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[OCA IPI No. 04-1625-MTJ. July 4, 2005]

RE: CRISOSTOMO vs. SINGH

SECOND DIVISION

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 4 2005 .

OCA IPI No. 04-1625-MTJ (Re: Estrella V. Crisostomo vs. Presiding Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 31, Quezon City.)

A Complaint-Affidavit dated 13 September 2004, was filed by Estrella V. Crisostomo charging Presiding Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law relative to Criminal Case No. 108982 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Armi Candelaria" for violation of Presidential Decree No. 651 (requiring registration of facts concerning the civil status of persons).

Complainant Crisostomo alleged that she discovered her husband Alexander C. Crisostomo has an illegitimate child with Armi Candelaria whose birth was registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City. She avers that the birth certificate of the child contained a false declaration that Armi Candelaria was married to her husband on 07 July 2000 in Cotabato City. Based on this purported false declaration, she filed a case for violation of P.D. No. 651 against Candelaria in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 108982.

Eventually, and after several postponements, all upon the instance of the prosecution, the decision dated 17 August 2004 of the respondent was promulgated on 07 September 2004 which acquitted Armi Candelaria and dismissed the Case for insufficiency of evidence.

Before this Court, complainant alleges that the dismissal is against the evidence on record. She further avers that the promulgation of the assailed decision was postponed several times and that prior to the actual promulgation, the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably upon orders of the respondent judge, served "advance copies" of the said decision to the parties.

On 25 November 2004, Judge Paulite filed a verified comment asserting that:

a.� the instant administrative complaint is not proper remedy to review or reverse the judgment of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 108982 citing Flores vs. Abesamis (275 SCRA 302);

b.� the complainant has neither alleged nor submitted any evidence of malice, bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence; and, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed her duties prevails;

c.� as a settled principle, a judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, absent any showing of bad faith, malice, corrupt purpose or a deliberate intent to do an injustice; and

d.� the respondent's decision to acquit the accused was proper, considering the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Judge Paulite asserted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused made the false entry in the birth certificate or that the false entry was already there when the accused signed the same. She added that the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

On the allegation that "advance copies" of the decision were dubiously released on 02 September 2004 or five (5) days prior to the actual promulgation, respondent judge contends that the release was made precisely to assure the parties that the promulgation was not being deliberately delayed, notwithstanding the several postponements, and that the case was in fact already resolved. She said copies of the decision were simultaneously released to and received by all the parties as shown in the acknowledgement receipt.

After study and evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of the complaint, ratiocinating as follows:

The first issue in this administrative action dwells on an issue evidently judicial in nature since it involves the appreciation of evidence by the respondent judge. It bears stressing that a trial judge's impression on the testimony of witnesses and his appreciation of evidence presented before him are binding on the Court in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or an obvious misapprehension of facts. The fact that the respondent's appreciation of the evidence differed from that of the complainant's - which could be biased - does not warrant the conclusion that the said judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that she is ignorant of the law.

In order to hold a judge administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown indubitably that the judgment was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. For liability to attach, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive (De Guzman vs. Dy, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1755, 3 July 2003, 405 SCRA311).

...

The second issue relates to the release of the copies of the Decision dated 17 August 2004 to the parties (the private prosecutor, the private complainant, the counsel for the accused and the accused) before the promulgation of the same. Respondent Judge Paulite submits the following explanation:

"[T]he Decision had been prepared and signed as early as 17 August 2004, the original scheduled date of the promulgation of judgment. The Decision was in fact dated 17 August 2004, as confirmed by the copy of the Decision attached as Annex "G" of the Complaint-Affidavit. Though the Decision was ready, the promulgation in open court was delayed for reasons outside the control of the respondent, to wit, the absence of the public prosecutor on 17 August 2004 and 2 September 2004 and the hospitalization of respondent's son on 24 August 2004. Considering that the delays were not attributable to respondent's negligence, respondent cannot be charged with gross inefficiency."

.

"The only reason respondent released copies of the Decision to all the parties on 2 September 2004 was precisely to assure them that the promulgation was not being deliberately delayed and that the case had in fact been resolve by respondent. More importantly, copies of the Decision were simultaneously released to, and receive by, all the parties, as shown by the acknowledgement receipt on page 6 of the court copy of the Decision. The release of the copies of the Decision was neither intended to favor any of the parties nor intended to extort some consideration from either of the parties. Respondent thus acted in good faith when she instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to release copies of the Decision to all parties on 2 September 2004, for which respondent should not be administratively charged. Indeed, in the instances where this Honorable Court punished judges for advance release of decisions, the release was to only one party."

This explanation responds to the issues regarding the delay in the promulgation of the Decision dated 17 August 2004.

Respondent Judge Paulite states that she "had the final version of the subject Decision printed in the morning of 17 August 2004, and she immediately signed it" (cf. Annex C, Affidavit of Clerk of Court Edilaida Alcantara). As of 17 August 2004, therefore, the case had been resolved. However, the scheduled promulgation of judgment on 17 August 2004 had to be postponed twice for reasons beyond the control of the respondent Judge. In Annex A of respondent Judge Paulite's Comment, Assistant City Prosecutor Joel Atanacio, the Public Prosecutor assigned to respondent Judge's court, stated under oath that he failed to attend the scheduled hearings on 17 August 2004 and 2 September 2004. This caused the cancellation of all hearings calendared on the material dates, including the promulgation of judgment in Criminal Case No. 108982.

