig, Felicisimo Bardoc, Zacarreas Leneboja, Cora Alberio, Letecia Bongcawil, Elmo Mogello, Guillermo Antonio, Ramel Mogello, Carlito Lambo, Narcosa Grayan, Bundin Pableo, Rodilita F. Montecino, Estrella Abillar, Fedillo Monetecino, Julia Mahilum, Juanita Tangeres, Vicente Timtim, Anore Carba, Judith M. Bangoy, Jionisca Baricoslatro, Alexander Sta. Ana.
[4] cralaw Also spelled as Lucia in some parts of the Rollo.
[5] cralaw The letter-complaint was originally filed on October 28,2002 and written in the Visayan dialect.In a letter dated January 23, 2003, the OCA required complainant Marcenadez to furnish them an English or Filipino translation of the letter-complaint. Rollo, pp. 2, 6, and 7.
[6] cralaw Id., p. 75.
[7] cralaw Id., p. 111.
[8] cralaw A.M. No. MTJ-00-1311, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 573, 578.
[9] cralaw A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302.
[10] cralaw Id., pp. 316-317.
[11] cralaw Cruz vs. Ali�o-Hormachuelos, A.M. No. CA-04-38, March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 573, 578; Bacar vs. De Guzman, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 328, 338.
[12] cralaw Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. vs. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 376, 384.
[13] cralaw Martires vs. Cokieng, G.R. No.150192, February 17, 2005.
[14] cralaw Cacayoren vs. Suller, A.M. Nos. MTJ-97-1132 and MTJ-97-1133, jointly decided on October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 159, 166; Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109205, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 477.
[15] cralaw Licudine vs. Saquilayan, A.M. No. P-02-1618, February 14, 2003, 396 SCRA 650, 656; Montes vs. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1627, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 539, 545; Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 606, 634.
[16] cralaw Ang vs. Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 91, 99; Daracan vs. Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447, September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161, 177.
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