Was such absence of the Public Prosecutor a valid reason for the deferment of promulgation? We find that it served as sufficient ground for the respondent Judge to reset the promulgation and, hence, the eventual promulgation of the judgment on September 7, 2004, or 20 days after the original date set for its promulgation, was not characteristic of gross inefficiency on the part of respondent Judge Paulite.

It should be noted that nowhere under Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is there any mention of the presence or absence of the prosecution. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 120 clearly lays down the rule for promulgation of the judgment in absentia, when the same may proceed even in the absence of either or both the accused and the accused's counsel, without any word regarding the presence or absence of the prosecution. Jurisprudence abounds on the issue of absence of the accused and/or accused's counsel during promulgation of judgment (cf Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 140243, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 197, and related cases), but none directly deals with the question of the necessity of the Public Prosecutor's participation in such promulgation.

In the absence of a specific rule on the matter, therefore, reference must be made to the general rule found in Section 5 of Rule 110 which requires that "(A) 11 criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor." In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Beriales (G.R. No. L-39962, 17 April 1976, 70 SCRA 361), the Supreme Court defined this role of the Trial Fiscal, thus: "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government. As stated by this Court, 'once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary information in court, he is by law duty bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination.' (Salcedo vs. Liwag, L-21068, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 609)." There can be no doubt that the "final termination" of a criminal prosecution referred to is the promulgation of judgment in the case. The presence of the Public Prosecutor during promulgation of judgment is therefore indispensable. This supports the common practice and the policy of trial courts of promulgating their judgments in criminal cases always in the presence of the assigned Public Prosecutor. The soundness of the rule is anchored on the equal opportunity that must be afforded to the State, which has an immutable interest in the prosecution of criminal actions, specially in a case such as Criminal Case No. 108982 which involved a supposed false entry in the Civil Registry. Public interest must at all times be safeguarded in the same manner that the rights of the accused are studiously protected.

Indeed, in this instance, the resetting was apparently at the instance of Assistant City Prosecutor Atanacio who admitted in his supporting Affidavit that on both 17 August 2004 and 2 September 2004, he informed the respondent court that he would be unable to attend the scheduled hearings (Annex A, Comment of Respondent Judge). Given that the Public Prosecutor controls the conduct of the prosecution, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 108982, who is the complainant in this administrative charge, cannot object if proceedings are reset at the request of the Public Prosecutor himself due to the latter's unavailability. At any rate, the record does not disclose that the private complainant objected to such resettings of the promulgation of judgment.

Lastly, we cannot but emphasize that the delay here, if any, was too insubstantial to qualify as "inefficiency," let alone "gross inefficiency," for inefficiency "implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service" (Suroza vs. Hernando, 110 SCRA 388 [1981]). There is no showing that respondent Judge is even remotely guilty of any of the foregoing. The fact that respondent Judge was ready with the judgment within the 30-day period required under the applicable rule negates such charge, because formal promulgation was delayed only for reasons beyond the control of respondent Judge and which are just under the circumstances, as found hereinabove.

Just as significant is the fact that where the Supreme Court has penalized judges for gross inefficiency, the delay was for periods much longer that the 20-day delay here. In Cueva vs. Villanueva (305 SCRA 459 [1999]), it was one hundred days; in Reyes Garmsen vs. Bello (A.M. no. RTJ-04-1877, 21 December 2004), eleven months; one year and six months in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Generoso (249 SCRA 477 [1995]); seven months in Gallego vs. Doronilla (334 SCRA 339[2000]); and, one year and seven months in Asinas, Jr. vs. Trinidad (242 SCRA 716[1995]). Specifically, in Santos v.s Lorenzo )387 SCRA 416 [2002]), a seven month delay was involved, yet the charge was nevertheless dismissed by the Supreme Court which ruled as "well-taken" this Office's recommendation that the charge be dismissed "considering the heavy case load of the courts within the National Capital Judicial Region. More so, there is nothing on record that will show the delay was done maliciously or was caused with deliberate intent to inflict damage."

As for the supposed release of the advance copies of the decision, respondent Judge Paulite sufficiently established that such release on 2 September 2004 was not of "advance" copies of the Decision as the same was, by 17 August 2004, already signed and in the hands of the Clerk of Court, and the release was made simultaneously to all parties, not to one party alone, as evidence (sic) by the record, in particular, the acknowledgement receipt signed by all parties on page 6 of the original copy of the Decision.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross inefficiency by reason of any delay in the promulgation of the judgment in Criminal Case no. 108982.

As to the premature release of copies of the decision, same should not have been done by respondent judge. The fact that all the parties were furnished copies thereof is not the issue. What is in issue is the release of the copies of the decision prior to its promulgation. Rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. [1] cralaw Prior thereto, said judgment may still be amended or changed by the judge. [2] cralaw Inasmuch as said judgment can still be amended or changed, it is only proper for respondent judge to have waited for its promulgation before sending out copies thereof in order to avoid any anomalous consequences that may arise on account of its early release. In one case, [3] cralaw the Supreme Court admonished a judge who prematurely released a decision prior to its promulgation.

We agree in the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator, save the premature release of the subject decision for which this Court ADMONISHES Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., G.R. No. L-42428, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 51.

[2] cralaw Comia v. Icolas, G.R. No. L-26079, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 492.

[3] cralaw A.M. No. RTJ-94-1144, Resolution dated February 24, 1999 entitled Reynaldo De Vera v. Judge Sancho Dames II.


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